The Nation. June 9, 1979 $1

A Special Issue

INTERVENTION

in·ter·ven·tion. n. interposition or interference of one state in the affairs of another

Under What Conditions, if any, Is Military (or Other) Intervention ever Justified? A Series of Articles on the Historical, International, Political, Diplomatic, Military, Strategic and Moral Ramifications of that Question by

William Appleman Williams * Walter LaFeber * Richard Falk
Fouad Ajami * Morton H. Halperin * Michael T. Klare
Norman Birnbaum * James H. Mittelman * Irene Gendzier
Penny Lernoux * Gareth Porter.

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LETTERS.

AH, *THE DEER HUNTER*

Nogales, Ariz.
As a contributor from Vietnam to *The Nation*, I want to endorse Gloria Emerson's article, "Oscars for Our Sins" [*The Nation*, May 12]. At a recent forum in Minnesota of writers and politicians involved in the war, it was clear that the myths to justify our interference in the Vietnamese civil war still flourish. Emerson's voice will remain a lonely one, films like *The Deer Hunter* will continue to clean up for Hollywood, and our military with its increased budget will—sad, sad, sad—gear up for another disaster. Ah, America. Ah, humanity. *William Eastlake*

EDITORIAL ZINGER

Washington
Your editorial, "Cornering History" [*The Nation*, May 5], is a zinger. It pierced right through all the obfuscation regarding the treatment of official documents as private property and faced up to fundamental realities that the communications media have sloughed off out of ignorance or shortsightedness. *M.B. Schnapper*
Editor
Public Affairs Press

NO WAIVED RIGHT

New York City
As Peter Singer sees it ["Forswearing Secrecy," *The Nation*, May 5], only a claim that the end justifies the means may properly be invoked by former C.I.A. agents who publish information about the C.I.A. in disregard of the secrecy agreements the agency required them to sign as a condition of employment. Singer dismisses arguments about the right to know by telling us "that in a democracy the people are able to waive that right" and that they should be presumed to have done so because they elected public officials who favor secrecy.

This is balderdash. The "people" do not have the right to waive any rights for anyone other than themselves individually. Electing public officials who oppose the right to counsel, or the right to speak, or the right to know does not—in a democracy—waive my right to any of those things. That much, at any rate, is explicit in the Bill of Rights which begins with the words: "Congress shall make no law. . . ."

I have a right to know what the C.I.A. is doing even if 99.9 percent of the people don't want to know and don't want me to know. Marchetti, Agee, Stockwell and Snepp make it possible for me to exercise my right. As for their rights, if they have violated their terms of employment they should be subject to the ordinary penalties—dismissal, refusal to rehire and bad references—but the Government has no business denying me my right to know about the C.I.A. *Aryeh Neier*

ANTI-INTELLECTUAL STRAIN

Athens, Ga.
Over a century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville noted a strong anti-intellectual strain in United States society. This strain was characterized by prejudice and in many examples, outright hostility. The reception given your astute articles on nuclear power by Meldon Belknap ["Letters," *The Nation*, May 5] serves as an illustration for the persistence of this general hostility.

The past decade in American history can only carry the label of trauma. Over the past generation, the concept of "conspiracy" has permeated our society. . . . Mr. Belknap proposes "constant surveillance" of all scientists. Aside from the general repugnance such a phrase should provoke in any concerned individual, one should also inquire on the validity of the terms employed by Mr. Belknap for his category of "scientist."

From a historical perspective, the warnings on the complexities and dangers of nuclear power emerged from "true" scientists themselves. Men such as Einstein, Bohr, Oppenheimer, Bronowski and the great humanitarian (as well as scientist) Leo Szilard, warned society of the dangers in the transposition of science with technology. It is not science, nor scientists, who require surveillance. It is the technocracy that requires surveillance. Knowledge is never an evil; the misuse of knowledge always is. If there was a crime, or any criminals, in the Three Mile Island affair guilt falls not on the idea but on its abuse. *Diego Rivero*
Department of History
University of Georgia

CON CON

Cambridge, Mass.
I agree with much of what Bertram Gross says about the campaign to call a constitutional convention to propose a balanced-budget amendment ["Unbalancing the Constitution," *The Nation*, April 28]. I made a number of the same points myself in a similarly titled article published the previous month, "Balancing the Federal Budget . . . or Unbalancing the Constitution?," *The Boston Globe*, March 2. But I fear that Mr. Gross underestimates the singular dangers posed by the balanced-budget amendment campaign, for he seems to consider anything short of total repudiation of fiscal austerity worthless.

Both a single-issue convention and a balanced-budget amendment should be resisted—whether or not one favors fiscal austerity. The current debate *is* "over fiscal technique, not fiscal policy substance." If a convention were held, constitutional chaos would be more likely to ensue than would a reordering of fiscal priorities. And if a balanced-budget amendment were ratified—and a particular fiscal approach thereby frozen into the Constitution—little constructive debate over fiscal policy substance would be possible. Thus it is wrong to deride those who oppose a balanced-budget amendment whenever they do not also attack fiscal austerity.

Beyond that, Mr. Gross is mistaken in supposing that I, or others who have declined to oppose fiscal austerity as such, all nonetheless favor "increased spending for military and corporate handouts." At least for me, reductions in Federal spending that burden the poor while leaving intact a bloated military budget and a system of corporate subsidy are utterly unacceptable.
Laurence H. Tribe
Professor of Law
Harvard University

New York City
It is unfortunate that in his January memorandum to the White House, Professor Tribe failed to indicate that the tripe of "fiscal austerity" is now being used by those who promote, or feast on, what he now properly calls "a bloated military budget and a system of corporate subsidy." Far from being worthless, this kind of false austerity, which I join him in repudiating, is worth billions to Government-coddled centimillionaires. If he continues to write and advise on budget balancing, I hope that Professor Tribe will expand on this crucial issue of fiscal policy substance—even at the risk of becoming *persona non grata* among the White House courtiers. *Bertram M. Gross*

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EDITORIALS.

The Issue Is Intervention

Throughout the entire 114 years of *The Nation*'s existence, the question of intervention, whether military, economic, colonialist or cultural, has repeatedly risen in the affairs of nations. We have, in tune with other critical voices in this society, sounded the tocsin of protest against the most egregious American adventures abroad, overt and secret. We have directed similar criticism at aggrandizement by other nations, whether Hitlerian putsches or Soviet tanks crushing freedom in Czechoslovakia. By the same token, there have also been cases of what William Appleman Williams in his Introduction calls reluctant intervention that we supported because the fundamental values we hold were at stake.

The cries for this ultimate exercise in national sovereignty continue to resound. Now, as always, a welter of voices sets off a confusing din. As the lessons of our Vietnam debacle fade into the mists of Technicolor Hollywood nostalgia, a new rank of interventionists steps forward, hatching, in the wake of the fall of the Shah of Iran, new schemes for "quick-strike forces" to insure our oil supply. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy in the Carter Administration warn that if the oil-producing nations massively employ the "oil weapon," they will suffer American military retaliation. Among the ranks of the neo-hawks and cold warriors in Congress, a new mood of jingoism has broken out.

Yet on the other side of the aisle the option is also raised. Senator George McGovern, for example, once suggested that international force be used to unseat the cruel regime of Pol Pot in Cambodia. Subsequently, Vietnam stepped in for its own reasons and accomplished this—and in turn was invaded by China, the anti-hegemonist. In Uganda, the role of Tanzania in overthrowing the tyrant Idi Amin was well received in the international community. Soviet advisers are now in the Horn of Africa, and newly independent Angola has been host to both Cuban troops and an abortive intervention by South Africa and the C.I.A.

As we have pondered these situations in today's world—in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Yemen, Rhodesia, South Africa, the mid-Asian arc and elsewhere—the larger question rose: under what conditions is military intervention (as well as economic and other nonmilitary forms of intervention) in the affairs of other nations justified? Having raised the question, we became aware of how little systematic thinking has been brought to bear on this critical issue. It was out of such concerns that the idea for the present Conference on the Question of Intervention grew. Now, under the joint sponsorship of the The Nation Institute and the Columbia University School of International Affairs, the conference has become a reality, and its scholarly fruits are contained in this special issue of *The Nation*, which will serve as a working document for the conference. The full program follows.

"THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION"

A conference jointly sponsored by The Nation Institute and the Columbia University School of International Affairs, to be held on Saturday, June 9, at the Kellogg Conference Center, 118th Street and Amsterdam Avenue, Columbia University, New York City. Seventy-five scholars, area experts, journalists, commentators, government officials and concerned specialists have accepted our invitation to participate in the deliberations.

Conference Coordinator: Harriet Cornell
Assistant Coordinator: Barbara Bedway
(212) 242-8400

The conference was funded by a grant from the J.M. Kaplan Fund, to which we express our gratitude.

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

8:15-8:45
Registration and coffee

8:45-9:00
Welcome by Hamilton Fish, Publisher of *The Nation*.

9:00-9:15
THE HISTORY OF INTERVENTIONARY DIPLOMACY

Speaker: Walter LaFeber, Noll Professor of History, Cornell University

9:15-10:45
Panel I: INTERVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Moderator: Aryeh Neier, Editorial Board of *The Nation*

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Papers:
"The Growing Prospect of American Intervention in the Third World" by Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University
"Intervention in Southern Africa: From Rhodes to Carter" by James H. Mittelman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Institute of African Studies at Columbia University
"The Post-Colonial State: Between Outside Intervention and Self-Inflicted Wounds" by Fouad Ajami, Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University

Commentators:
Frank Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Michael Reisman, Professor of International Law, Yale University Law School
Julian Bond, Georgia State Senator and member of the Board of Directors for the African-American Institute

10:45-11:00
INTERMISSION

11:00-12:30
Panel II: INSTRUMENTALITIES OF INTERVENTION: THE COLD WAR

Moderator: Blair Clark, Contributing Editor of *The Nation*

Papers:
"Intervention in Europe and the Paradoxes of World Politics" by Norman Birnbaum, Professor of Sociology, Amherst College
"The Power Projection Gap: Comparing U.S. and Soviet Long-Range Intervention Capabilities" by Michael T. Klare, Director of the Militarism and Disarmament Project, Institute for Policy Studies

Commentators:
Marcus Raskin, Senior Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies
Martin Sherwin, Visiting Professor in the Department of History, University of Pennsylvania
Jenonne Walker, member of the Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State
Stephen Kaplan, Professional Staff, Brookings Institution

12:30-1:30
Informal Buffet Lunch, Kellogg Conference Center

1:30-3:00
Panel III: INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Moderator: Frances FitzGerald, Editorial Board of *The Nation*

Paper:
"Intervention and the Different Aspects of the National Interest" by Irene Gendzier, Professor of History and Associate of the African Studies Center, Boston University

Commentators:
Eqbal Ahmad, Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies specializing in international relations and Third World development
Laurence Stern, Assistant Managing Editor for National News, *The Washington Post*
Mansour Farhang, Associate Professor of Government, State University of California
Morris B. Abram, Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Sidney Morgenbesser, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

3:00-3:15
AFTERNOON INTERMISSION

3:15-4:45
Panel IV: MILITARY INTERVENTION: IS IT EVER JUSTIFIED?

Moderator: Victor Navasky, Editor of *The Nation*

Papers:
"American Military Intervention: Is It Ever Justified?" by Morton H. Halperin, Director, Center for National Security Studies and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
"Intervention in Latin America" by Penny Lernoux, prize-winning journalist who has lived in Latin America since 1962, and Latin American correspondent for *The Nation*
"Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia" by Gareth Porter, Congressional foreign policy adviser

Commentators:
Elizabeth Becker, Reporter for *The Washington Post*; currently a Fellow at the Center for International Policy
James Chace, Managing Editor, *Foreign Affairs*
Diane La Voy, Staff member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

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INTRODUCTION

Understanding Intervention

Intervention has become a vague term, subject to many definitions and connotations (and related judgments). Let us begin by agreeing on a definition: intervention is the knowing and willful intrusion by one nation into the affairs of another country with the purpose of changing its policies and even culture. Next, we shall investigate in more depth the two basic kinds of willful intervention, and discuss the means or methods employed.

Inherent Interventionism

One kind of intervention is inherent in the political economy and the culture. There are several examples of this phenomenon, but since we are here concerned with the United States, let us concentrate on the Western *Weltanschauung* that evolved during the era generally known as the Age of Discovery and Exploration. Though popularly associated with Columbus, that epoch was in truth initiated by Prince Henry the Navigator and his Portuguese successors. Their outlook and routine behavior set the pattern for five centuries of sustained Western intervention into the lives and affairs of every other society and culture in the world.

It is important to understand that such an approach was not inherent in human nature. Consider, for example, the situation at the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century when the Portuguese finally inched their way around the Cape of Good Hope (what an irony!) and on northeastward into the Indian Ocean. By that time the Arabs had been there—and on eastward—for several centuries. And the Chinese had come and gone. Now, to the degree that uninvited presence is intervention per se (the cultural party-crasher, as it were), then the Arabs and the Chinese were interventionists. Thus, at first glance, no different from the Portuguese.

But the Arabs, while launching more sophisticated ships and hoisting more subtle sails, and while establishing trading centers that returned marvelous profits, did not seek to impose their way of life upon the Indians, Malays and Chinese. The Chinese were even more impressive. They sent seven fleets westward to the Middle East and Africa. Some of them carried upward of 37,000 people in ships measuring 400 feet from stem to stern. They came, traded esoteric items for oddities such as giraffes, and went home to break up and burn their awesome fleets.

It all reminds one more than a bit of the Japanese. They were fierce (and worse) warriors in defense of their homeland, but revealed no urge or necessity to intrude upon other cultures. They honored a different axiom: to go abroad to find one's purpose is to lose one's identity.

There is no way out of it: it was the nascent capitalism of the West that insisted of necessity upon intervening in a regular, routine and institutional way into the viscera of every other culture in the world. The Portuguese initiated and carried through one of the bloodiest campaigns of conquest known to history. Then came the Spanish, the French and the British.

Consider only the example of Capt. James Cook. Cook was an exceptional seaman, an awesome navigator, and an unusually perceptive and generally peaceful human being. He often spoke his respect for the peoples of the Pacific. Yet he knew in his belly that he represented the cutting edge of a systematic intervention into their cultures that would never rest until it had carved their integrated way of life into various divisions of labor in the capitalistic marketplace. Appropriately, if tragically, he died in an intervention to retrieve a minor piece of property.

Cook symbolized the inability of the Western world to encounter and deal with other cultures without intervening to change their values, institutions and way of life. We all know the story. Spain in Central and South America. France and Britain in North America. And then all those, along with the latecomers (such as Germany, Russia and Italy), in Africa and Asia. Then the United States: the revolution for freedom, liberty and democracy leading on to global intervention as a matter of necessity and principle.

Here we have a classic example of intervention as inherent in the political economy and the culture. Given the focus of this discussion, I do not think that it is of first importance to debate the priorities to be assigned to economic or ideological factors in explaining the American record of persistent intervention into the life of other societies. Surely we can all agree that the dynamics of capitalism, in the theory of Adam Smith as well as in the practice of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, generate continuous intervention. But so do the religious and secular urges to reform and save the benighted of the world. Hence we are dealing with the dynamic interaction of these factors: (*1*) the capitalistic necessity to expand the marketplace; (*2*) the necessity of Christians to save sinners, and (*3*) the necessity of secular reformers to transform the world.

The theory of Western democratic capitalism (most strikingly formulated in the United States) comes down to a very simple proposition: it is impossible to have democracy without surplus resources and surplus social space. Call it the frontier thesis or whatever you choose: democracy is dependent upon having more than is needed. Thus, intervention to acquire more than is needed becomes a way of life.

Think only of Thomas Jefferson, that apostle of yeomen's democracy who defined America as the "world's best hope":

> The day is within my time as well as yours, when we

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may say by what laws other nations shall treat us upon the sea. And we shall say it. (1801)

If the English do not give us the satisfaction we demand, we will take Canada, which wants to enter the Union; and when, together with Canada, we shall have the Floridas, we shall no longer have any difficulties with our neighbors; and it is the only way of preventing them. (War of 1812)

Reluctant Interventionism

The second kind of intervention is defined by a deeply reluctant acceptance of the occasional need to protect the integrity of one's culture from external assault. Those who seek to avoid defining themselves as inherently interventionist face these troublesome questions: How do you realize your values short of empire? How do you defend your right to be nonimperial without becoming imperial?

I suggest that there are three interrelated answers: (*1*) you accept the truth that the definition of democracy as having more than you need is inherently destructive of democracy; therefore, (*2*) you come to terms with, and accept, the truth that democracy is defined by sharing what can be created and exchanged without any imperial intrusion into other societies, and hence (*3*) you intervene only to preserve your right to define democracy as a nonimperial system of self-government. That is a very demanding task. But it has been done. And there have been many Americans who have recognized the possibility and tried to realize it in policy and culture.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Americans who accepted the inherent necessity of institutionalized intervention were generally called expansionists or imperialists. In a process that began during the Progressive Era, that blunt language was gradually replaced by several euphemisms such as internationalism, exercising world leadership, saving the world for democracy or for the Four Freedoms, and containing Communism. The critics of such policies came during those same years to be damned and dismissed as isolationists (whose commitment to freedom, democracy and material well-being was often questioned). That process can be observed today in the mounting campaign to demean and render ineffective those who talk about the lessons of Vietnam and agitate against similar interventions in the present and future.

Given either conception of intervention, there are five primary methods of intervention: economic, political, intellectual, cultural and military. Those who advocate restraint in intervention can and have used each of those methods, and various combinations thereof, but those who favor institutionalized intervention as a necessary part of our way of life regularly employ all such means in an interrelated (and sometimes sophisticated) mix.

Once one accepts—consciously or passively—the assumption that the expansion of the marketplace is essential to liberty, democracy and the good life, then intervention as a way of life becomes part of empire as a way of life. Covert and overt become two sides of the same coin. Different strokes for different folks: an international takeover bid, branch factories, bribes for contracts, or a Government loan or grant; a state visit, monies in secret to the preferred party in a foreign election, or the refusal to make a grant or loan; programs designed to reorient another culture to the capitalist ethic, special favors to foreign intellectuals of the proper persuasion, or secret monies to newspapers and magazines that propagate the correct ideology; arms to friends, shows of force, or open military intrusion.

If it is to go beyond the description and analysis of case histories, a symposium on intervention must confront the question of moving America away from intervention as a way of life toward the position of those who advocate intervention as a last—and restrained—resort. This is an extremely difficult task because it involves changing the way Americans perceive the essentials of freedom, democracy and well-being. It is a situation fraught with great danger because one can easily imagine Americans embracing the essentials of fascism to save democracy.

All the more reason that it must be addressed directly and candidly. And we must face the possibility that it may not be possible to undo empire as a way of life in time to prevent disaster. If not, then we as a culture will go out with the whine of the spoiled child who is finally told it cannot have a third ice cream cone.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS

William Appleman Williams teaches in the department of history at Oregon State University. He is president elect of the Organization of American Historians and is the author of the forthcoming Empire as a Way of Life.

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ARTICLES.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION THROUGH HISTORY

Empire Begins At Home

WALTER LAFEBER

A cult of personality has shaped American historical writing ("if Roosevelt had only lived. . ."), political conversations and best-seller lists. It is well to recall, therefore, that certain major forces have been common in the American experience regardless of who held power, and that structure has determined foreign policy choices. Since its birth, for example, the United States has been an interventionist power. At the same moment in 1775 that the Founding Fathers edged toward the treasonous discussions about independence, they ordered a ragtag army to march north and conquer Canada.

Intervention may be defined as the interference of one state in another state's affairs for the purpose of forcing the latter to act according to certain wishes of the former. Using that perspective, American history can be viewed not only through the prisms of the vanishing frontier, evolving democracy and immense resources that created "a people of plenty" but through a persistent policy of interference that has shaped the lives of other peoples. From their beginnings, Americans sought both independence and a security that could be gained only through acquiring what the Founders called "empire." That process has employed various means, but it has been unrelenting as the United States intervened in a continental, then global, arena.

Recent interventionist policies, particularly those developed since the early 1970s, are new in degree but not in kind. They utilize military, cultural and especially economic, powers that have deep historical roots. The most striking insight into the present is provided by American diplomacy in the 1920s, but the roots go deeper.

Walter LaFeber, Noll Professor of history at Cornell University, is the author of The New Empire *(Cornell University Press) and* America, Russia and the Cold War *(John Wiley).*

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, U.S. diplomacy rested on the premise that the nation's future security depended on limiting the security of others. Between 1803 and the Civil War, the United States used various tactics to acquire its continental territory. It supplied an anti-French revolution in Santo Domingo, whose success compelled Napoleon to sell Louisiana; fomented in Spanish East Florida a revolution whose smooth operation would have made the C.I.A. envious and which led to American annexation of the territory; invaded militarily the remainder of Spanish Florida, then used the invasion as leverage to force Spain to sell the rest of its continental claims to the United States, and declared war against Mexico in 1846 in order to seize one-third of that nation for the use of American merchants and farmers.

Across the Pacific, meanwhile, U.S. officials, missionaries and businessmen cooperated with the British and French empires in opening China to Western prayers and products. Historians have generously labeled Washington's approach as "jackal diplomacy," but the victim was not dead and this jackal often attacked before the larger animals arrived. The Chinese, at least, made no distinction among the predators. Anti-foreign rebellions targeted Americans as well as Europeans. After President William McKinley landed troops in Peking to protect Americans—and also preserve their Chinese markets against Russian and German threats—China declared war against the United States. Back home, troops completed a 300-year effort to contain and/or eradicate the Native American population. The justifications—that is, the white desire for resources and a racism encapsulated in Theodore Roosevelt's remark that Indians were only "a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, and ferocious than . . . wild beasts"—were then applied between 1893 and 1903 to Hawaiians, Spaniards and Filipinos who tried to stop the United States from seizing hegemony in the Caribbean and naval bases in the Pacific.

This record is outlined not to demonstrate that American interventionism has been any more bloody or morally reprehensible than the acts of other imperial powers. It does demonstrate that twentieth-century United States power emerged out of 300 years of constant intervention in the affairs of other peoples; that the interventionism occurred on a number of levels—covert, military, missionary and economic, and that when either Woodrow Wilson or Jimmy Carter declared war against sin, their own nation's historical record indicated that the war would be an uphill fight.

In the National Interest

Most important, Americans intervened because they believed their national interest, at times their existence, was at stake. John Kennedy once remarked that since American development before 1900 was easy and relatively painless, we should be tolerant of newly emerging nations who fight for survival in a more difficult world. His advice was good, but his history questionable, notwithstanding that Kennedy followed research findings of distinguished historians who have argued that the United States indeed reached maturity rather easily through an era of "free security." When, however, Presidents moved forces into Louisiana, Florida, Texas or northern Mexico, they did so partly from fears of foreign invasion into the United States or the establishment of a great power such as England on another American boundary. Throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, officials, merchants and farmers constantly argued that unless they found new lands and resources, the political system would collapse. Southerners believed that to such an extent that they tried to form their own expanding empire in 1861 after the Republicans threatened to contain them (and prevent pro-slavery intervention in the Caribbean and Central America).

Throughout their history, Americans have intervened not simply out of perverseness, misperception, misplaced values or the false belief—whose falsity does not make it less beloved by experts on international affairs—that "political vacuums" always entice "great powers." (Even as a minor power the United States intervened in areas, such as Canada and the Caribbean, that were not political vacuums.) Americans interfered in the affairs of other peoples

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because they saw their national (and individual) interests in jeopardy. The era between 1750 and 1900 saw little free security, but a great deal of intervention to seize resources and territory in the hope that some security could be found. That hope has persistently diminished. In 1760 Benjamin Franklin argued that England's intervention in Canada would assure colonial allegiance and security; in 1846 President James Polk argued that intervening in Mexico would assure the security of Americans in all sections of the country; in 1898 the McKinley Administration argued that intervening in the Philippine revolution would help secure U.S. interests in Asia, and since 1945 many have argued that creating a strike force that could effectively intervene anywhere—including Southeast Asia and the Middle East—is necessary for American security. But as Reinhold Niebuhr observed nearly thirty years ago, the irony of American history is that as our power has grown to a degree infinitely greater than it was in the time of Franklin or McKinley, our security is infinitely less.

The motivations for, and the instruments of, American intervention during the twentieth century, therefore, are present throughout much of our history. The degree of the power and the areas in which it has been employed since 1900, however, are new. That twentieth-century history can be surveyed by dividing it into four eras.

The Four Eras

The first, lasting through World War I, was marked by military intervention in the surrounding neighborhood. Justified by Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine that the United States could act as a policeman who insured peace and the containment of revolution in much of Latin America, American troops marched into Cuba, Panama, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, Haiti and Mexico. In one sense, the use of soldiers in Europe during 1917-18 was an aberration, given traditional American military abstention from the Continent. In another respect, however, Wilson's deployment of force in France—and especially in Russia when he tried simultaneously to reopen the Eastern Front and undermine the Soviet regime—developed naturally out of the experience in Latin America. (Latin America has often been used as the laboratory in which U.S. policies have been tested and developed before they have been applied globally.) According to such early "realists" as Roosevelt, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Lewis Einstein, wisely used military force made the wheels of evolution and Western civilization go 'round. Wilson extended that belief to conclude that U.S. intervention in 1917 would also propel him into the peace discussions that would reconstruct a shattered Europe. At Versailles, however, Wilson learned the limits of American influence. The Senate rejected his compromises, and the more perceptive officials searched for better methods of exerting United States power.

The second period—1920 until the outbreak of World War II—became known for a time as the New Era. It was new not because the United States quit using force in Latin America but because of the paramount economic power the nation built through loans and trade arrangements with the declining European powers. Washington officials used this weapon to preserve business opportunities throughout the world, including the revolutionary areas of Russia, Mexico and China. As *The Atlantic Monthly* preached in 1928, "The work that religion, government, and war have failed in must be done by business." American self-interest was again the motivation: "The prosperity of the United States largely depends upon the economic settlements which may be made in Europe," Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes declared in 1921. With that insight, Hughes and other officials used American economic dominance to force England to the gold standard, pressure France to accept German reconstruction, seduce the Russians back to an acceptance of capitalistic investments and maneuver the Japanese and Western Europeans into accepting naval disarmament plans.

By 1929, Republicans congratulated themselves for building with economic intervention what Wilson and the Europeans had almost destroyed with force. They also applauded themselves for another reason: reconstruction had been accomplished through the private banking sector, and particularly the great central banks, which did not have to be overly sensitive to the vagaries of democratic politics. To rephrase the thought, the bankers worked outside the control of Congress, the American people, and—at critical moments—the Executive itself. This occurred largely by design. The Senate's action in 1919-20, the doubts cast on the usefulness of public



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opinion by Walter Lippmann and others, a new Foreign Service corps that was as ideologically prejudiced as it was elitist, and the just-established Council on Foreign Relations—all combined to assure that the global economic interventionism of the New Era was as insulated as possible from the scrutiny of democratic processes.

This system began to self-destruct in 1929, but by 1939 it re-emerged transformed. Such New Deal measures as the Export-Import Bank, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program and direct deals between the Administration and a besieged China brought the Government in line with the New Era's system without changing either the motives or objectives of that system. Resembling officials of the 1920s, leading New Dealers believed that economic intervention, not military, could save the situation. That situation, however, was already critically ill because of such economic intervention. The Soviet Union, then Japan, then Germany declared themselves independent of the dollar. With more subtlety, England and France also declared their independence. The New Era-New Deal interventionism finally failed because American officials and businessmen alike confused the supposed values of an international marketplace with international stability. As a result, the Congress that had been bypassed (sometimes willingly) by bankers and bureaucrats found itself voting for war measures in 1938-39.

World War II to Vietnam

During the third period, lasting roughly from 1939 until the early 1970s, American leaders reacted to the supposed historical lessons of the New Era by stressing that superior armed force had to be combined with the nation's incomparable economic power to create postwar order and contain Soviet expansion. Harry Truman observed that the military commitment of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan's economic commitment were "two halves of the same walnut."

The military soon became much the greater half of American foreign policy. Between 1945 and the 1970s, the United States carried out an average of one major military intervention each eighteen months. By another count, it used armed force or the threat of it 215 times between 1945 and 1975. American officials justified this in the name of a "realism" that was based historically on the experience of a European balance of power that had seldom worked, and that assumed the possibility of managing armed force in a rational, limited fashion. Realist interventionism included the use of covert activities (as in Iran and Guatemala), and economic influence (as in multinational lending agencies) that Theodore Roosevelt's generation had not been able to employ on such a scale. But in important respects, post-1945 interventions were only T.R.'s and Wilson's interventionism extended globally. Both justified using force in the name of a higher, Western morality that became not a restraint but a rationalization for moving as far as your power allowed (for example, Roosevelt and Mahan earlier and John Foster Dulles later). Both used similar devices to blunt controls on their acts by Congress and democratic procedures (T.R.'s executive agreements earlier, the imperial Presidency later). Both argued that the interventionism was defensive and not offensive (Roosevelt's and Wilson's "policeman" earlier, "containment" later). And both generations believed that through pragmatism and elite leadership they could fine-tune and closely control power. Interventionism, however, developed its own momentum. As a Defense Department official warned during an early debate over whether United States intervention in Vietnam could be limited, "One cannot go over Niagara Falls in a barrel only slightly."

The failures of Vietnam policy, a declining dollar and the criminal acts of an imperial Presidency brought the third period to an end in the early 1970s. The importance of this era is not that it ended in tragedy but that it is an aberration in American history. While sharing common traits with the 1900-to-1920 years, the post-1945 era was also marked by the American attempt to use military power to reshape global affairs, not merely those in the Caribbean and Western Europe. By the mid-1950s a resurgent Europe and Third World were already fighting that attempt, and by the mid-1970s, Americans encountered a new cold war—one in which they could no longer control the decentralizing forces that had first appeared two decades earlier.

The danger is that whether they are debating alternatives for their military budgets, SALT II, or energy sources, Americans who matured between 1945 and 1970 will assume the era was a norm rather than an aberration. The danger is less one of a Munich syndrome or, for younger generations, a Vietnam syndrome, than that an American-Century syndrome which developed after World War II will shape future policy debates.

A New New Era

The United States entered a fourth period in the 1970s that is resembling the New Era of the 1920s rather than the earlier and later years of military realism. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger tried to adjust to the realities by transforming the instruments of intervention from overt military weapons to the weapons of massive arms sales, C.I.A. activities, and trade. The Carter Administration has preserved these tools and has added human rights. The question about such a use of human rights is not whether individual rights should be preserved but whether they are best preserved through public crusades, and whether such crusades are only a more acceptable form of intervention. As a State Department official recently testified, the United States has opposed forty-eight loans from international financial bodies to fifteen countries that violate human rights, and has told other nations that if they brought up loan projects we would oppose them. Given American power in these agencies, such a position usually dooms the projects.

Some Americans continue to use the rhetoric of 1945 to 1970, especially as Presidential primaries approach. George Bush, who advertises himself as a Republican moderate, has said that Carter should have intervened to save the Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi: "It is not intervention in another country's affairs for the United States to support friendly governments facing revolution. That's not meddling, that's supporting." Bush's approach, however, is less characteristic of American policy in the post-1973 years than Kissinger and Carter's quieter use of dollars, American markets, arms aid and U.S. technology to maintain some control over both Allies and the détente process with Russia and China. The means are changing but the objectives remain the same. Those objectives are reminiscent of Charlie Chaplin's advice when a fellow actor asked him how to play the next scene: "Behind me and a little to the right."

The Kissinger-Carter approach attempts to retool the diplomacy of the 1920s. The analogy is especially striking since the 1970s, resembling the 1920-29 era all too closely, has also witnessed the development of private banking power to a point where it may be beyond the control of the major capitalist governments. Since 1973, these

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banks have handled the recycling of OPEC balances, and in the process—in the words of a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report—"effectively make the crucial decisions regarding access to liquidity and the financing of payments imbalances" for a host of less-developed nations. And again as in the 1920s, these decisions are made outside the public's view. As Robert Keohane remarked, "the unstated premise" in this new economic policy is "that democratic politics must adjust to capitalist economics, rather than vice versa."

Such readjustment could continue even after defaults by a number of countries create a banking crisis that once again requires massive governmental intervention to preserve the order needed by a modified state capitalism. The question will not be whether the state should intervene at home and overseas—the New Deal settled that on both counts. Nor will it be whether the state should intervene at all; nothing in their past, or in a future that holds shortages of raw materials and energy, indicates that Americans will be reluctant to intervene forcefully in other nations' affairs.

The most interesting question is by which process will such interventions be determined. Who will decide the tactical issues and who, if anyone, will be able to hold the decision makers responsible? For although the first three eras of twentieth-century interventionism differed in some respects, they shared three common characteristics: the interventions were undertaken on the assumptions that they were required by tangible American interests and could be controlled; they ultimately got out of control and created crises both at home and abroad, and a struggle then ensued to make future interventions more politically responsible and accountable. Those struggles, from the democratic perspective, were never very successful. In preparing for the next one it should be remembered that American intervention abroad has both begun and ended at home. In history as in architecture, after all, structures are studied so persons can change them. □

THE PROSPECTS OF INTERVENTION

Exporting Counterrevolution

RICHARD FALK

My thesis is simple: a new consensus among American political leaders favors intervention, whenever necessary, to protect the resource base of Trilateralist nations'—Europe, the United States and Japan—prosperity and dominance. The only unresolved questions are tactical. Where? When? How? The immediate focus is upon the Persian Gulf region where the tides of anti-Western nationalism have been running so strongly in recent years. This interventionist mood, which has been little noticed so far, represents a dangerous, probably futile, attempt to offset Western political and economic decline by reliance on American military force. In a fundamental sense this renewed resistance to Third World nationalism revives the Western struggle to preserve colonialism.

The stakes seem frighteningly high. On the one hand, First World capitalism has a desperate need for energy resources. On the other, there is considerable danger that the Soviet Union would interpose its military capabilities to deter American intervention and touch off a nuclear war. What looms ahead is a severe test of American composure, statesmanship and overall energy policy. Nothing on the domestic scene is reassuring about the capacity of our current or prospective political leadership to perform well under this kind of pressure. In effect, the real lessons of Vietnam remain unlearned.

Since Vietnam, American foreign policy has been struggling to overcome a central tension between contradictory developments: (*1*) discrediting of military intervention as an effective and politically acceptable way to promote vital interests; (*2*) the inability to arrest the economic and geopolitical decline of U.S. power on the world scene without exerting control over the internal politics of foreign societies.

Various official attempts at reconciliation have not met with great success. In the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford period, the effort at reconciliation took the following principal forms: the Nixon Doctrine, aimed at supplying arms and training for friendly governments sufficient to meet their internal threats without requiring direct involvement by American troops; the formation of "special relationships" with regional subimperial powers so that military intervention could be delegated to junior partners; moves toward détente with the Soviet Union and normalization with China to increase managerial capabilities, as well as to reinforce the geopolitical status quo; defusing the Arab-Israeli conflict while giving leading OPEC members a stake in the dominant international economic order.

Trilateralist Focus

Foreign policy in the Carter period has continued along similar lines. The pre-election promise of a Trilateralist focus on West-West collaboration has not materialized, nor has the promise to engender moral enthusiasm for American foreign policy by emphasizing the promotion of human rights, the control of arms sales and the move toward meaningful reductions in the defense budget. In each area strong initial rhetoric encountered even stronger practical obstacles and the promised policy shift was quietly abandoned. Even such a symbolic move as removing most American troops from South Korea has been shelved. The much-heralded Panama Canal treaties and the forthcoming SALT II agreements are such meager achievements that not even much symbolic content remains. Efforts to stabilize friendly repressive regimes have been increasingly channeled by American foreign policy makers through international financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund. Even in Nicaragua such an unacceptable regime as that of the Somoza dictatorship is being helped by the I.M.F., with American approval, to meet its payments on $350 million worth of loans to foreign banks, thereby providing economic relief at a time of massive political discontent and struggle. (See Cynthia Brown, "Bottom Line on Somocismo," *The Nation*, April 28.) In Zaire the I.M.F. has taken a degree of control over the economy that is virtually equivalent to what existed in the

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colonial period; Western planners of the I.M.F. operation have even indicated a willingness to change leaders if an alternative to Mobutu existed.

Another dimension of imperial policy is to encourage allies in the advanced capitalist countries to be more active in interventionist roles. How many Americans realize that France has troops in more African countries than does Cuba? This kind of invisible reliance on the military power of the former colonial power to keep order is part of the effort to delegate subimperial roles to advanced industrial countries such as France and Japan in regions of special concern.

The goals of American foreign policy in Third World countries have not changed in the period since World War II. What happened was that the Vietnam defeat temporarily discredited American military intervention. Also, the revulsion of Watergate led to a complementary reaction against the sort of covert interventionist role played by the C.I.A. in Chile while Allende was in power. Given the persistence of imperial goals, the discrediting of these central techniques of intervention has led to a frantic search for effective substitutes. The geopolitical trend seems adverse to American counterrevolutionary goals. First in Mozambique and Angola, later in Ethiopia, and finally in Afghanistan, internal policies have taken an anti-Western turn. Hence, a crisis for American public opinion and leadership is emerging in relation to Third World intervention: either revise the means or renounce the goals. Revising the means implies a return to a pre-Vietnam willingness to engage in military intervention, although with altered logistical conceptions. Renouncing the goals is almost utopian; it would involve redefining American interests so that a nationalist revolution in a Third World country would not be perceived as an adverse development. The central political question becomes: what would have to happen in American politics to make the rejection of interventionist diplomacy feasible?

Iranian Trauma

In the meantime, attention should be paid to the growing pressure on American leaders to rehabilitate military and C.I.A. capabilities for interventionist purposes. The pressure arises from what is perceived or alleged to be the failure of post-Vietnam diplomacy to arrest declining U.S. control over the Third World. It is augmented by the growing apprehension that revolutionary nationalism is impinging on the resource base of the world capitalist economy—the oil countries of the Middle East. In this respect, the developments in Iran have been traumatic for the American foreign policy establishment and amount to a decisive demonstration that the post-Vietnam "adjustments" have been a geopolitical failure.

Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's Iran epitomized what American leaders were seeking in the Third World: a strongly Western-oriented modernizing Government that supplied oil even to Israel and South Africa and that was prepared to intervene militarily to contain radicalism in its region, as was done when Iran helped suppress the 1975 Dhofar uprising in Oman. Besides, Iran purchased billions of dollars worth of modern military equipment and used state power with apparent success to choke off dissent. As the Islamic opposition movement gained ground against the Shah, the United States acted like an awkward, helpless, rejected lover. Jimmy Carter's glowing endorsements of the Shah were a particular embarrassment since they almost seemed sincere, thereby making a mockery of his claim that a morally acceptable foreign policy was possible for the United States. As the situation deteriorated in late 1978, expressions of support from the White House were widely understood in Iran as celebrations of massacre, especially the much publicized telephone call from the Camp David Summit to express support for the Shah immediately after the mass killing of unarmed Iranian demonstrators in Jaleh Square on September 8, 1978. This diplomatic stance was reinforced by the belated gesture of ordering the aircraft carrier *Constellation* to steam into the Persian Gulf, and then further confused by terminating the order while the naval vessel was en route early in January. (See Alan Wolfe, "The Cycles of Belligerency," *The Nation*, Feb. 3.) As it turned out, the Carter Administration's handling of the Iran crisis displeased all sides: its die-hard identification with the Shah antagonized progressive opinion while its ho-hum gestures of support angered conservatives, giving the Republican Party an irresistible campaign issue for 1980.

The Oil Weapon

In actuality, the Carter policy was buffeted by its inability to handle the contradiction between nonInterventionist realism and imperial politics. On the operational side nothing much could have been attempted without intervening in a large-scale way that would have been bloody without being effective. Yet to stand by while a close ally and key oil supplier slipped from imperial control was to exhibit an inability to protect the most vital of imperial interests, access to a significant source of oil, as well as seriously to jeopardize hegemonic control over the entire Persian Gulf region. Also troublesome was the complicating impact of Iran on American diplomatic efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the Shah gone, the specter of the use of the oil weapon to help the Palestinians has reemerged as an anxious concern in Washington. To some extent the Camp David agreements compensate for the shift in Iran's orientation by neutralizing Egypt's role as an Arab adversary; yet choosing between stabilizing relations with OPEC and supporting the Israeli approach has become more difficult.

Attempts to justify or attack what was done during the months of struggle in Iran during 1978 and early 1979 have generated a post-mortem debate in the United States that is as inconclusive and irrelevant to the course of policy as was the earlier attempt to save the Shah without doing anything. Republican critics vaguely contend that Carter didn't do enough by way of support, but fall short of claiming that military intervention could have worked and should have been tried. Kissinger insists that Carter's ill-conceived human rights diplomacy was responsible for weakening the Shah's grip on Iranian society. Carter Administration apologists retaliate by alleging that it was Kissinger-Nixon in 1972 who nurtured the Shah's dreams of regional imperial glory, thereby fatally distracting him from meeting the real challenges of Iranian society. Some claim that the Shah fell mainly because he tried to modernize Iran too rapidly, alienating in the process key sectors of society; others emphasize the top-heavy investment in military hardware that brought thousands of American white-collar mercenaries to Iran in servicing and training capacities. This large foreign presence undermined still further the Shah's claims of political legitimacy. The depth, breadth and intensity of the Iranian revolution suggest that far more was at stake than any of these appraisals admit, including a historical buildup over decades of popular resentment against dynastic tyranny and foreign domination.

The religious character of the Ayatollah Khomeini's movement demonstrat-

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ed that a non-Marxist route to national revolution exists. There was no credible way to claim that support for the Shah was necessitated by Soviet machinations, or standard East-West, cold-war formulations. In this respect, more so even than the long Vietnam ordeal, American hostility toward the Iranian revolution, despite its anti-Marxist, indigenous character, revealed imperial motivations, among them classical impulses to secure raw materials and markets for industrial exports, including weapons systems. The resulting display of an admixture of American affinity and helplessness contributed to this country's humiliation in Iran. It revealed both a persisting counterrevolutionary outlook in Washington and a new vulnerability of American imperial power to national struggles of liberation (thereby reinforcing in a new crucial setting the two lessons of the Vietnam War for the Third World). And of course, the Iranian revolution added a third lesson—namely, that Islam was a powerful revolutionary force capable of mobilizing and guiding a mass movement.

Cold-War Masks

What remains clear, whether in Iran or Nicaragua, is that Third World struggles for self-determination are still being waged in the face of American opposition. The form and tactics of this American role may vary, depending on a mix of domestic and situational factors, but the orientation toward revolution in Third World countries remains virtually what it was back in 1948 when the Truman Doctrine was proposed to offset an alleged marginal Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war. Throughout most of this period, the face of American counterrevolutionary foreign policy has been deliberately hidden from the American public beneath a series of cold-war masks, with only rather beleaguered leftist criticism penetrating the ideological cover of anti-Communist, anti-Soviet necessity.

In the period after Iran, the pendulum is swinging back toward the kind of militarist mood that preceded the Vietnam involvement. The Carter response to the collapse of the Shah has been to rush offers of weaponry to friends in the region, to provide North Yemen with assistance and advisers in its conflict with South Yemen, to work toward an increased American naval presence in the Persian Gulf and most of all to form a 100,000-man contingency strike force, which would be deployed and earmarked for use in the Gulf area, and to exert diplomatic pressure upon the anti-radical governments in the Middle East to form a military alliance. Such a program is predicated upon the assumption either that the Shah fell because he was not strong enough militarily as compared to his opposition (plainly absurd) or that the United States was not able and willing to intervene with effective force (equally absurd). With anxiety mounting about "another Iran" in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, there is a solidifying consensus on the desirability of American military intervention to assure retention of friendly control over Persian Gulf oil. There is even a new effort to revalidate the role of covert operations under C.I.A. auspices as a selective interventionary tool of American foreign policy.

The pressure for intervention extends beyond the Persian Gulf. Colin Legum, writing in the pages of the January *Foreign Affairs*, contends that Carter's emphasis on "African solutions for African problems afforded few means to discourage Soviet activism in the Horn." In a more prescriptive vein, Legum adds, " . . . those who strongly dissent from any idea of returning to open or clandestine military intervention must show what other positive methods are available to resist Soviet expansion." Unlike the Persian Gulf region, where the geopolitical rationale of vital interests takes the place of an ideological rationale of anti-Communism, the African argument tends to be couched in more conventional cold-war terms.

In one respect, that part of the interventionist mood that acknowledges vital interests as a justification for setting aside the dynamics of self-determination is something relatively new for the United States, the historical precedent closest in time being the annexation of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The Persian Gulf scenarios contain no cover story that potential American involvement is restricted to instances of Soviet or other outside intervention which the United States must neutralize. In contrast, recall the intelligence and public relations effort devoted to establishing a prior North Vietnamese presence in South Vietnam, as well as the emphasis placed on North Vietnamese provocation in 1964 to secure the famous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which empowered the President to wage war in Vietnam without declaring it. Now the interventionist rationale of the United States is



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avowedly a matter of defending "vital national interests." As such, it represents a repudiation of even the pretense that the United States respects the dynamics of internal politics in a foreign society. The new approach, yet to be articulated in the form of a doctrine, is an outright, unilateral claim to exert hegemonical control over a foreign region containing a large fraction of the world's oil reserves. It represents the start of a new phase in American foreign policy.

Its background is best expressed, perhaps, by the cover of *Business Week*'s March 12 special issue on American decline that showed the face of the Statue of Liberty disfigured by a metallic, green tear rolling down the right cheek. Revealingly, perhaps, *Business Week*'s editors anchor their argument about decline in the United States' failure to support England and France during the Suez invasion of 1956, an outright neocolonial use of military power to undo Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: "Unable to see the tie of oil to power and economic growth, the Administration forced the Europeans to back off. That significant miscalculation underlies a myopia that has afflicted every succeeding Administration: the inability (or unwillingness) to see the economic and monetary implications in foreign policy." In essence, anti-Communism was an insufficient imperial mandate to guide American foreign policy in the Third World even during the Dulles period. Such a line of complaint is a kind of mirror-image to the international conspiracy wing of the left's view that the entire cold-war stress on "containment" was nothing more than window dressing for a foreign policy designed to make the world safe for the multinational corporation.

To relate the perception of American decline to economic factors is useful, especially when the domestic economy is included in analysis. Certainly the falling dollar, chronic trade deficits, unemployment and inflation are signs of decline and, what is more serious, storm warnings of worse to come. *Business Week*, sensitive to the link between foreign and domestic economic policy, offers the following prescription to improve prospects: "If the decline in U.S. power is to be arrested, the trend toward spending a smaller share of the federal budget on defense must be reversed, and economic policy must change in a way that encourages investment at the expense of consumption." Such an outlook expresses the bankruptcy of conservative analysis. The "loss" of Iran had nothing remotely to do with the level of American defense spending in recent years, and the weakening of the United States' world economic position was mainly caused by a deteriorating competitive position vis-à-vis northern Europe and Japan. This deterioration is partly a matter of overextended overseas commitments causing dollar outflows, partly the expression of relative inefficiency as measured by energy use and a losing role in the industrial productivity race.

Militarist Foreign Policy

The picture that emerges is quite scary. In our relationships with the Third World, we are generating an interventionist climate that is totally ineffectual in relation to revolutionary nationalist movements, whether Marxist or Islamic in their inspiration, but bloody in its execution abroad and repressive in its domestic impact here. In relation to the world economy, we are edging toward a rationale for squeezing the poor to inhibit inflation and to stimulate savings for investment that will have little related impact on the fundamental causes of growing American economic weakness. At the same time, a massive campaign is underway to revive the American people's fears of Soviet military might and intentions, thereby accelerating the development of unstable new weapons systems with first-strike potential.

In other words, the pendulum of elite opinion is swinging back in the United States toward support for a militarist foreign policy that is wasteful, expensive, dangerous and keeps us aligned with the most historically reactionary forces in the world today. The alternative is reliance on desperate stratagems (that is, military intervention) or desperate technologies (for example, Trident submarines or nuclear power). America's juggernaut version of mature-to-elderly capitalism in a mad search for geopolitical Lebensraum poses, in my view, the central threat to world peace at the present time.

To be reconciled to Third World nationalism and a falling standard of living at middle- and upper-income levels is the only positive foundation on which to build American foreign policy. Any relevant vision of the future must be planetary in scope, post-imperialist in inspiration, and progressive in its domestic implementation.

As matters now stand, mainstream American politics seem bogged down in the center-right terrain ruled by an obsession with arresting the nation's decline. A "new politics" is needed to open up a complementary center-left terrain that will expose the self-destructive futility of such a posture and engender some hope that a humane foreign policy can be as real in deeds and intentions as it now is hypocritical in rhetoric and far-fetched in aspiration. □

THIRD WORLD INTERVENTION

Orphans in Search Of a Patron

FOUAD AJAMI

> When the West failed to help Angola the anti-Soviet blacks in Africa were like a "band of orphans."
>
> —*President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast*

> Some African leaders questioned whether the United States because of past experience was willing to take on the role of leadership expected of it. President Sadat, for example, spoke of the "Vietnam complex" which is causing the U.S. to exhibit inaction in Africa.
>
> —*Report of the Delegation to the Middle East and Africa, U.S. Congress, February 6, 1978*

On the other side, what does the democratic West do? The United States, traumatized by the failure in Indochina and the scandal of Watergate, is reticent when its President calls for vigilance in Africa, and Congress refuses to vote the necessary appropriations. Thus, the American government can only voice empty threats. At most, it will give transport aircraft, not to send troops, but to send equipment from other armies. That is little indeed from the greatest power in the world, which proclaims itself the champion of the rights and liberties of men. With the exception of France, the other Western powers have not done much more. . . .

—*Léopold Sédar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal*

In the face of the perpetual shrinkage of the realm of freedom almost without resistance during the last thirty

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years, the problem of the West is one of credibility. After Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and now especially Iran, and after the ideological softening everywhere, throughout Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, and even among the political and intellectual circles of Europe and the United States, how can the term "the free world" have any longer a coherence and a consistency of its own?

—Charles H. Malik, Former Foreign Minister of Lebanon

Henry Kissinger and Daniel Moynihan are not the only ones who bemoan the "crisis" of the West. There is a "band of orphans" out there who want the United States to be worthy of its mission: "failure of nerve" and "softening" recur like a litany in some Third World statements—almost as frequently as they do in the statements of the Committee on the Present Danger.

The passages above are a sample. It could be legitimately observed that they are all "special cases." Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor are children of France's civilizing mission; that has always been and remains their universe. Sadat too is a special case: he has left the Pan-Arab fold and come to look to the "American Connection," not only for material help but for a sense of psychological belonging as well. His dream is a "European" Egypt, disconnected from the Arab world and its troubles; America is his new patron and his new theater. Charles Malik, the most obscure of the four, is a leading figure in the Lebanese Front, a spokesman for that segment of Lebanon that feels shipwrecked in a largely Arab-Moslem world. Malik is nostalgic for an earlier era. Twenty years ago, the Sixth Fleet could intimidate Malik's rivals in Lebanon and bring about an end to a civil war along lines that Malik could accept. Today we live in a different world. The West fails to understand the barbarism of Malik's rivals; the gunboats have lost their magic; the West has lost its will.

To these passages many others could be added. We hear the same noise from China, which wants the United States to be resolute in its opposition to hegemonism. Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan warns that, unless America acts like the superpower it is (though he never says what that means), he can do nothing less than make a full-scale return to Islamic fundamentalism. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire is also worried about the resoluteness of the West. Unless his regime is propped up and saved every now and then, the West will presumably falter.



The leaders mentioned above are—to use the language of anthropology—"native informers." Their testimonies provide ammunition for those in the United States and the West who want a "tougher" posture: the travelers—journalists, Congressmen, scholars—who return with such authenticity. Their sources are, after all, leaders who know the world as it is; they are free of the guilt and the doubts of traumatized liberals. If Sadat and Houphouët-Boigny can see the crisis of instability and Communism, then the people in the United States should do no less. It is in this vein that Senator Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) introduces a pamphlet by Mr. Malik as a "remarkable document by a man who has the insight to penetrate to the heart of the problems." And it is in this vein as well that the Congressional delegation invokes the authority of Houphouët-Boigny and Anwar el-Sadat.

Invitational Intervention

Intervention is of three dimensions. It is part penetration, part the normal traffic of goods and ideas in a world that has been knit together by capital, technology and thought, and, finally, it is part invitation. Traditionally, discussions of intervention—even the very image of it—have been concerned with the penetrational aspect. This classical mode of intervention created the modern world system; it is the one that the Third World presumably wants to rein in and it is the one that those who remember Vietnam are determined to oppose.

The penetrational aspect of intervention remains; it will do so under any conditions of inequality, whether capitalist or socialist. For Vietnam, there is Prague in 1968. So long as nations are unequal, the powerful will seek to transmit their goods and ideas and their political systems to others weaker than they are. But there is mounting evidence that the invitational aspect of intervention has become an important feature of the contemporary setting.

Unlike the penetrational aspect, there is no grand struggle here or an epic of resistance. Inviting others is a product

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of failure to solve one's own problems, to cooperate with one's neighbors. Face to face with their own citizens and with neighbors more or less like themselves, many Third World states now invite Western intervention. The result is a tension between symbols and realities that stresses Third World sovereignty and autonomy and another set of symbols and realities that poses serious political and intellectual problems for those who identify with the Third World and its aspirations. Side by side, we have the changes in the world that have given non-Western states new resources and skills and deep structural problems that now expose their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. That is why the noise and the evidence coming out of the Third World are so confusing and jumbled: there is both assertiveness and helplessness, a desire to keep the outsiders at bay and, at the same time, an effort to find a patron, a new dependency.

The new dependency comes at a time when many Third World dreams seem to have aborted and many of the more promising Third World experiments seem at a stalemate. Far too many states in the Third World have made a mess of their independence and their capacity to hide their troubles is as worn out as the capacity of sympathetic observers to look the other way. The difficulty that this situation raises for those who sympathize with Third World aspirations and who want a less unequal world is easy enough to understand. After all, it had been the contention of the colonial world view—which still has potency today—that these societies are bound to fail, that the departure of the West would unleash native barbarism, and would bring to the surface the repressed contradictions, the hatred and the visceral passions of non-Western societies.

Faced with this kind of intellectual and political armor, the recent troubles of the Third World—the obvious failure of the new international economic order, the erosion of Third World solidarity, the scale of nihilistic violence in such places as Lebanon and Argentina, the disorder and violence in Indochina—have been a source of embarrassment and confusion. In some circles there is a bewildered kind of silence—particularly about China's behavior, at home and abroad; in others there is demoralization and a sense of defeat. There is also a new kind of revisionism about the Third World: a desire to see it "as it is," so to speak. This revisionism can be seen in Europe's current intellectual landscape; no doubt, it will soon make its passage across the Atlantic. Consider the following statement by a disillusioned French intellectual who once edited a Maoist newspaper (from *Daedalus*, Spring 1979):

> Everything seemed possible, beginning with a return to the pure sources of the revolutionary ideal, at the wellsprings of the Third World, with a great strategic detour through countries where outcasts rose up with empty bellies, guns flowering from their hands. Thus, we invented our own Third World, with the birth of Ben Bella's Algeria and Castro's Cuba, both a substitute for and regenerator of the enfeebled proletariat. From China, Lin Piao called to us, "Long live the victorious people's war!" while the appeal of Che Guevara to "create one, two, three Vietnams," pierced our hearts with its certitude. Each in our own way, we set ourselves to the task, most of us intent on "putting to the torch the heart of the imperialist octopus"; others did not hesitate in forsaking everything, led on by the dream of new International Brigades. One need only recall our passionate discussions at that time, faithfully recorded in Chris Marker's film "The Depths of the Air Are Red," to realize that each epoch nourishes its own hopes of imaginary lands.

Men invent their own distant revolutionary lands; they invest others with qualities that they miss in their own universe. The danger of reading into other societies our own dreams and disillusionment is an ever-present one that must be guarded against. We make idols and then we are left with nothing but disillusionment. The dissatisfaction with the Third World may in part be a proxy statement on the intellectual and political climate in the West; it may yet be another reflection of historical impatience—the desire to see old worlds washed away and new ones emerging out of revolutionary blueprints and dreams. This has to be stated as a caveat: stated, that is, before one considers the objective dimensions of Third World troubles. The Third World has plenty of its own troubles; failing to live up to the expectations of others should not be added to the list. The real troubles have to do with the failure to build just and competent orders, to give substance to the claim that they want to make their own way through this world, to show that the dream that fired so many anticolonial wars and sacrifices was worth fighting and dying for.

Nations can strut on the world stage with all the sound, fury and pride that they can muster, but the weakness of the state ultimately asserts itself: it dashes the inflated rhetoric; it revives old temptations and patterns of dependence. And this is precisely where we stand today: whereas the West was off-balance after October 1973, there is in the air the old complacency—a feeling that the Third World has lost its steam and power. The change is not so much due to anything that the West has done: its dependence on imported energy remains as acute as ever; its own capacity to put together a united front has not been that impressive. The change in terms of the so-called North-South conflict has to do with the disarray in Third World ranks. At home the Third World states are more "tribalized" than ever—witness Lebanon, the Horn of Africa, the troubles of the Arab states, etc. This limits the capacity of Third World states to play the international game, for the domestic weaknesses intrude; we are face to face with the classical dilemmas of the state: unless the "rear" is secure and states can run viable economies and organize with their neighbors, their international schemes come tumbling down. There is, when all is said and done, a difference between the illusions of power and the real thing.

The Industrial Illusion

The roots of Third World weakness can be (rapidly) identified. There has been a disastrous deterioration in Third World agricultural output. The historical division of labor between advanced countries that export their manufactures and less-developed countries that export agricultural products has been altered. With a few exceptions, the Third World states can no longer feed themselves. Their elites who looked at the international system misunderstood the nature and bases of power; they saw the West's industry but forgot that industrial revolutions depend on a prior agricultural revolution. The futility of trying to bypass agricultural revolutions and leap into the international market has been illustrated in a brilliant and provocative work by economist W. Arthur Lewis, *The Evolution of the International Economic Order* (Princeton University Press, 1978). What Professor Lewis demonstrates is that even if the less-developed countries were to succeed and penetrate Western markets with their manufactures—an unlikely thing given the strength of protectionism—they would merely "exchange one dependence for another." And when that happens, the factoral

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terms of trade would shift, as they have done, in favor of the agricultural products of the developed countries. The reliance on trade—a bet of so many Third World states—will not work. "The gateway to technological change," Lewis writes, "is through agricultural and industrial revolutions which are mutually dependent. . . . The most important item on the agenda is to transform the food sector, create agricultural surpluses to feed the urban population, and thereby create the domestic basis for industry and modern services. If we can make this domestic change, we shall automatically have a new international economic order." And if we cannot, then states will be left vulnerable to new forms of intervention and dependence. With feet of clay, they can demand all the new utopias they can envision, but their capacity to really change their situation in the world is limited.

One, Two, Many OPECs

All along, the hopes for a new international economic order that would limit the vulnerability of Third World states assumed that these states can, to use the language of the African scholar Ali Mazrui, organize horizontally—that is, deal with one another and break their old dependence on the West. This has not materialized—either economically or geopolitically. The slogan of "one, two, many OPECs" remained just that. The OPEC countries have either used their wealth to deepen their integration into the world economy, or have squandered it on weapons with which they thought they could leap, as if by magic, from weakness to the summits of power, or have taken up insurance policies against political instability by investments in the West. As a thorough report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concludes, the OPEC countries have shown no inclination to play Robin Hood in putting to use their accumulated wealth. Of their investment behavior, the report notes:

> . . . the OPEC countries have behaved like other prudent investors in disposing of their financial surpluses; that is, they have invested almost exclusively in low risk, high yield assets such as government securities in the hard currency countries, in stocks and bonds offered by Western corporations, and in deposits with the 15 or so largest multinational banks. Thus, according to the U.S. Treasury estimates, of a total of approximately $133 billion in financial assets accumulated by OPEC in the period 1974-76 that can be accounted for, an estimated $48 billion was invested in government paper, portfolio and long term direct investments in the industrial countries; another $9.75 billion was loaned to international organizations; and . . . the largest amount, $49 billion, or 37 percent of the total, was deposited with private commercial banks, mostly in New York and London.

Horizontal interpenetration among Third World states would require a change in the geography of the mind—away from London and New York in the direction of New Delhi and Dacca. In retrospect, this mental revolution should not have been expected; but so strong was the belief in a new order that many embraced the call for a new international economic order even when they could see its contradictions and problems.

The hopes pinned on the new international economic order advocated by the Third World are, to put it mildly, no longer as bright as they used to be. The fifth meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development recently convened in Manila; that President Marcos can be a champion of a new order underlines the absurdity of the Third World strategy as currently pursued. The meeting generated and warranted very little attention; a marked contrast to the enthusiasm stirred by the Sixth Special Session on Raw Materials of 1974. Two symbolic events emerged from the Manila meeting, and both expose the stalemate of the Third World and the difficulty of trying to push for a progressive and egalitarian global system when men are not seriously committed to the proposition of equality. The first was the appearance of a local delegation of dissidents who used the occasion rightly to dramatize the irrelevance of such international conferences and to draw our attention to the absurdity of having regimes like that of Marcos preaching equality in the international system and denying it at home. The second event was no less suggestive: the American delegation insisted on greater austerity than that displayed by the Third World participants and declined its share of the fleet of Mercedes-Benz cars that Mr. Marcos had put at the disposal of the delegates. The Third World is being outflanked on its own causes; even symbolic victories against the rich are difficult to pull off.

Nothing so clearly illustrates the current impasse of the Third World and its

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

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incapacity to alter the terms of its relation to the international order as its crisis of mounting foreign debts and its lopsided integration into the world economy. To analyze this predicament is to give concrete reality to the so-called "crisis of the state." Some figures are in order: the outstanding foreign debts accounted for by the less-developed countries rose from $48.4 billion in 1967 to $206.8 billion in 1976. Where the debt had grown by an annual rate of 13.9 percent from 1967 to 1972, it did so at an unprecedented 22.1 percent from 1972 to 1976. Since the Third World states found their way into the Eurocurrency markets, the structure of their debts has changed: greater reliance on private lenders and greater reliance on short-term debts. The external financing needs of the Third World rose from $13 billion in 1970 to $56 billion in 1977 (of the 1977 needs, $35 billion were provided by the Eurocurrency markets). Debt servicing now accounts for 20 percent of the export earnings of the Third World—this is 75 percent more than it was in 1973 (see *The Economist*, March 1978).

I.M.F. Imperialism

The crisis of foreign debts limits the maneuverability and possibilities of many governments. It brings in its train new forms of intervention, ones that the heroes of independence did not anticipate a quarter-century or so ago. No first-generation nationalist leader could have prophesied the struggle of many Third World states with the International Monetary Fund today. We live in a technocratic international system that imposes its own kind of limits. The gunboats have been beached; here and there we can see nostalgia for them. But they are not the interventionist instruments of today. The I.M.F., says an official of the Turkish Government of Mr. Ecevit, is an "instrument of financial imperialism." In the words of a former I.M.F. Middle Eastern director: "The measures that many countries have to take are nearly tantamount to surrendering their sovereignty in the economic field." In country after country the "politics of creditworthiness" has more to say about the actual conduct of policies than any ideological exhortations.

Altogether sixty countries have found their way into international capital markets and they have been borrowing with a vengeance. Sluggish rates of growth in the West and the relatively low volume of investment in plant and machinery have heightened the competition for Third World markets and borrowers. In their turn, the Third World states have been equally anxious for the loans to (*1*) finance balance of payments deficits; (*2*) finance large-scale development and the purchases of advanced technology (technology is under fire in the West but it is cherished in the Third World); (*3*) refinance or restructure existing debts. This goes on, more or less smoothly, so long as the loans are economically invested and so long as the ratio of debt servicing to exports is not unusually high.

Trouble begins when debts mount and borrower countries either risk default or have to reschedule their loans. It is then that the "I.M.F. conditionality" inevitably means that access to private lenders is contingent on a stamp of approval by the I.M.F. In extreme cases, as in Zaire under Mobutu, governments even dispense with the trappings of autonomy. The chaos of Zaire had to be dealt with by inviting I.M.F. advisers actually to run Zaire's Central Bank and to plan its budget.

In other settings, the medicine that the I.M.F. recommends goes hand in hand with martial law and crackdowns. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report cited earlier is quite revealing of the connection between I.M.F. guidelines and the grim game of governance in a situation of scarcity and constraints. Of the standard I.M.F. policies, the report observes:

> The difficulty with these policies is that while they may be the most effective way of rapidly bringing a deficit country's external accounts into balance, they may also lead to higher unemployment, cuts in social welfare programs, and a generally lower standard of living for the people, at least over the short term. And in desperately poor countries, where the majority of the population may already be living at a bare subsistence level, a decision by the government to impose a program of stiff economic austerity can create social and political turmoil. The requirement that government spending be reduced and the private sector expanded may also conflict with the long-term social and economic goals of a government or of certain political factions within a country.
>
> If the I.M.F. and the other creditors are not sufficiently responsive to these internal constraints, they may push a government into a position of having to choose between acceptance of the foreign creditors' terms—and perhaps having to use political repression to carry them through—or repudiation of the I.M.F., the banks, and possibly its debts.

This has come to pass in several countries. The troubles of Peru that culminated in martial law by January 1979 provide a textbook case. The Peruvian experiment began with all sorts of populist hopes in 1968 and was exhausted by 1975 when it took a turn to the right under Morales Bermudez. Depressed prices for Peru's exports forced Peru into greater reliance on loans which by 1976 had reached something like $3.7 billion. The "reform package" that the I.M.F. and the banks insisted upon was initially resisted but Peru eventually caved in. The cuts in the budget and the subsidies sparked massive demonstrations that were brutally put down and the result was martial law and the suspension of constitutional rights.

Egypt and Turkey

In Egypt, the I.M.F. guidelines—backed up by the Arab oil states—sparked a full-scale popular revolt in January 1977. It was suppressed in a welter of blood and a death toll of seventy-nine lives. The revolt erupted when the Egyptian Government decided to reduce the food subsidies in order to balance its budget. President Sadat was quick to blame it all on the Communists—a breed that hardly exists in Egypt—and to dismiss it as an "uprising of the thieves." But he was equally quick to rescind his Government's decision on the subsidies. In the Egyptian case the I.M.F. is under pressure not to push Egypt too hard lest further cuts bring about the collapse of the regime.

The troubles of Turkey with the I.M.F. show how governments often end up repudiating their professed social goals and have to resort to force in order to put down disillusioned supporters. With aggregate foreign debts of $12 billion, Turkey tried to resist the austerity measures that the I.M.F. and the banks (and behind them, the United States and the European Economic Community) insisted upon. After a long, drawn-out fight in which Turkey threatened to turn away from the West, the Turkish Government capitulated, devalued its currency by 23 percent and began a slow process of adjustment. The result was that Mr. Ecevit's left-of-center Government ended up with the same policies as its conservative predecessors. Here too the I.M.F. guidelines had to be enforced by martial law, which was declared in March 1979.

From Friedrich List to Alexander Hamilton, the warnings against excessive and premature integration into the world economy counsel patience, a de-

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gree of protectionism and emphasis on the domestic market. This the Third World has not done and the crisis of the Western-based international economy has allowed it to indulge itself. None of this, however, will lead to viable economies, and weak states will remain vulnerable to the guidelines and monitoring of others. Outsiders—banks, international institutions—who are overextended, as they are, say, in Zaire, have no choice but to intervene. To expect otherwise is to entertain illusions about power and interests and the way they are defended and maintained.

Orphans of the Storm

Economic sovereignty aside, even the old goal of Third World nonalignment is becoming increasingly untenable. A quarter-century separates us from the Bandung Conference and the struggle of men like Nasser, Nkrumah and Nehru has been forgotten. These men had the correct instinct: you must keep your distance from the mighty, and their choice made sense in a polarized system. Their successors throughout the Third World play a different game today and their policies have legitimized a new culture of dependence and alignment. Thus there is some justification in the question posed by the French scholar Jacques Julliard and in his answer: "Does the Third World still exist? In its poverty and underdevelopment more than ever; in its nonalignment less and less." Be it in Asia, Africa or the Arab world, the carving out of spheres of influence has acquired a new legitimacy. If independence is such a difficult thing and if one's neighbors are so difficult to live with and have their own patrons, then why be an "orphan" in a tough and merciless world?

Perhaps the charismatic heroes of nonalignment doomed their successors and left them with a host of problems that could not be handled with the flair and grace possessed by the great figures. It could be that the pressures from within Third World societies (rising expectations, demographic explosion) are infinitely more difficult to handle today than they were a quarter-century ago. This, however, does not justify or exonerate the new trend toward dependence and incoherence in Third World policies. To be sure, the pressures are formidable, but in most cases the retreat from autonomy is a function of incompetent state policies; in many other cases, superpowers are invited because neighbors find it difficult to live and cope with one another. Vietnam's and Cambodia's troubles invite the Soviet Union and China; the incapacity of the Arab states to organize a fairly workable regional order invites American intervention, etc. The contempt for one's neighbors and the fear of their schemes go a long way toward explaining the new yearnings for the West.

Home-Grown Repression

But above all, there is an old dictum that explains the vulnerability of Third World states to outsiders: terrified subjects cannot stand up to free citizens. This has acquired new salience in light of the increasing brutality of many Third World regimes. The states that terrorize their own people and rob them of initiative ultimately stand on sand: they are really empty shells. They may rant and rave about revolution or order, or a new international economic bargain; they may offer their people a nauseating diet of noise about authenticity and the ways of the ancestors (as they do in Egypt and Zaire and elsewhere), but they are bound to falter so long as they remain disconnected from their own citizens.

This is a reality that Nigeria's head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, expressed to his fellow heads of state at the 1978 summit of the Organization of African Unity. I do not know Nigerian politics well enough to say whether General Obasanjo practices what he preached, but I think that what he said is worth citing here:

> Government in its broadest sense is justice and nothing more. . . . For as long as we neglect the true interests of the generality of our people, so long will other powers find it easy to interfere in our internal affairs and divide our peoples. There is no better defense against external forces than the government which endeavors to carry the majority of the population along with it and treats its people fairly decently. It is safer and more secure than the one-sided so-called mutual defense pact between unequal partners of European and African countries based on colonial relations. We must not allow the East and the West to divide us and set us against ourselves under any guise.

The truth of General Obasanjo's remarks is something that discussions of intervention must inevitably come up against: states either become viable, decent orders or they devour their own people and become victims of others e.g., Lebanon) or slaughter-grounds that raise questions about the capacity of the Third World to live justly and hu-

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manely (e.g., Amin's Uganda, Argentina, etc.). The weakness of such states in the world system goes hand in hand with their tyranny at home. This is the pathology of it all: that the men who torture and crack the whip, who exude so much "manhood" and brutality at home, are incapable of standing up to the outside world.

Unless they become viable worlds of their own, states collapse or rot away. And when they do they invite others. They surrender to those with enough power to keep them economically afloat or to arm them to the teeth so that they can forget and ignore their decay; or they vent their rage against their own citizens; or they become sheer theaters where tragedy and farce blend and where the talk about authenticity (e.g., Islam, the ways of the ancestors, kingship) serves as a cover to conceal decay and collaboration.

The subject of intervention ends (and begins), then, with states coming to terms with their own traditions, with their own people, with their capacity to handle their own destiny and to keep their people at home, so to speak. If they do so in a coherent manner, the outside world can be managed and dealt with. If they don't, intervention by others (either by distant powers of the East and the West or by neighbors) may turn out to be the least of their troubles. For as the grim tales of recent Third World horrors (e.g., Uganda under Amin, Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Argentina under the military, etc.) teach us, societies can inflict on themselves far more suffering than outsiders even dreamt of or could get away with. □

American Military Intervention: Is It Ever Justified?

MORTON H. HALPERIN

In considering the question of whether or not the United States should ever intervene with military force in foreign countries, it is necessary to distinguish among the questions of the United States' *right* to intervene, the *techniques* appropriate for such intervention and the decision as to whether the United States *should* actually intervene in a specific situation.

The Right to Intervene

There has been no greater gap between the aims and actions of U.S. policy than the one which exists in its position on the right of states to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

The United States is publicly committed to the principles of nonintervention and the right of collective security. These principles, reflected not only in the United Nations Charter and in international law but also in, for example, the U.S.-Soviet agreement signed at the time of the SALT I treaty, say in essence that foreign powers can come to the aid of governments threatened by outside aggression and to those threatened by internal subversion who request support. They provide that no support should be given for acts of aggression or actions in violation of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet-American agreement provides in particular that the two countries should take steps to avoid confrontation with each other in local situations. American spokesmen have taken the position that the United States abides by these principles and that it expects all other nations to do so.

However, the actions of the United States and its justifications for those actions involve us in a thoroughgoing double standard.

The *internal* position of the United States justifies intervention whenever it is necessary to protect its security interests regardless of the principles of international law. That position was perhaps most clearly expressed in Henry Kissinger's famous remark to the Committee of 40: "I don't see why we need to stand by and permit a country to go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Armed with such "reasons," the United States authorized substantial intervention in the internal affairs of Chile in order to subvert a constitutionally elected Government. When pressed on this issue American spokesmen will sometimes retreat to *Realpolitik*, i.e., they will argue that while the principles of international law are appropriate, they cannot always be adhered to.

While rejecting the principles of international law as too constraining for American policy, the United States has often demanded that the Soviet Union, China and Cuba adhere to an even higher standard than that required by these principles. We object to a Soviet military base in Cam Ranh Bay, for example, while maintaining bases of our own throughout the world and we do so despite the fact that a Soviet military base in Vietnam would violate none of the principles in the United Nations Charter, international law or Soviet-American agreements. We object to the presence of Cuban troops in Africa and have made that a central issue in both the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba and in Soviet-American relations. Yet every action which the Soviet Union and Cuba have taken in Africa has been consistent with the principles of international law. The Cubans have come in only when invited by a government and have remained only at their request. Neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba was prepared to continue to support Somalia when it threatened to cross or did cross international borders. Nonetheless, our position is that Cuban and Soviet actions in Africa indicate that both countries are irresponsible and incompatible with détente.

It is my view that the United States should abandon both aspects of this double standard, i.e., the United States should never contemplate intervention unless that intervention is consistent with principles embodied in the United Nations Charter, international law and bilateral agreements including the Soviet-American agreement. At the same time, we should not expect the Soviet Union, Cuba or other countries to live up to a higher standard and to refrain from intervention even when permitted by these principles.

The reasons for this are simple. Our interest in reducing the threat of violence in the world and our interest in establishing orderly principles for international behavior are far stronger than our interest in having the right to intervene in circumstances where in-

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ternational law does not permit that intervention. Moreover, all of the genuine security needs of the United States can be met by a simple rule which permits us to intervene when invited to do so by a foreign government.

The attempt at holding the Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries to a higher standard than we set ourselves is fraught with danger. For one thing, the legitimacy of the American adherence to the principles of international law is undercut when we seem to oppose intervention by other countries not because they violate accepted principles but because we think it is incompatible with an orderly international system or our own view of how that system ought to develop. Thus, the continued inability of the American Government to specify exactly what in Soviet or Cuban conduct in Africa constitutes a violation of international principles undercuts the legitimacy of our objections to actions which do violate those principles.

Moreover, these objections create unrealistic expectations within the United States that Cuban or Soviet behavior can be restrained. The American public needs to understand that Soviet conduct in Africa violates no Soviet-American agreements nor any accepted principles of international behavior. It reflects simply a different Soviet estimate of what should happen in the African continent and a genuine conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

When to Intervene

I would argue that a necessary condition of any American intervention, including military intervention, is that it be consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the standards of the United Nations Charter, of international law and of any bilateral agreements that we may have negotiated.

I would add a second prerequisite for any evaluation of a particular situation to determine whether the United States should intervene, i.e., that the intervention decisions must be made in a way which is consistent with the American constitutional process. If the decision has to be made in ways which violate those procedures, then it should not be made. The procedures include open public discussion of alternatives and public debate on the relevant facts.

In my view, there are no circumstances in which intervention carried out in violation of these principles is sufficiently important to the national security of the United States to justify circumventing these normal constitutional procedures. Moreover, we have learned that once these procedures are violated, it sets a precedent for other violations and rapidly leads to a situation in which the executive branch assumes that decisions relating to foreign policy and national defense can be made outside the normal constraints of the democratic process.

These arguments, briefly summarized, constitute, in my view, an overwhelming case against covert operations since such operations must by definition be carried on in secret and cannot be evaluated even on a post hoc basis.

Congress has begun on an ad hoc basis to legislate the principles which must underlie the procedures leading to any American decision to intervene. These have been embodied in such diverse legislation as the War Powers Bill, which covers arms transfers, and the legislation requiring notice of covert operations. At some point it would be appropriate to bring these pieces of legislation together and to embody them in a set of general principles regarding intervention that includes the following:

§ *Open debate prior to commitment.* Before the United States undertakes a commitment to intervene militarily in another country under certain specified circumstances there should be full public debate about the commitment. Normally the commitment should be embodied in a treaty, although in some cases an executive order of some kind may be appropriate provided it is publicly reported to the Congress and approved by both Houses. The kind of secret commitments that the United States in the past made to countries such as Thailand or Spain to intervene with military force when necessary should be clearly prohibited.

§ *Public debate on the decision to intervene.* Before the United States reacts to any request for assistance, whether based on a prior commitment or not, there should again be full public debate and explicit Congressional authoriza-

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tion of the intervention. This is now required in part by the War Powers Bill although there are loopholes in the bill and interpretations of it by successive Administrations that have weakened its impact.

§ *Periodic reporting and evaluation.* Finally, the legislation should provide for periodic public reports by the President to the Congress of the activities which the United States has engaged in. These reports should include a discussion of the conduct of the military operation, the expected course of those military operations and the contributions which the government we have intervened to defend is making to the conduct of the operations. The report should also assess the implications of the intervention for the human rights on both sides of the conflict.

Setting the Limits

Two principles should define the extent and nature of all American military interventions. The first principle is that of proportion and the second principle would absolutely prohibit certain kinds of activities.

The principle of proportion would require that American intervention be no greater than the intervention by other outside powers in the local conflict. For example, American support for South Vietnam was probably ten times greater than the assistance given North Vietnam by China and Russia. Such a level of intervention clearly violates the proposed rule of proportion. In addition, the United States should intervene to prevent a state possessing nuclear weapons from practicing nuclear blackmail on a state which has adhered to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Moreover, the amount of destruction we are prepared to engage in should correspond to the way we perceive the stakes. We should not assume that once we intervene we are free to commit whatever destruction is necessary in order to secure our objectives. Again, the level of American bombing in Vietnam, including in particular the Christmas bombing of Hanoi, violated the second rule of proportion.

The second principle suggests a flat prohibition on certain kinds of intervention. Here I would propose at least two rules:

First, as I have suggested above, covert intervention, whether through the C.I.A. or any other agency, should be absolutely prohibited for the reasons suggested above.*

*These are elaborated in greater detail in my article (with Jeremy Stone), "Secrecy and Covert Intelligence Collection and Operations," in *None of Your Business*, edited by Norman Dorsen and Stephen Gillers (Viking Press, 1974).

The second principle I suggest is that the United States be prohibited from being the first to use nuclear weapons. In my judgment, there are no circumstances that would justify the United States using nuclear weapons unless those weapons were used first by an opposing power.

The Decision to Intervene

This paper thus far has suggested several conditions which are necessary to legitimate intervention. In addition to those absolute principles, a decision to intervene should involve a careful consideration of two other questions: the nature of the American security interest and the nature of the country or group to which the United States is aligned.

There is no reason to assume that every treaty signed in the 1950s is still in the American security interest. If the United States is not going to intervene to protect a country, it should renounce the security treaty prior to any outbreak of violence or threat of violence. Moreover, if it is not in the interests of U.S. security to protect the country, the treaty commitment should be ended so that the treaty itself does not force our intervention simply to show that the United States will not draw away from security commitments under fire.

One of the great disappointments of the Carter Administration is that it has failed to give any systematic reconsideration to the security commitments of the United States. In several cases it has in fact changed some aspects of American policy but done it in ways which appear to reinforce the commitment rather than to move away from it. The Carter Administration's actions in Korea provide a classic example of this. The President made a decision that the United States would withdraw some forces from Korea not because he had concluded that the United States did not have an important interest in Korea and not because he concluded that the United States would not use military force if necessary to defend those interests but rather because he concluded that those commitments could be met without the continued stationing of American ground forces in Korea. Thus, the decision to withdraw the forces was accompanied by a commitment to keep air and naval units in and around Korea—a strong reaffirmation by the United States of its security commitment to Korea. This action prevented a careful consideration of whether the United States *wished* to remain committed to the security of Korea.

Similarly, the United States did not carefully examine its security commitment to Thailand until shortly before the visit of the Thai Prime Minister to the United States at which time, without careful consideration, the commitment was reaffirmed.†

Even if a commitment is maintained, a request for American military intervention should not be routinely honored. While there is, of course, a substantial cost in not honoring a commitment, there may be a greater cost in intervening and then failing to see the situation through. Thus, there needs to be a full debate about the nature of the American commitment and the kind of effort the United States is prepared to make to meet it before American forces intervene in a particular situation.

Finally, the future of the government to which we will be allied in any military conflict needs to be carefully assessed. The United States must ask whether that government is viable—whether it commands a sufficient amount of support and loyalty from its people to succeed in the confrontation. The United States also needs to ask whether its ally is committed to the democratic and human values which justify our support. We also should consider whether either side of the conflict is likely to align itself in international politics in ways which will adversely affect American security interests.

If all of this is done, American military intervention will be very rare. In the places where such intervention would be clearly justified, including in my view, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and, if Soviet military forces are used, Israel, such intervention is not likely to be necessary because the depth of American commitment is clear and the stakes are too high for anybody to contemplate the use of military force. In all other areas of the world American military intervention would be very unlikely and, in my view, not justified.

I should add that I wrote a similar paper in 1967 while serving as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense. That paper, which also suggested that there should be se-

†Even in the case of Taiwan, I would argue that the United States has not abandoned its commitment to prevent the use of force to change the Government on Taiwan. Rather, it has changed the form of that commitment in deference to Chinese sensibilities.

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vere limits to American military intervention, was delivered as a speech at Pomona College and subsequently published.* According to some analysts, it served as one of the bases for the Nixon Doctrine and that doctrine in turn was said to justify American bombing and invasion of Cambodia. If any of that is true, I can only hope that this paper will have less influence. □

*Morton H. Halperin, "After Vietnam: Security and Intervention in Asia," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIII, No. 2, (1968).

SOVIET-U.S. INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES

The 'Power Projection' Gap

MICHAEL T. KLARE

It has long been common for Western analysts to assume that the Soviet military establishment is structured along the same lines as the American war machine. Thus, the Soviet nuclear arsenal is often pictured as a carbon copy of the American arsenal, while the Soviet Navy is described as a latter-day replica of the United States Navy. But while many Russian weapons resemble their American counterparts, the Soviet military apparatus as a whole is not closely patterned on the American model. Indeed, there are many disparities and asymmetries in the United States-Soviet military balance, reflecting profound differences in history, military doctrine, political outlook and technical proficiency. Only by recognizing these differences can we obtain an accurate assessment of America's and Russia's military capabilities and thus of their relative capacity to employ force as an instrument of national policy.

Nowhere has the tendency to misportray Soviet military capabilities been more pronounced than in the case of intervention forces. Because the United States maintains a large and powerful interventionist apparatus, and because these forces have occasionally been used in controversial and unpopular operations abroad, it has sometimes been convenient for Pentagon apologists to postulate the existence of a comparable Soviet apparatus. Thus, Soviet helicopter carriers are described as "aircraft carriers," Russian coastal infantry units are likened to the U.S. Marine Corps, and Soviet paratroop brigades are equated with America's long-range strike forces. The fact is, however, that the Soviet Union has not attempted to duplicate the American interventionist force, and such comparable units as it has created are organized for rather different tactical missions than their American equivalents.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union lacks a capacity to employ military force in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives; indeed, recent events in Angola and Ethiopia tell us otherwise. But we must not assume that because Moscow has demonstrated its willingness and capacity to support beleaguered allies abroad, it is therefore willing and able to commit its own troops in a full-scale intervention of the Vietnam type far from Soviet territory. As we shall see, the U.S.S.R. does not at present possess such a capability, nor does it appear to be building one. It is likely, however, that Moscow will seek new alliances in Africa and the Middle East, thus prompting calls for decisive American action—possibly including military action—to discourage these ventures. And given the danger that such action could trigger a major conflict, it is essential that we appreciate the relative imbalance between American and Russian intervention capabilities. This will enable us to draw the likely limits to Soviet military involvement abroad.

In this essay, I will compare the long-range intervention capabilities of the two superpowers and examine the military doctrine that governs their design and deployment. Before proceeding, however, a few words must be said about nomenclature. By *intervention capabilities*, I mean those military forces created by a country for the purpose of invading and occupying other countries in order to affect their political behavior. In Pentagon parlance, such capabilities are called "projection forces" (as in "projection of power"), and are characterized by their capacity "for long-distance, forcible insertion into enemy-occupied territory against armed opposition." Normally, such forces are assumed to include both ground combat units and the air- and sealift elements used to transport them to the battlefield. Projection forces may of course be used for other purposes—to intimidate hostile powers through "show of force" operations; to assist allied governments under attack from a common enemy; or to reinforce regular military forces during a major war—but it is their capacity to forcibly occupy enemy-held territory far beyond a country's normal defense perimeter that distinguishes interventionist forces from conventional military forces. Thus the Russian tank forces used to subdue Czechoslovakia in 1968 cannot be considered interventionist forces if they lack the ability to perform similar missions in, say, Africa or Asia, nor can Soviet amphibious forces be considered interventionist if they are unable to transport combat forces beyond Soviet coastal waters.

Having made these distinctions, we can turn to an examination of American and Soviet intervention capabilities, beginning with a review of the doctrines and strategies that govern the size, structure and operational deployment of these forces.

One-and-a-Half Wars

Ever since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a "forward-deployed" strategy whereby large numbers of troops are based overseas in order to secure the boundaries of the Western world. Most of these troops are stationed along the principal East-West frontiers in Europe and along the 38th Parallel in Korea, but another set of forces has always been reserved for contingencies arising elsewhere. These latter forces, based in the United States, at sea and at key bases abroad, are on permanent call for deployment to distant trouble spots at the discretion of the President. Although trained and equipped for forcible insertion into enemy-held territory, these "projection" forces are also used in a threatening mode to signal that Washington can employ military force against any errant government that refuses to alter its objectionable behavior.

American projection forces also con-

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stitute the nation's standby reserve for meeting the "half-war" requirement in the Pentagon's "one-and-a-half war" planning model. Under current doctrine, war planners assume that America may someday have to fight a major war in Europe against Warsaw Pact forces (one war) and, at the same time, a limited conflict elsewhere (the half war). In order to guarantee that Washington can respond to a minor contingency in the Third World without in any way diminishing its capacity to withstand the Russians in Europe, the one-and-a-half war strategy requires the maintenance of powerful combat forces outside the NATO military establishment.

This "half-war" scenario reflects Washington's conviction that national security is threatened as much by political and economic turbulence in the Third World as by a hypothetical East-West war in Europe. Because the American economy is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign sources of raw materials—particularly energy sources—as well as on overseas markets for American-made goods, America's "national interests" are now seen as including unimpeded access to foreign oil supplies and control over the world's key maritime trade routes. "The United States has become irreversibly involved in world issues," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told Congress on January 25. "Our economy has come to depend heavily on imports of energy supplies and raw materials, and 9 percent of our G.N.P. now results from the sale of U.S. goods and services abroad." To protect these interests, and to insure the survival of pro-American governments abroad, "we are bound to have a strategic stake in such distant places as the Sea of Japan, the Strait of Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Dardanelles, the Baltic, and the Barents Sea." When the United States' access to these strategic areas is threatened, Brown affirmed, we must be prepared "to act early and positively."

Ultimately, then, the task of American projection forces is to forestall any changes in the world political-economic order that threaten our continued prosperity. Because such threats are largely unpredictable, and because they could involve a wide spectrum of potential adversaries, American projection forces must be prepared for rapid deployment to any location on the globe and, once there, to overcome forces that could range from poorly armed guerrillas up to modern armies, such as those found in Syria and Iraq. Pentagon doctrine also holds that these forces must be prepared to overcome Soviet expeditionary forces in the course of such maneuvers, and must be prepared to do so without assistance from allies. It is on the basis of these demanding contingencies, according to the Congressional Budget Office, that the United States maintains its current mix of "large, diversified projection forces with many support units."

U.S. Capability

For planning and budgetary purposes, the American projection capability is assumed by the Department of Defense to comprise the following combat, transport and supply elements:

§ *The Marine Corps*, consisting of three Marine divisions of 20,000 men each and their associated Marine Air Wings. Considered the interventionist force *par excellence*, the Marine Corps now numbers 192,000 men and women, with 30,000 (representing one division plus one air wing) held in the Reserve. Marine assets include 364 combat aircraft, 438 helicopters, 575 M-60 tanks and assorted artillery pieces. Normally, one Marine Amphibious Unit (a reinforced battalion assault team plus associated landing ships) is stationed in the Mediterranean and two in the Pacific.

§ *Army mobile strike forces*, encompassing the 15,000-man 82nd Airborne Division and the 18,000-strong 101st Airmobile Division. These "light" divisions, normally based in the United States, are kept at a high state of readiness for deployment on short notice to trouble spots abroad. Although these Army divisions do not possess integral air support as do the Marine divisions, Pentagon doctrine calls for the simultaneous deployment of several Tactical Air Command wings of seventy-five to 100 aircraft each. Also, should these forces prove inadequate, there are another three Army infantry divisions in the United States available for a "half-war" contingency. For lesser contingencies, on the other hand, Washington can employ such airborne units as the Army Special Forces, the Rangers and the new anti-terrorist force being assembled at Fort Bragg.

§ *Air Force transport capabilities*, consisting of seventy C-5A Galaxy heavy transports, 234 C-141 Starlifter medium transports and 234 C-130 Hercules tactical transports. These are the planes that would be used to transport Army or Marine units or both to the battlefield in any future interventions abroad. All told, the C-5As and C-141s can carry 16,000 tons of cargo or 60,000 fully equipped soldiers over distances of 3,000 miles or more, while the C-130s can carry 5,125 tons or 21,500 troops over 2,500 miles. These military aircraft can be augmented on short notice by the 220 commercial transports (727s, 747s, etc.) in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

§ *Navy carrier forces*, consisting of thirteen carriers and their aircraft, plus associated escort and supply vessels. All told, the existing carrier force can deploy an estimated 800 fighters and ground-support aircraft (F-14s, F-4s, A-7s, A-6s) plus assorted A.S.W. (antisubmarine warfare) and reconnaissance planes and helicopters. These forces, which can be brought to bear against any overseas power without reliance on foreign bases, are rightfully considered the backbone of America's power projection capability. (The Defense Department now expects to maintain the carrier force at its present, thirteen-ship level; Congressional pressure to establish a "Fifth Fleet" in the Indian Ocean could, however, force the Pentagon to deploy a fourteen- or even fifteen-carrier force.)

§ *Navy amphibious lift*, provided by sixty-four amphibious assault and transport vessels. This total includes two LCC amphibious command ships, three LHA helicopter assault ships (two more are under construction), seven LPH amphibious assault ships, five LKA amphibious cargo ships, fourteen LPD amphibious transport docks, thirteen LSD dock landing ships and twenty LST tank landing ships. All told, these vessels can carry the equivalent of one Marine division plus their war materiel, and can deliver this force directly to the battlefield using their self-contained fleet of some 300 helicopters and 100 landing barges.

And this is only the "cutting edge" of American projection forces. A full accounting would have to include any tactical air units provided by the Air Force for support of Army strike forces, Strategic Air Command tankers used for in-flight refueling of transport aircraft, and all necessary backup communications, logistics and medical forces. All told, the United States' power projection capability probably involves 600,000 uniformed personnel (about 28 percent of total Armed Forces manpower) and consumes some $28.5 billion, or 22 percent of the fiscal 1980 defense budget.

For some Pentagon planners, even this prodigious force is not adequate to protect critical American interests abroad. Citing the growing strength of

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such potential adversaries as Syria and Iraq, they argue that America's projection capabilities must be expanded if the Defense Department is to guarantee our access to Persian Gulf oil in the event of hostilities. In response to such concerns, the Carter Administration announced that the Pentagon would establish a 100,000-strong "rapid-reaction strike force" for possible deployment in the Persian Gulf. This special force is likely to consist of the 82nd and 101st divisions plus other Army, Marine and Air Force units. Moreover, the Air Force is enlarging its C-141 transports to provide additional airlift capacity, and will begin procurement of the McDonnell Douglas KC-10A advanced tanker/cargo aircraft. As concern over the Persian Gulf and adjacent areas mounts, these programs will undoubtedly receive increased attention from both Congress and the White House.

The 'Motherland' Strategy

Turning now to the Russians, we find a very different set of strategic priorities. While U.S. military doctrine emphasizes a "forward defense" at the outer boundaries of the West—Germany, Turkey, Korea, etc.—Soviet doctrine stresses the fortification of the U.S.S.R. itself as an impregnable bulwark against Western attack. (Thus, while nearly half of all of U.S. ground combat formations are stationed overseas, only 18 percent of Soviet divisions are deployed outside the borders of the U.S.S.R.—and all of these are stationed in Eastern Europe, which is perceived by Soviet leaders as guarding the very approaches to Moscow.) Given the grim experience of World War II—in which perhaps 20 million Russians lost their lives, defense of the Motherland is quite naturally seen as the overriding mission of the Soviet military establishment. This view is reinforced by Moscow's beliefs that the U.S.S.R. constitutes both the supreme achievement and the ultimate guardian of socialist society; in any war with the West, therefore, Soviet forces will be fighting not only to defend their homeland but also to insure the survival of socialism itself. Nationalism and ideology thus combine to perpetuate the "siege mentality" which governs the disposition of the Soviet military forces.

Soviet military theory also deviates from American doctrine in prescribing the *types* of war that Soviet forces must be prepared to fight. Whereas U.S. doctrine holds that American forces must be highly diversified in order to meet a wide spectrum of possible conflict situations, Soviet doctrine assumes that any East-West clash will automatically escalate to a full-scale war and that Soviet forces must therefore be designed with this contingency in mind. Thus, while the United States maintains both "heavy" divisions for a European contingency and "light" divisions for a Third World contingency, *all* Soviet divisions are designed for a full-scale engagement with the West.

It follows from all this that there is no equivalent, in Soviet doctrine, of the American "one-and-a-half war" strategy. In contrast to the U.S. practice of reserving a large block of forces for a "half-war" contingency in the Third World, all Soviet forces are assumed to perform a strategic defense role. Nevertheless, Soviet doctrine holds that these forces may, on occasion, be used for other missions in accordance with Soviet foreign policy. Such missions can include "show the flag" visits by Soviet vessels to foreign ports, naval maneuvers designed to demonstrate Moscow's support for an endangered ally or client (as, for example, when Soviet warships were stationed off the coast of Vietnam following the recent border clash with China) and to deliver military hardware to friendly Third World governments and national liberation movements. In such cases, Soviet forces can be said to be operating in a projection mode; but it is important to remember that the units involved are seen by Moscow as being "on loan" from their normal, defensive mission, and so would presumably be recalled the moment they were needed at home.

Despite this distinction, some military analysts in the West have charged that Soviet leaders are prepared to launch a "Western-style" intervention against hostile governments abroad. Soviet doctrine assumes, however, that Moscow would act only after a friendly government had come under attack and requested Soviet assistance (as the Russians perceive their role in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan). Thus there is no requirement, in Soviet strategy, for specialized forces capable of "forcible insertion into enemy occupied territory against armed opposition"—to use the American definition of a projection capability. Nor do the Russians speak anywhere of overseas "interests" such as oil or mineral supplies which would justify such a capability. Such restraint is motivated as much by pragmatism as by ideology—Soviet leaders are fully


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aware of the West's determination to protect its vital interests abroad, and it is implicit in Soviet military doctrine that Moscow would not care to commit its own forces to any Third World contingency where there is any risk of a direct clash with U.S. military forces.

Although Western analysts tend to discount the relevance of Soviet military theory (except when seeking evidence for their own interpretations of Soviet behavior), the evidence suggests that the Russians—no less than the Americans—tend to design and deploy their forces in accordance with established military doctrine. While America's "one-and-a-half war" strategy has resulted in the establishment of a substantial pool of forces designed for Third World contingency, the Soviet forces are principally designed for an all-out war with the West. Thus there are no true Soviet equivalents to the specific U.S. projection forces described earlier. There are, however, some Soviet central-war forces that exhibit characteristics comparable to U.S. projection forces and that would, presumably, perform a similar role should the U.S.S.R. engage in interventionist operations overseas. These forces are:

§ *Soviet Naval Infantry*, a small force of 12,000 "marines" assigned to Soviet fleets and river flotillas. This modest force was created in the early 1960s to provide the Soviet Navy with a limited amphibious assault capability. Unlike the United States Marines, the Naval Infantry is not equipped with tanks or other heavy equipment, and does not possess an integral air arm. According to former Pentagon analyst Graham Turbiville, the principal mission of the Naval Infantry is to secure the coastal flanks of Warsaw Pact ground troops in Europe (where Soviet land-based aircraft would be available to provide the necessary air cover). Theoretically, these forces could also be used in a seaborne attack outside of the European theater, but their small size and lack of integral airpower would place them at a severe disadvantage in any assaults on heavily defended positions.

§ *Soviet airborne forces*, consisting of seven paratroop divisions of about 7,500 men each equipped with infantry arms, anti-tank missiles and mobile artillery. Although often compared to the U.S. 82nd and 101st divisions, Soviet paratroop forces do not have a primary Third World orientation but appear to be designed for a support role in the European theater. Thus, in recent Warsaw Pact training exercises, they have been used to neutralize enemy strong points in front of the main ground assault, or to occupy key ports, airstrips, bridges, etc., behind enemy lines. Presumably, these forces would also be used in the event of future anti-Soviet uprisings within Eastern Europe (or even in one of the ethnically distinct autonomous republics of the U.S.S.R. itself). Some Western analysts have suggested that they could likewise be used to spearhead a Soviet invasion of hostile countries in the Third World, but given Russia's lack of true attack carriers, they would be highly vulnerable to enemy air and tank attacks and are unlikely therefore to be deployed against a determined, well-equipped adversary.

§ *Soviet air transport capabilities*, now encompassing the 1,300-odd transport planes assigned to the Military Transport Aviation (V.T.A.) service. The long-range component of the fleet presently consists of 735 An-12 medium transports, some fifty An-22 heavy cargo planes and eighty Il-76 jet transports. These aircraft are capable of moving a significant quantity of troops and materiel over relatively long distances, but lack the airborne refueling capability of American transports and thus must land at friendly airports for refueling on long-haul operations. Also, the largest of these aircraft, the An-22 turboprop, can carry only 175,000 pounds of cargo compared to the C-5A's 220,000 pounds, and has a shorter operating range (3,100 miles compared with 3,750 miles). And while these aircraft could be used to supply Soviet forces in the event of a major operation abroad (as indeed they have been used to supply allied forces in Angola and Ethiopia), they could only be employed in the absence of an enemy air threat since the Russians lack carrier-based fighters to protect their unarmed transports.

§ *Soviet carrier forces*, presently consisting of two *Moskva*-class helicopter carriers and two *Kiev*-class helicopter/VTOL (vertical-take-off-and-landing plane) carriers. (Two more *Kiev*-class vessels are reportedly under construction.) The 15,000-ton *Moskva*, and her sister ship, *Leningrad*, normally carry some eighteen to twenty KA-25 ASW helicopters armed with depth charges and torpedoes; the 40,000-ton *Kiev*, and sister *Minsk*, carry twenty-five KA-25s plus a dozen or so Yak-36 VTOL combat planes (which, because of weight restrictions, are not believed to have a significant offensive capability). Neither class can be considered a match for America's newest carrier, the 93,000-ton nuclear-powered *Nimitz* with its complement of 100 jet fighters. The Russians call their carriers "anti-submarine cruisers," and everything we know about them to date confirms that this is indeed their mission. They can also be used, in peacetime, for "show the flag" operations intended to demonstrate Soviet support for distant allies, but they would be of very limited use in supporting a Soviet amphibious assault against heavily defended positions.

§ *Soviet amphibious lift*, now provided by eighty-four amphibious cargo ships, of which only twenty-five (fourteen *Alligator*-class LSTs, ten *Ropucha*-class LSTs, and the new *Ivan Rogov*) are considered capable of "open-ocean transit" by the Department of Defense. Most Soviet amphibious vessels are much smaller than their nearest American counterparts—the 5,800-ton *Alligator* types, for instance, have less than one-third the capacity of the comparable *Iwo Jima*-class transports, and they lack a self-contained helicopter transport fleet. Even the new *Ivan Rogov*, at 13,000 tons the largest Russian amphibious vessel, is considered a "far cry" from the 39,000-ton *Tarawa*-class helicopter assault ship. Although some Soviet amphibious vessels have joined combat ships on voyages to the Indian and Pacific oceans, Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar note in their *Guide to the Soviet Navy* that "these amphibious forces are primarily maintained to support ground and naval operations along the Soviet periphery."

Together, these forces provide the Soviet leadership with a substantial capacity for aiding friendly forces abroad, but only a modest capacity for long-range intervention against a well-armed opponent. In any major undertaking, Soviet projection forces could of course be reinforced by regular combat units—but this would require the diversion of forces committed to either the European or Chinese theater (since, as we have seen, the Russians do not have a strategic troop reserve such as that mandated by the Pentagon's "one-and-a-half war" strategy) and this is not likely to be allowed except in extraordinary (and at this point unforeseen) circumstances.

Some Western analysts have suggested that Moscow has embarked on a major effort to beef up its interventionist capabilities, but evidence for such an effort is at present meager. The Naval Infantry and Airborne divisions have remained at their current strength for the past twenty years or so and

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there is still no sign that the Russians intend to build a true attack carrier on the American model. There has been an expansion in Soviet amphibious capabilities, but this reflects gradual improvements in ship design rather than any crash program to augment the fleet. Similarly, old propeller-driven transport planes are being replaced with jet-powered aircraft, but the overall size of the military transport fleet has diminished as this modernization program has progressed. Undoubtedly there are some Soviet officers who, like some American officers, feel that their country's projection capabilities are grossly inadequate for many of the possible contingencies that are likely to occur in the future but, given growing Soviet concern with the threat posed by China, it is unlikely that any Soviet leaders will condone a major transfer of resources from the main defensive armies to a Third World-oriented projection apparatus.

U.S.-Soviet Gap

We can now compare the strength and effectiveness of the principal components of the United States and Soviet intervention capabilities. Simply adding up the numbers of each provides some rough indicators of relative capacity:

§ *Manpower:* counting "marines" and air-mobile forces only, we have 215,000 for the United States and 64,500 for the U.S.S.R., giving the United States a 3-to-1 advantage.

§ *Carrier forces:* total American carrier displacement comes to 1,039,600 tons compared with 114,000 tons for the U.S.S.R. (a 9-to-1 advantage); American carriers can launch 800 attack aircraft compared with perhaps forty

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Yak-36s of questionable value (a 20-to-1 advantage which increases to about 100-to-1 when U.S. advantages in range and payload are factored in).

§ *Airlift:* American transports (C-5As, C-141s, C-130s) can together deliver 21,135 tons while Soviet transports (An-12s, An-22s and Il-76s) can deliver 24,140 tons; this slight advantage for the Soviets is offset, however, by the superior range of the American transports.

§ *Amphibious lift:* the total displacement of U.S. amphibious vessels is 944,000 tons, compared with 175,000 tons for Soviet vessels, giving the United States a 5-to-1 advantage.

These figures clearly indicate that in most basic categories American projection forces are considerably superior to those possessed by the Soviet Union. This numerical advantage is enhanced, moreover, by significant American advantages in the performance capabilities of these forces. Soviet transport planes, for example, lack the in-flight refueling capacity of U.S. transports, Soviet amphibious vessels lack an integral helicopter lift capability and Soviet marines are not equipped with tanks as are their American counterparts. More important than any of these deficiencies, however, is the U.S.S.R.'s lack of true attack carriers; without assured air superiority over the battlefield, Soviet ground forces would be highly vulnerable to enemy air and tank forces in any encounter with a determined opponent and thus it is in no position to launch a full-scale "over the beach" assault such as those conducted by the Marines during World War II and the Korean War.

For all of these reasons, the RAND Corporation concluded in 1977 that "gross Soviet capabilities" to project power abroad "do not remotely equal the gross capabilities the United States could potentially bring to bear." This assessment was seconded by the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his fiscal 1979 report on United States military posture: America's ability "to project and sustain power by military force," he asserted, "is unequalled by any other nation." Stated in more familiar terms, the Soviet Union is suffering from a severe "power projection gap" in relation to the United States.

Allies Count Too

So far, we have been talking only about comparative American and Soviet capabilites. When we consider allied capabilities on both sides, the East-West projection gap widens appreciably. Both Britain and France possess significant interventionist forces which may prove useful in some of the trouble spots that might develop in Africa or the Middle East. Russia's Warsaw Pact allies, however, could provide only token support. Britain and France each retain two aircraft carriers in regular service, and both have well-equipped paratroop and counterinsurgency forces which have seen active service in Africa and the Middle East. France, in particular, has demonstrated a willingness to commit its interventionist forces to "police" operations in Africa (where recently, French commandos were carried on American military transports during the crisis in Zaire's Shaba Province), while even tiny Belgium has repeatedly sent its paratroop units into Zaire. These capabilities are, of course, balanced by the sizable Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia, but, barring any sudden reduction in the level of fighting in Angola, it is unlikely that the Cubans can muster additional forces for major conflicts elsewhere. The Cubans cannot, moreover, expect the same sort of battlefield air support from the Russians that the French and British can provide to their own forces.

Clearly, the United States retains a significant capacity for full-scale intervention against armed opposition in almost every area of the Third World. The only foreseeable contingency that is likely to pose extraordinary difficulties for United States forces is an armed takeover of Arab oilfields. Because such facilities are spread over a very wide area and are highly vulnerable to sabotage, it is considered unlikely that American forces could seize them intact should the Arabs decide to destroy them. The growing military power of many Third World countries—enhanced in many cases by Western no less than Soviet arms transfers—also poses problems for Pentagon war planners. But there is no doubt that American projection forces remain a credible instrument for a show of force, intimidation and, if need be, armed intervention against hostile Third World powers.

Moscow's options are manifestly much more limited. While we can expect that the U.S.S.R. will continue to provide military aid—and in some cases rather substantial aid—to chosen allies abroad, it does not appear capable of mounting a full-scale intervention against a determined and well-equipped opponent located any distance from Soviet territory. Should a war break out in the "northern tier" area of the Middle East—i.e., the region stretching from Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east to Iraq and Turkey in the west—Moscow could of course move its forces by ground directly to the battlefield. Elsewhere, however, the U.S.S.R. would encounter major difficulties in inserting its forces in sufficient speed and strength to insure certain success, especially if its adversaries were equipped with any sort of air force. Thus, it is unlikely that Moscow will order a Western-style intervention in Africa, Southeast Asia or other nonadjacent Third World areas. And if there is any likelihood of Washington or NATO involvement in a given conflict, the probability of direct Soviet involvement drops pretty close to zero—where it has been ever since the end of World War II.

The preceding analysis permits us to discard some of the more alarmist projections of future developments in Africa and the Middle East. No doubt the Russians will continue to cultivate ties with the Marxist-oriented regimes which have cropped up over the past few years, but its unhappy experiences with Somalia and Egypt (both of which have annulled their treaties of friendship with the U.S.S.R.) and the growing anti-Soviet outlook of the new Iranian Government will surely lead to a fair degree of caution. Soviet aid to its chosen allies—Ethiopia, Angola, Southern Yemen, etc.—will continue to vex Western leaders and thus prompt intensified calls for anti-Soviet efforts in the Middle East, but it is unlikely that Moscow will care to challenge—in military terms—any of the West's major overseas commitments. Given all we have learned here about comparative American and Soviet intervention capacities, we should be skeptical of any claims of an imminent Soviet military threat to critical Western interests, and reject any scare talk about Soviet military buildup that calls for further massive expansion by the United States of its forces □

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INTERVENTION IN EUROPE

Paradoxes of American Power

NORMAN BIRNBAUM

The United States is a European power and, as such, has continuously intervened in European affairs since World War I. The paradoxes of its intervention are two. Frequently, our policies have produced results quite the opposite of those intended. The American refusal to participate in the League of Nations, in order to insure our distance from Europe's perennial conflicts, contributed in the end to the outbreak of a second war into which we were quite inevitably drawn. Our strenuous efforts to assist the West Europeans after 1945 has made them much more independent of us, and rendered the assumptions of the Atlantic Alliance more tenuous. The doctrine of liberation, intended for the Soviet bloc (and in some versions, for the Soviet Union itself), has served to emphasize our unreadiness and unwillingness to alter the division of Europe.

The second paradox is that developments in Europe have occurred less as the result of our intentions than as the consequence of intrinsic long-term processes that we could hardly alter. The West Europeans have found the economic and political resources to deal quite effectively with the Soviet bloc. Within the bloc itself, economic and political pressures (not least, contact with freer societies) have compelled the ruling parties to make changes in the direction of liberalization. What lessons follow? Let us examine the recent past before drawing any. This essay rests, however, on a deliberately large (even imprecise) conception of intervention. The forms of intervention vary, but there are ways in which our very historical presence constitutes intervention. Other nations must take account of us, even when we suppose that we are going about our own business. This analysis rests on the further assumption that our political, economic, military and cultural relations with the Europeans merge with one another to constitute this historical American presence in Europe, i.e., our intervention.

Norman Birnbaum is a professor at Amherst College, and a member of The Nation's *Editorial Board.*

Stability and Liberation

To elaborate on this, the political aims of the United States in Europe were, ostensibly, stabilization for Western Europe and the opposite for an Eastern Europe that was to be "liberated." In fact, the pursuit of stability in Western Europe meant that we became involved in its political conflicts. We could not manipulate these, however, indefinitely or without limit: Western European autonomy was too great. After all, in these societies we accepted voting as a means of regulating conflict. The aim of "liberation" in Eastern Europe imprisoned us between claims on which we could not make good and risks we could not incur. We had little direct access to populations denied political freedom—and few ways to compel ruling elites to extend freedom, short of threats that could undermine our position in Western Europe. Politics stopped where our means ran out.

Business and Foreign Policy

In Eastern Europe, economy and state were one. In Western Europe, as in our society, they were inextricably connected. Our economic ties to Western Europe had several consequences, not all of them intended. Our Government sought political stabilization there through Marshall Plan aid. Our corporations got large orders and widened access to an expanded West European market. Much more recently, we attempted stabilization of our ties to the Soviet bloc and took political steps to expand trade. Our corporations, again, profited from an aim initially political. In both cases, the context of political decision was economic. Now Western Europe is an economic power in its own right, while our capital is increasingly unproductive—bound up in arms production or blocked by our defective social infrastructure. Economic relations, then, both extend and shape political ones. Despite Kissinger's denunciation of businessmen for their narrow concentration on profits rather than (his definition of) the national interest, it is impossible to imagine an American for-

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eign policy without large corporate participation, frequently in the personnel of the national security apparatus.

War and Politics

War, said the Prussian thinker Karl von Clausewitz, is the continuation of politics by other means. We can say the same about preparation for war. Our military presence in Western Europe, our alliance system, its armament, the strategy and tactics we plan to follow, imply—and help determine—political ends. We rely on a deterrent which, if used to save Europe, would surely destroy it: tactical nuclear weapons. No one quite believes that we would risk the nuclear destruction of the United States to avert a Soviet attack on Europe. The present strains in NATO (particularly with Germany) show how political military questions can become. Our military presence in Europe was, once, a blunter instrument. We used it to threaten intervention in Italian politics—and the West Germans are only now emancipating themselves very slowly from our tutelage. The shift to a counterforce strategy by the Pentagon, meanwhile, will (despite SALT II) destabilize our political relations with the Soviet Union. Vending arms to China would do the same. There are, in effect, no purely military questions—as our Pentagon understands very well.

Irresistible Ideas

I have described ideas as instruments of power. Ideas, after all, are the most effective means to exact political compliance. Ideas, however, do not function in isolation. They are embedded in a culture, in a structure of personal and social sensibility, in a vision of community. Despite all the conflicts and flaws in our society, our most formidable appeal in both Europes is our egalitarianism. Economic and educational exchange, our military forces in Europe, tourism, the ethnic ties of tens of millions of families amount to an American cultural presence in Europe far deeper than that conveyed by books, films, records and TV. The anxiety of the Soviet elite about this presence is a measure of its effectiveness. The difficulty lies elsewhere, in that residue of Calvinist self-righteousness in our elites which has given them a sense of imperial mission and an ineradicable provincialism. Once the American populace comes to see that we too are that mission's objects, that will change. Our protest of the war in Vietnam was more than a political phenomenon, it was a cultural one—an international lesson in citizenship. Our cultural relations with Europe, in other words, escape the control of ideological bureaucrats. Let us see how all of these themes combine in recent historical experience.

Historical Role of U.S. in Europe

Our European role is as old as the Republic—nay, older. The colonial provinces and especially the new United States served the eighteenth-century European imagination as a parade ground of liberty. In the nineteenth century, we were seen (not alone by Tocqueville but by Marx) as the *locus classicus* of democracy and equality. The struggle over slavery divided Europe, particularly England. Unrestricted immigration, meanwhile, had considerable effects on the social life of a number of European peoples. The steady flow of political migrants meant that domestic politics occasionally refracted Europe's conflicts. (Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in *Foreign Affairs*, has recently shown that the current debate on human rights was anticipated by our politicians well over a century ago.) In the twentieth century, under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, our political presence in Europe was direct. We always hear about Wilsonian moralism, but along with Calvinist self-righteousness, we were by then exporting capital to Europe. Britain's economic losses during the war, the liquidation of its investments abroad and the burden of reparations on Germany meant that we emerged as the world's strongest economic power. An important group of the elite in charge of that power between the wars was in continuous session at the Council on Foreign Relations—where academic and corporate internationalists laid the conceptual foundations for our role after World War II. The period between the wars was not one of isolationism in any enduring or pure sense. Popular repugnance for renewed military involvement abroad had ethnic (and sometimes ideological) sources. The interval between the defeat of the League of Nations Treaty in the Senate (1920) and the Lend-Lease Act (1941) was not simply one of American withdrawal from European politics. Finally, it was also a period in which ethnic groups other than the one represented by the Council took a larger role in American politics—with important consequences for our policies in Europe, then and later.

Postwar Continuity

American intervention in postwar Europe, then, was not part of the assumption of a new role—but the continuation of an old one. We moved quickly into the vacuum left by Great Britain. The dollar replaced the pound as the dominant international currency. We assumed Britain's military role in Greece and Turkey in 1947. We re-

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stored the continental balance of power by forming NATO in 1949. The sequence suggests that a large economic and political role for the United States in Western Europe preceded a military one.

The new international monetary system, indeed, was prepared during the war—at the Bretton Woods conference. The sudden, even brutal, stoppage of Lend-Lease with the end of hostilities in 1945 gave the United States immediate economic advantage over Labor-governed Britain and the other allied nations. The Marshall Plan, formulated in 1947, was clearly and explicitly intended not only to assist European recovery but to stabilize Western European politics and society. The occupying nations' policies in their zones of Germany, before the formation of the Federal Republic in 1949, had the same aim.

NATO and the Marshall Plan

Military and political confrontation with the Soviet Union in central Europe, which culminated in the Berlin blockade, simply deepened our elite's resolve to maintain friendly regimes in Western Europe. The Marshall Plan was originally open to the East European nations, although our planners hardly entertained illusions about the Soviet response. The primary American strategic concern in Europe was not the problem of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, which had been conceded by the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations—particularly with respect to Poland. It was with the two dangers to American hegemony in Western Europe. One was represented by the Communist parties in France and Italy, and by the general potential for social unrest in Europe. The other was entailed in the German problem. Efforts to negotiate a settlement of that problem with the Soviet Union were unavailing. The subsequent debate within Germany and in Europe on German rearmament dragged on until 1954, but rearmament was clearly implied by the consolidation of the three Western zones into a provisional state in 1949. We do well to remind ourselves, now that Germany is NATO's most effective European member, that the Social Democrats originally opposed rearmament and membership in NATO because they preferred a reunified and neutralized status for their country—a status offered by Stalin as late as 1952 and refused by the German Government then in office as well as by the United States. NATO and the Marshall Plan thus had effects which were neither strictly military nor limitedly economic. These were the means of American institutional intervention in Europe, ways of establishing close connections with European elites.

Choosing Friends . . .

We favored, in Western Europe, those who had settled on reformist or welfare capitalism and parliamentary democracy. To be sure, there were some credentials we did not examine too closely—many of our new-found German friends had been either Nazis or faithful servitors of the Nazis. In Greece, Portugal and Spain we were quite prepared to deal with authoritarians and fascists. It must be said that we displayed the same ideological largesse

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when, after a long period of hesitation, we aided Tito's Yugoslavia. Our Government did not object to social democracy; we were not exporting a model of society. Rather, our officials preferred to collaborate with those who gravitated to a model of society not impossibly different from our own. Nor did Europeans need American instruction in techniques of marketing or production. The people who had invented the Ecole Polytechnique or the Technische Hochschulen did not need the Harvard Business School to instruct them on capitalism. The American unions (with assistance from the C.I.A.), for their part, insisted that the Christian and social democratic segments of European unionism—especially in France and Italy—break with the Communists.

. . . and Influencing Peoples

The United States also undertook a program, subtle or otherwise, of cultural propaganda. It suggested that there was a certain identity between the mass consumption of consumer goods and true egalitarianism. It also suggested that a sane democracy would and should go no further than a mild reformism with respect to class relations. The United States not only found European industrialists and politicians willing to collaborate with its program, European intellectuals and publicists came forward, too. This was the period, remember, during which the C.I.A. ventured into financing the spheres of culture, when prominent American academics and intellectuals did not feel ashamed to act as the C.I.A.'s paymasters, being themselves already on its payroll.

Singular Alignments

The historical coincidence of two problems, an external and internal Stalinist threat, and the difficulties of economic recovery, resulted in singular European alignments with the United States. The United States favored West European unity. Had not federalism worked for us, and would it not work for less fortunate peoples? A unified Western Europe would offer a larger market for American capital. Politically, the integration of West Germany into Europe was favored by other Europeans anxious about the Germans, and by Germans who distrusted their own national traditions—especially by conservatives who made no distinction between Social Democrats and Communists. Our elites were functionally deaf to a prominent note in the movement for European unity. European Catholics and Protestants, socialists and radicals, and a good many conservatives, adhered to the idea of a distinctive European cultural and political mission. They thought of a unified Europe as ideologically equidistant from the competing materialisms, as they saw them, of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Gaullist Détente

The American response to de Gaulle reflected, in full measure, our provincialism. De Gaulle campaigned against American economic hegemony by attacking the dollar. He envisaged a Europe militarily independent, withdrew France from the NATO Command and developed an independent French nuclear force. His conceptions of a European political vocation (one Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals") were a European version of détente. De Gaulle's concentration on these issues was made possible by his liquidation of the French colonial heritage in Algeria. In his remarkable speech at Phnom Penh in 1965, he called upon the United States not to repeat imperialism's errors in Southeast Asia. Both the American elite and the opposition were bewildered by de Gaulle. Clearly a conservative, how could he speak almost like those "neutralists" excoriated by John Foster Dulles as "immoral"? What Americans dismissed as de Gaulle's idiosyncrasy, however, was one expression of considerable cultural and political movement in a Europe which—fifteen years after the end of the war—had come to itself.

Common Market U.S.A.

The success of the Common Market stimulated American investment in Europe, which grew from $1.7 billion in 1950 to $6.7 billion in 1960 to $24.5 billion in 1970. European capitalists and unionists alike were quite aware that an undervalued dollar was buying productive capacity in Europe, and de Gaulle was not the only European political leader to complain that the Europeans were financing the disaster in Vietnam. The Nixon devaluation of the dollar in 1971 was a different sort of effort to impose our terms upon the Euro-

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

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pean economy, an effort to compete with the more efficient of the European economies (above all, the German one) on more nearly equal terms. There have been European suggestions that the oil crisis was not entirely to American disadvantage since the Europeans had to import all of their oil. What has happened, in general, is clear—a more antagonistic form of economic relationship between the European Community and the United States. American complaints, in the current trade negotiations with the Community, that the Europeans sell below "market price" have been dismissed by the Europeans. They insist that American "market price" rests on the lower level of social contributions made by American employers, on lower standards of environmental and occupational health protection. Once again, the political organization of the market determines market relations between the United States and the Europeans. For the moment, then, European capital and labor are relatively united in pursuit of European interests: the epoch of the Marshall Plan is well behind us.

Cultural Exports

The forms and content of American cultural penetration of Europe have also changed. The Europeans have their own mass culture to worry about, and cannot and do not depict it as an American importation. American culture still appeals profoundly in Western (and Eastern) Europe in ways which express our egalitarianism and vitality. The music of protest has crossed the Atlantic as jazz did before it. Did not the grotesque Otto von Habsburg, campaigning for the European Parliament in Bavaria with the party of Franz-Josef Strauss, denounce Bob Dylan as an enemy of Western culture? The French existentialists took their philosophy from Heidegger and Husserl, their social thought from Weber and Marx, but in literature they thought of Faulkner and Hemingway. The recent American reception of the varieties of Marxism and structuralism suggests that cultural exchange across the Atlantic is a round trip, once again.

'Liberating' East Europe

West Europeans and East Europeans have antithetical problems with respect to the United States. The former cultivate their autonomy, the latter seek closer ties. American relations with the Soviet bloc, now in a phase of some uncertainty, have exhibited one constant. There has been an inverse relationship between big talk and bold action. Roosevelt and Truman acquiesced in the hardening and tightening of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, including the *coup d'état* of 1948 in Czechoslovakia. America's Polish and other East European ethnic groups were unable to move successive administrations to ignore geopolitical and strategic constraints. The consolidation of our limited hegemony in Western Europe required restraint in Eastern Europe. The Republicans in this period attacked the "betrayal" of Eastern Europe at Yalta in terms as ferocious as those with which they denounced the "loss" of China—and the allegedly inexplicable limits put on the conduct of the war in Korea.* Once in office in 1952, the Eisenhower-Dulles Government proclaimed its commitment to liberation in Eastern Europe—and did nothing during the Polish disturbances and German revolt of 1953, or the Hungarian revolt of 1956. No doubt, there

*There, incidentally, was a case of intervention in reverse. The British made it clear that they would not tolerate the use of nuclear weapons in Korea. As usual in these matters, their intervention was effective because a significant segment of our own national security elite agreed with their view.

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was plenty of C.I.A. activity in Eastern Europe—and Radio Free Europe bears some of the (criminal) responsibility for encouraging the Hungarians to think that Western military aid was coming.

The reasons for the absence of direct Western intervention in Eastern Europe are not at all obscure. There was (and is) no Western consensus for policies that would almost certainly entail the danger of military confrontation—and there was (and is) no Western consensus that aggressive policies short of war can accomplish anything but increase the defensiveness and the repressiveness of the Soviet bloc. In the circumstances, our own propensity toward intervention has been restrained.

Contradictions of Communism

Stalinism, within and without the Soviet Union, has decomposed. The repression of dissent in the Soviet Union is still terrible, but its open expression contrasts remarkably with conditions some decades ago. The Soviet bloc is characterized by diversity. In Poland, an opposition has quasi-open standing and negotiates with the Government. In Czechoslovakia, the opposition is treated savagely. The relative loosening of repression is due to a process many American (and Western) experts assured us could never occur—immanent conflicts within state socialism which divide the party apparatus and enlarge the space for opposition. Indeed, those who now seek American governmental campaigns for more freedom in the Soviet Union (and in the nations of the Soviet bloc) are usually ready to demonstrate that nothing can change in those societies. Liberalization owes something to the sort of cultural, economic and political contacts with the Soviet bloc regimes abjured by the proponents of direct intervention. It isn't easy to find an approach that will not appear to condone or tolerate repression, while refraining from empty rhetoric. One answer is familiar, but useful: it falls to American citizens in their churches, professional and occupational groups to conduct their own campaigns for more freedom in the Soviet bloc.

Separate Hegemonies

President Carter's initial campaign for human rights in the Soviet Union has now given way to other tactics—not least because of Western European criticism as well as Soviet official anger. Our official position on the Soviet bloc is not very different from the one sketched on behalf of Henry Kissinger by his associate, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, in 1976. Rather than attempting to interfere directly in the relations between the Soviet Union and the nations of the bloc, we should make it clear that we recognize Soviet hegemony in its sphere. Since the Soviet Union in no case can be dislodged from Eastern Europe, only a sense of security on the part of the Soviet leadership will encourage it to make concessions to the peoples of the bloc.

In return, Sonnenfeldt said, we would want Soviet recognition of our hegemony in our sphere. In particular, we would expect a free hand in keeping the Western European Communist parties out of government in Western Europe. (Sonnenfeldt strenuously denies that he also argued that a danger of Eurocommunism was that it would encourage libertarian socialism in Eastern Europe and therefore have a generally destabilizing effect. However, he said as much at the Council on Foreign Relations—and the argument is not only his own.) The difficulty with that position, of course, is that Western Europeans of many parties resent being instructed by the United States about their political choices. Decidedly, the maintenance of hegemony is a difficult task, East and West.

In any event, even a general recognition of Soviet hegemony does not preclude specific steps by the United States to establish special ties with particular East European nations. We have rather close ties with Poland, and our economic aid to that country—quite like West German aid to East Germany—is clearly intended to stabilize a regime whose collapse might well be a world political disaster. There are, clearly, limits: there is little point to urging Rumania to quit the Soviet bloc entirely, which would expose it to Soviet military pressure. American public opinion would not countenance military resistance to such pressure on our part. There is a point to trusting in the general attractiveness of liberty—and in the magnetic power of our own and the Western European societies. We do not, of course, meet Solzhenitsyn's standards—but in the eyes of judges other than a fanatical Eastern orthodox one, we do fairly well.

Furthering Human Rights

The Helsinki agreements have been criticized on the ground that we legitimated Soviet conquests and in return got nothing but cynical Soviet bloc promises to respect the freedoms of their citizens. The conquests we "legitimated," however, are those we had long since abandoned hope of undoing—and the agreements give international legitimation to the cause of human rights. On balance, the way to further human rights in the Soviet bloc is to participate in the creation of an international climate which would make human rights violations everywhere and anywhere a matter of international concern. When the Soviet bloc crushed the Czech experiment of a more democratic and humane socialism in 1968, our own nation was preoccupied with Vietnam.

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

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We might recall that our prestige in Europe was quite high during the movement for civil rights and against the Vietnam War—a period in which the European student movement referred to the Berkeley revolt as its own starting place. Not all our ideological interventions in Europe, it appears, need be the work of the C.I.A.'s domesticated intellectuals.

The Trilateralist Program

What follows from the present situation? The changed balance of power between the United States and Western Europe has divided our elite. The Trilateralists seek a common front with respect to the world economy and the developing world, a common position on détente, a supple hegemony that is prepared to buy off everyone. The more nationalistic sectors of American capital (and, of course, the defense industries) have found spokesmen who denounce Western Europe for its alleged softness toward the Soviet Union, and who profess to be ready for explicit economic and political conflict with both Europes. Some of these figures presumably experience a certain cultural inferiority toward the Europeans—but more than their resentful provincialism is at stake.

A Common Opposition

As these debates continue, we may expect an increasing internationalization of politics. Indeed, should Soviet dissent win more open space, the conflict between Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn will find Americans taking sides. Already, the inner West German debate on relations with the other German state (and the Soviet Union) has provoked American intervention—vigorously resisted by Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. It remains to be seen whether the miserable tradition of American pronouncements on Italian politics continues after the election of June 3. More importantly, we face an internationalization of social conflicts. As the European unions and European social legislation raise their cost of production at home, the European multinationals are moving, like our own, into the Sunbelt. The prospect of international action to restrain this sort of thing evokes the possibility of a joining of West European and American movements of opposition. That the Old World may come to the help of the New is not quite within the usual rhetoric of the Atlantic community—but history's recent turnings warn us to expect more surprises. □

INTERVENTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

America's Investment In Apartheid

JAMES H. MITTELMAN

In the old days, before imperialism became a dirty word, its architects expressed their motives unblushingly. "I was in the East End of London [a working-class district] yesterday," said Cecil Rhodes in 1895, "and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread,' 'bread!' and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism. . . . My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists."

In recent decades, there has been a reshuffle in the pecking order among global metropoles, with the United States taking over Britain's premier spot. America's current foreign policy was born in the Trilateral Commission, sponsored by David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank, which reaps large profits in South Africa. The Trilateralists, now in office, champion the self-serving argument that U.S. economic investment in South Africa is a sure-fire way to reform apartheid. The connection between financiers and politicians is not mere happenstance, for it is grounded in history: What links Rhodes and Carter is their professed belief that salvation lies in the giant corporations.

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There is no point contemplating whether modern imperialism should intervene in southern Africa, since it is already doing so. What must be resolved, though, is how best to understand intervention. The term is most often used promiscuously to mean military coercion internationally directed against a foreign country. There is also the prevailing tendency to conceive of intervention as substantial state activity in a foreign economy. Both views are flabby, if not euphemistic. What is needed is some idea of how the various dimensions of intervention are intertwined: economic-political-strategic; governmental-nongovernmental; bilateral-multilateral; direct-indirect; intensive-extensive.

The root of intervention is, of course, imperialism, or expansionism beyond the confines of national borders. Imperialism stems from capitalism's inherent need for cheap labor, new markets and raw materials. The drive for profit requires political and military institutions to insure capital accumulation. Hence imperialism is not exclusively economic. And no pat formula explains the tactics employed by the wielders of power. Interventionist measures are adopted to realize overall ends, and vary according to local conditions.

A Racial Monopoly

Of increasing tactical importance are subimperialists, or regional powerhouses, which serve as bridgeheads in the Third World. Subimperialists exercise hegemony over neighboring countries yet are still subordinate to major powers since their own national capital is not developed sufficiently to place them on the top rungs of the imperialist ladder. Though imperialists and subimperialists are partners, cooperation between them does not preclude conflict; imperialists do not generally dictate terms to subimperialists.

Subimperialism in southern Africa builds on foundations laid in the colonial era. The Southern Africa Customs Union and the agreements between metropoles and South Africa under which Europeans sold African migrant labor to the white redoubt for gold illustrate this. The upshot today is

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that the subcontinent is by and large a unit.

What makes this unit distinctive is the *combination* of white supremacy and rich resources. South Africa, the military and industrial heavyweight in the region, is the only country in the world to legalize racial discrimination. And South Africa is also a treasure house of all the minerals save bauxite needed by the industrial nations. In addition to diamonds, uranium, manganese, chromium and antimony, South Africa produces 75 percent of the capitalist world's platinum and 77 percent of its gold. But the country's wealth in gold is not attributable to a superior grade of ore. Rather, an abundance of cheap labor has enabled the South African mines to break off ore at an unprecedented depth. In contrast, mines in Australia and the United States, with a comparable quality of gold to that of South Africa, had to be abandoned when it was no longer profitable to sink deeper shafts. In short, the pillar of South Africa's economy is black labor, which is secured by the apartheid system.

The principal features of the apartheid system are well known: whites vote, and run a parliament in which blacks—80 percent of the population—have no representation. Blacks must carry passbooks which designate their domicile and work place. This regulation, and others, are enforced by torture and detention without trial. About a million black migrant workers are required to live as "temporary sojourners" without their families in urban compounds. The entire black population is assigned to Bantustans, or homelands, which comprise 13 percent of the land. Essentially, blacks have been told that if they want freedom, they must go off to reservations, the economically unprofitable areas determined by whites.

This is what meets the eye. But the Angolan civil war and Rhodesia's internal settlement surely show that it is simplistic to think that race explains African politics. True, the race factor gives South Africa its special character, but what accounts for the prominence of racial ideology there?

Only a brief outline can be given here. Beginning in 1652, colonial settlers subdued indigenous peoples, subjecting them to slavery and forced labor. Illiterate trekboers adopted the techniques of African pastoralists for coping with their environment. Settlers incorporated these pastoralists as a labor force and did not exterminate them. Later, the Afrikaners and English needed local laborers to work the mines and other industries. The unions made their peace with Afrikaner landowners in 1924, and, as a result of unrest among the black proletariat, whose increasing presence in urban areas rendered the policy of segregation obsolete, the ruling Nationalist Party switched to the apartheid system in 1948.

Afrikanerdom is the expression of a racial monopoly over the means of production. Apartheid is a vast system of labor control. Racial ideology is the vehicle of economic exploitation in South Africa. Even if all the racist laws were repealed overnight, only the membership of rival groups would differ; the underlying conflict would remain, and the state would still keep the poor in place.

The primary catalysts of change now are liberation forces. They have launched an armed struggle aimed at the complete destruction of the basis of apartheid.

In this country, some opponents of apartheid cannot bring themselves to endorse the use of violence, but this is to ignore the lack of alternatives. Gandhian passive resistance actually originated in South Africa early in this century, and blacks patiently embraced a nonviolent strategy until the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. In neighboring Rhodesia, Ian Smith, beseeched by demands for majority rule, retorted, "Never in my lifetime." But under the gun, he has thus far conceded a very limited form of black rule. The point is *that no people willfully negotiate their* own political liquidation. The Afrikaners are no exception.

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The defeat of the South African Army in Angola shattered the myth about the invincibility of the white redoubt. Following the 1976 Soweto riots, disgruntled youths swelled the ranks of the banned African National Congress, a liberation movement, and are now receiving military training in Angola and Tanzania. The murder of black leader Steve Biko was the harbinger of the end of apartheid, for it convinced many Africans that, unfortunately, a violent solution is the only answer.

Armed insurgents are currently infiltrating South Africa, caching weapons, and fighting when necessary. At least 25 percent of border-area farmers have fled to urban areas, seeking security and economic opportunity. Their absence is a missing link in the defense chain. In the cities, underground resistance is growing. Last month's guerrilla raid on a Soweto police station came on the heels of the slaying of ten South African soldiers outside Pretoria and the bombing of an elegant shopping center in downtown Johannesburg. Sabotage, arson and assassination are on the rise.

Is this an exaggeration or wishful thinking? True, it would be wrong to underestimate the obstacles to guerrilla warfare. Not least are a ruthless security apparatus and the exile of liberation leadership. But if more evidence is needed to document the challenge to apartheid, just open the pages of South African newspapers. They will tell you all about the increasing number of political trials. The level of African National Congress activities was recently gauged by South Africa's chief of Security Police, Brigadier C.F. Zietsman: "They [militants] go all over the country, and they contact people in various places and they get them to form cells, and then in that way they spread it out all over the country. . . . They are everywhere."

Why do Americans know so little about armed confrontation in South Africa? Guerrilla incidents often go unreported. Since the northern Transvaal has been declared a "combat area," our correspondents are unable to cover skirmishes there. Another reason we remain ignorant lies in our own ideological hegemony. Capitalists own and operate the mass media. They downplay or ignore the successes of liberation movements, which are not only anti-imperialist but also anti-capitalist.

One learns about guerrilla assaults in South Africa from sources in other countries in the subcontinent, some of which serve as launching pads for raids into the white redoubt. Victories there by fighting organizations have inspired their South African brethren. Afrikanerdom in turn has intervened forcibly in the affairs of hinterland countries to thwart their efforts to aid insurgents.

The Subimperial Web

What propels subimperialist intervention is the contradiction between a rapidly expanding productive capacity and a narrow internal market. Although black laborers are the backbone of the South African economy, their opportunity for consumption is throttled. The apartheid system attempts to escape this contradiction by exporting capital and manufactured goods, as well as by importing foreign labor and raw materials.

South African policy makers believe that the most efficient means of intervention is to nourish conservative black leaders like Malawi's Hastings Banda and create a ring of Bandastans around the white bastion. Thus Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are locked into the South African economic orbit. Transkei is hostage. Namibia is an outright colony. Mozambique is attempting to disengage but, at independence, inherited a service economy linked to the interior: railways between Mozambique's major cities do not hook up within its own borders, and energy from Cabora Bassa dam, even for the capital Maputo, must be relayed by an Apollo converting station in the Transvaal.

Now let us look at what happens when a country attempts to break out of the subimperial web. Mozambique approaches multinationals in the United States and Europe to do business. Their reply is, sorry, chum, you must deal with our regional affiliate, which is in Johannesburg. If a parent company does agree to fill an order, say for urgently needed spare parts, delivery time from Europe is at least four or five months. It takes weeks to get a technician out to Mozambique from Europe to repair one of the country's few printing presses, but only a couple of days from Johannesburg, an eight-hour drive from Maputo.

Nevertheless, if the more subtle means of subimperialism fail, cruder methods are tried. Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Mozambique have all experienced the presence of South African troops or planes. Landlocked, white Rhodesia could not have survived for long if it were not for the flow of oil and arms from the subsidiaries of multinationals in South Africa. Now there is talk in Pretoria of establishing a "fortress southern Africa" alliance. The idea is to forge close ties among South Africa and economically dependent countries in the region, and to step up their joint efforts against insurgencies.

Sometimes Western interventionary initiatives dovetail with those of South Africa. The NATO powers injected massive doses of military assistance into Portugal to quell African liberation movements; the C.I.A. backed the South African invasion of Angola by funneling $60 million to the losing factions; American mercenaries fought to save Ian Smith, and the United States transported French and Belgian troops into Zaire's Shaba Province, the northern extremity of southern Africa. Indeed, history seems to have come full circle since the 1960 multilateral intervention in the Congo. The Administration's Africa policy, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski warned in 1978, will prove disastrous "when white nuns being raped by black guerrillas wearing red stars on their armbands start appearing on nightly television news" (see Robert Manning, "The Battle for Zimbabwe," *The Nation*, May 12). To gain an appreciation of what gives rise to this nightmarish image among hard-line interventionists, we must trace the unfolding of American foreign policy toward Africa.

In the last two decades, the United States has consistently pursued three objectives in Africa: expanding American business, installing moderate blacks in power and countering Soviet influence. Tactical adjustments and pious pronouncements should not deflect attention from the overall pattern. What separates Carter from Nixon and his other predecessors is simply a different means to the same ends.

The U.S. and Africa

With the advent of African nationalism, the United States supported decolonization everywhere on the continent except in the territories undergoing wars of national liberation. Put differently, the United States opposed a transfer of political power to indigenous people only where worker-peasant alliances led the drive to independence. Unlike the countries that acceded to political independence via constitutional conferences and commissions set up by the metropole, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique had to contend with external efforts to shore up a weak colonial power and to tame radical movements.

Integral to the decline of American hegemony in the 1970s is a scaling

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down of direct military intervention and a stepping up of indirect intervention. This used to be dubbed "Vietnamization." Nixon and Kissinger urged local allies to make a greater contribution to their own defense. The United States offered substantial assistance to "strong middle powers" assuming direct responsibility in their spheres of influence.

To apply this policy to southern Africa, Kissinger presented three basic options, and Nixon chose the wrong one. He adopted the now famous Option 2, embodied in National Security Study Memorandum-39, based on the premise that the liberation movements would fail. It called for expanded communication with the white minority regimes. In practice, the policy meant closer economic and military collaboration.

Kissinger's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Donald Easum, nevertheless advocated improving relations with countries such as Nigeria and Mozambique, and was promptly fired. His successor, Nathaniel Davis, had served as the American Ambassador in Chile and allegedly participated in the destabilization campaign. Evidently, it was not only Davis who had no prior familiarity with Africa, for Easum said that his former boss "didn't know how to spell Namibia. He didn't know where it was on a map."

The 1974 coup in Lisbon unhinged U.S. policy in Africa, and impelled Kissinger to take another tack. In his Lusaka speech of April 1976, the Secretary of State prescribed a peaceful transfer of power to moderate blacks in the subcontinent, and pledged more than $1 billion to buoy the Rhodesian economy. He also offered financial inducements to the front-line states to enlist their cooperation, though the Senate balked at development assistance to Mozambique (and a ban is still on).

After the Republican years, the liberation movements were pleased with signs of change in Washington, such as the appointment of freewheeling Andrew Young as Carter's troubleshooter in Africa. The Ambassador to the United Nations has a greater sensitivity to African problems than did his predecessors. His statement that Cubans are a "stabilizing influence" in Angola provoked the ire of many Americans. But if there is concern in this country about intervention in Africa, why has the public been silent about French military incursions? Cuban troops are known to be present in Angola and Ethiopia, whereas some 20,000 French soldiers are stationed in nine African countries.

In Young's view, capitalism will be southern Africa's saving grace. He champions American capitalism in partnership with African development on the ground that Africa needs our technology and markets for its natural resources, and that most change in the world is taking place in free-market countries. The Ambassador believes that armed struggle is a "no-win situation" for all concerned. Rather, he points out, the lesson of the American South is that segregation policies change when blacks gain a stake in the free-market system.

Africans, however, do not want an American solution to their problems. The legislative techniques used to accomplish integration in the American South in the 1950s and 1960s are not appropriate for ending colonialism and winning genuine independence in southern Africa in the 1970s.

Like Young, and Kissinger before him, South African officials have sought to extend the frontiers of capitalism by relying on a combination of persuasion and economic incentives. In a bizarre

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

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twist to contemporary interventionism, a subimperialist country has reportedly intervened in the affairs of an imperialist power. Former South African Information Secretary Eschel Rhoodie disclosed the existence of secret cash reserves to boost apartheid's worldwide image. The project included payments to politicians overseas, attempts to purchase newspapers in the United States and elsewhere, payoffs to American labor leaders and contributions to campaign funds to unseat critics of South Africa.

The influence-buying scandal is of prime tactical relevance to the liberation struggle. It shows the questionable cohesion of the ruling class, and demonstrates that Afrikaner leaders lack confidence in apartheid's future. They are hedging their bets by preparing to defend the white laager while stashing away money in Zurich banks. Still, it is folly to expect fundamental change to emerge within the state apparatus, especially since Afrikanerdom is shored up by external interests.

Investing in Apartheid

For Americans, the question of investment in South Africa is crucial precisely because it is vital to apartheid's taproot, labor control. The debate over investment centers on two theses. First, the corporate case: Economic growth creates jobs for blacks, and will eventually alter the political order. Since white labor is scarce, black workers will be upgraded, and apartheid will gradually disappear. In addition to hurting blacks most, withdrawal would enable Japanese and European firms to replace American business.

Divestment proponents see it from an entirely different perspective: Rather than undermining apartheid, foreign investors reap huge profits and reinforce an exploitative system. A loss of jobs as a result of withdrawal would be a small price to pay for a challenge to apartheid. Black leaders, except for some of those who are appointed by the Government, favor divestment. The contention that other competitors would supplant U.S. enterprise is open to challenge on moral grounds: If you were causing people to die, would you continue because someone else might do the same thing?

The way to separate the wheat from the chaff, it seems to me, is to look at the historical evidence. The case for investment assumes that there is enough time for apartheid to die a slow death, but the current level of black militancy suggests that time has already run out. The gradualists do not specify how a strengthened economy would break down apartheid. The change-through-growth thesis is not a scenario but a guess. It is all so hypothetical. In the last two decades, the South African economy has burgeoned, but apartheid has hardened. With increased industrialization, racial controls have become more entrenched. Political repression has mounted. The wage gap between white and black industrial workers is in fact growing. It rose from $259 per month in 1969 to $463 per month in 1975. Until the dust settles, an expanding economy leads to neither improved living conditions nor political power for the black majority.

What characterizes American multinationals in South Africa is their large size and involvement in critical sectors of the economy. Four corporations—General Motors, Mobil Oil, Texaco Inc. and Ford Motor Company—account for 50 percent of all United States investment in the country. Yet American firms are the source of only 2 percent of employment in South Africa. Besides offering jobs to a small fraction of the black population, American business provides capital, licenses, advanced technology and personnel, all of which contribute importantly to military preparation against the majority.

In the divestment polemics on our campuses, an oft-repeated argument is that universities are not political institutions. Agreed, universities should not jump on the bandwagon every time students get riled. But allowance must be made for South Africa as an exceptional case. To attest that academe is apolitical overlooks the facility with which academicians move into top Government posts and vice versa. Surely universities that confer an honorary doctorate on the Shah of Iran, or award a cash prize to Robert McNamara for contributing to international understanding, are expressing a clear political preference.

Of immediate concern to Americans is the expanding scope for external intervention in southern Africa. South African participation in Rhodesia compels the Patriotic Front, a liberation coalition, to seek more military assistance, which only the socialist countries provide. The Soviet Union is the principal supplier of arms to Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU and China is the main source for Robert Mugabe's ZANU. Aware that the arms flow to guerrillas heightens the predisposition of the United States to intervene militarily, Ian Smith has sought to internationalize the war against "Communism." Repeated bombing raids on Mozambique are meant to pressure President Machel to embrace Cuba and the Soviet Union, and thus to draw in the United States in support of the status quo in Rhodesia.

U.S. Involvement

If armed struggle escalates in the subcontinent, American holdings would be vulnerable to attack. General Motors, the leading American investor in South Africa, is now training an all-white commando unit to protect its premises. G.M. has agreed to honor South Africa's security regulations which empower the Government to take over strategic industries in the event of an emergency. Under the current enabling legislation, the Government may enjoin a foreign company to meet national requirements. In that case, G.M., for example, would be obliged to produce military vehicles instead of passenger cars.

The implications of this sort of connivance with apartheid are skillfully played out by Randall Robinson in his recent novel, *The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay*. This is a story, seen through the eyes of an Afro-American soldier, about black unrest in South Africa. The United States Army intervenes to evacuate American citizens and guard American plants. Our soldiers are told that their job is to defend the national interest against a band of Communist terrorists. The black troops do not share their officers' enthusiasm. Ambivalence turns to despair and, ultimately, death.

The theme of this novel is not fictional: Last year the 82nd Airborne Division was put on alert to evacuate Americans and Europeans from Zaire. American involvement in South Africa is dangerous precisely because the presence of American property and lives provides a pretext for greater intervention. Recent Western initiatives to reach a settlement in southern Africa reflect a fear that armed struggle will sweep away private enterprise and substantial profits, as well as redound to Soviet advantage. All of a sudden the liberals in Washington are hellbent on taking preventive actions against exploitative social relations in the subcontinent which speed up the revolutionary process. The defeat meted out to imperialism in Angola drove home the need for tactical readjustment to everyone save the hard-liners in the Carter Administration.

At this juncture, the most desirable and least likely policy for the United

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States is actively to assist liberation forces in southern Africa. Short of standing foursquare behind the fighting organizations, the United States should withdraw its investments from South Africa and impose comprehensive sanctions, preferably under United Nations auspices. Specific measures would include halting nuclear cooperation, closing the embassy in Pretoria, severing intelligence links and making it illegal for American nationals to work in South Africa. South Africa in turn might freeze American assets and declare a mineral embargo. We would experience some dislocation in our economy, and have to develop other sources of supply. Given the political realities in the United States at present, this course of action is also fanciful.

Meanwhile, anti-apartheid groups—among others churches, students, labor unions and human rights advocates—are mustering widespread support to open a national debate and revamp U.S. Government policy.

In the final analysis, however, the outcome of the African liberation struggle will not be decided in this country. Those who have taken up arms in Africa know that apartheid cannot be liberalized. Just as democratic fascism does not exist, liberal apartheid is an absurdity. The rectification of apartheid's indignities requires a fundamental change both in the way in which wealth is appropriated and in the power structure. The critical question for Americans is whether we are going to allow our Government and corporations to stand in the way of this change. What we *can* do is create a favorable international climate in which oppressed peoples can liberate themselves. □

INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Keeping Oil Safe For Democracy

IRENE GENDZIER

On March 10 of this year *The Boston Globe* carried an article entitled, "U.S. Draws the Line in Yemen." In it an American official was quoted as saying, "We're making it clear that we regard stability in the Middle East and Arabian Peninsula as being a vital national interest. . . . We're demonstrating that the trauma of the Vietnam experience is behind us and that we are prepared to act to protect our interests wherever they are threatened." The statement was unambiguous and succinct. The "national interest," which in this context clearly meant oil, had to be protected at all costs. Given the demise of the American surrogate, the Iranian Shah, and the potential altering of the balance of power in the region as a result, the possibility of direct military intervention had to be considered. It was not so much a novel situation as a reflection of the intensified concern over America's prime interests in the Middle East, interests that not only shaped our foreign policy in the area but also defined the parameters of intervention in the region.

In a more general sense the statement quoted above may serve as an introduction to the subject of American intervention in the Middle East. Such intervention, whether direct or indirect, in the form of military, political or economic action, has always been the expression of the aggressive pursuit and defense of American interests. In the 1950s the emphasis was on the strategic nature of those interests and the need to cultivate allies whose policies coincided—or could be made to coincide—with those of the United States. Hence the inclusion of Turkey and Greece into NATO; the support for the Shah after the C.I.A.-engineered expulsion of his Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, in 1953, allowed him to return to power; the attempt to impose the Baghdad Pact in order to isolate the "radical states" of the region, and the formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was the basis of American military intervention in Lebanon in 1958.

Strategic interests assumed not only a positive search for American allies but also the active "containment," to use George Kennan's expression, of Soviet influence and infiltration outside the area. In the public mind, American Middle East policy was increasingly tied to its anti-Soviet thrust, but this policy was often used to disguise the pursuit of American interests. The concern with "stability," for example, with its distinct allusion to the dangers of outside meddling in the region, like the perennial search for "moderate" governments, was more often than not the search for pro-American regimes—regimes whose internal policies were sometimes glaring examples of repression. A variety of states fulfilled American interests in this regard, including Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Their relationship to the United States, and their role in the area, were both affected by the dynamic transformations that occurred within the Middle East and within their own countries. These changes, one might add, were also influenced by the ubiquitous expansion of American economic objectives, which had a "modernizing" impact.

Indirect Intervention

In the late 1960s American policy in the Middle East was affected by the Vietnam War and particularly by President Nixon's decision, announced in July 1969, to promote a greater "responsibility" among Third World allies for their own defense and, incidentally, for the protection of American interests. Where possible, then, intervention assumed an indirect expression, carried out by surrogate powers whose political and military reliability were beyond doubt. In the Middle East two countries emerged as the new axes of American power: Iran and Israel. Israel's striking military victory in the Six Day War of 1967 enhanced its military prestige and its political usefulness in the eyes of American policy makers. This did not mean the total withdrawal of America's presence, as the civil war in Jordan demonstrated in 1970. At that time not only was the possibility of Israeli military intervention a publicly declared threat, the presence of the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean provided logistical and political support for the Jordanian regime and its "closet" ally, Israel. Further to the East, Iran had embarked on an expanded regional role in the aftermath of Britain's declared intention in 1968 of leaving the area of the Gulf. Britain withdrew three years later, and within one year after that the Shah in-

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itiated his extravagant purchases of arms from the United States. The sales as well as the power they were intended to establish in the region were both welcomed by the United States.

It is revealing that public discussion of American policy in the Middle East at this time was largely couched in strategic, political and moral terms. The United States was preserving "moderate" regimes, like those of Jordan and Israel, and contributing to the maintenance of "stability" in the region, including that of the Gulf. That its policy in both areas was intimately related to its overall interests was not immediately clear to a public more accustomed to the problems of the Arab-Israeli dispute than to the distant ones associated with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the mysterious Persian Gulf region. That, of course, was to change abruptly with the 1973 Middle East war and the ensuing oil embargo of that year. And it is in this context that the issue of American military intervention was raised in 1974-75, and again in 1979. In both periods, the debate on intervention provoked an unparalleled acknowledgment of the nature and extent of American economic and political involvement in the area, underlining the economic interests of not only the United States but the major industrial powers. The link between intervention and economic interests was openly acknowledged. As a "top-level policy maker" declared in an interview given in December 1974, "The Arabs must be made to realize that 800 million people in America, Europe and Japan are not going to permit their industrial societies to be destroyed by 80 million Arabs."

From 1973 to 1979

A number of events transpired in this six-year period that can be singled out as particularly revealing of both the question of extent of American intervention in the Middle East and the circumstances under which military intervention might occur. Of these events, the oil embargo in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war, the Lebanese conflict, the Camp David accords of 1978, the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of 1979 and the fall of the Shah and his departure from Iran in January of this year are the most important. Clearly, the fall of one of the United States' most potent and heavily armed clients—purchaser of some $18 billion worth of American arms in twenty years—marked a turning point. It was to affect negotiation of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and the new alignment of those two powers in the Middle East. It affected America's relations with Saudi Arabia, which cast a more wary eye on the Egyptian-Israeli-American accords and what might safely be expected from their endorsement, or better, from a withholding of such endorsement. And finally, in recent weeks, it was a decisive factor in the "new militant posture" which the United States adopted in Yemen, and which characterized Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's conversations with Middle East leaders.

The problem of American intervention, however, did not begin in 1973. It merely rose to the surface of public debate in that year. The decision by the Arab members of OPEC to withhold delivery of oil until Israel ceded some of the Egyptian territory it had seized in the course of the war came as an unexpected reaction in the eyes of the American public. No effective embargo had been implemented in 1967; none was anticipated in 1973. What followed, therefore, was experienced as an unpleasant challenge to the previously untested supremacy of the industrial powers. Crude oil prices quadrupled, affecting not only the "international financial order" in general but the economies of Europe, Japan and the United States in particular. The industrialized world rose in revolt, though subsequent studies demonstrated that the revolt was well orchestrated and that the role of the Arab states had been considerably less sinister than the public was led to believe. Moreover, the United States was less affected than its allies in Europe and Japan, a perhaps not entirely accidental matter. The 1973 embargo, however, as recent analysts have pointed out, was an open-and-shut case in comparison to the situation that evolved in 1979. With the pullback of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal, the conditions that had sparked the embargo were ended. Countering the aftershock of the embargo in the West took much longer, however.

The possibility of using force to control the oilfields of Saudi Arabia was discussed from the first. In January 1974, then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger warned Arab oil producers that they risked military reprisals if they "crippled the industrial world," a threat that provoked immediate response from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, all of whom allegedly prepared their oilfields for demolition in the event of such action. In the winter of the

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same year, although they had occurred earlier, war games were simulated in desert conditions in places like "Petrolandia," while an article in the December 1974 issue of *U.S. News & World Report* entitled "Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?" detailed locations in those Middle Eastern oil-producing countries where such a takeover might be feasible. Saudi Arabia, the article argued, with its output of more than 8 million barrels per day, was the only country capable of meeting the "essential needs" of Europe and America. It was estimated that three army divisions would be required to do the job. Interestingly enough, it was not solicitude for the possible reactions of the Arab countries that gave pause to those weighing intervention, it was the prospect of Soviet reprisals. Guerrilla attacks and possible sabotage of the oilfields might occur, but these were considered manageable side effects. The possibility of a Soviet counterattack was ultimately discounted because it was assumed that since the Russians, like the Americans, wanted to avoid a major confrontation, and since the Russians realized the indispensability of Arabian oil to the West, they would restrain their response. According to a high-level U.S. policy maker cited in the above *U.S. News & World Report* article, "They would stand aside—just as we did in Czechoslovakia where we recognized that Soviet national interests were at stake."

In January 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger revived the issue of military intervention in his famous interview with *Business Week*, in which he spoke of the strangulation of the industrialized world and the need for action. He subsequently clarified his statement by saying that the only contingency to which he had addressed himself was the "absolutely hypothetical case in which the actual strangulation of the entire industrialized world was being attempted; in other words, in which the confrontation was started by the producers." The debate became more concrete when Schlesinger declared the Persian Gulf to be a "feasible" military target, although he too emphasized that he was talking only of action to be taken in the most serious emergency. In January of the same year, a controversial article by Prof. Robert Tucker of Johns Hopkins, which Clifton Daniels called the "most extensive and closely reasoned public examination of the military option," appeared in *Commentary* magazine. Its viewpoint was echoed in another equally controversial article that appeared in March in *Harper's*. The anonymous author of that piece, who called himself "Miles Ignotus," was identified only as a professor with close Government ties. The object in both articles, as well as the strategy, were clear. Breaking the power of OPEC was to be accomplished by seizing the region from Kuwait down along the coastal area of Saudi Arabia to Qatar. Supplying 40 percent of current oil production, it was estimated to contain 40 percent of world oil reserves. According to the *Harper's* analyst, it was not high prices that would justify the seizure of oilfields but the prospect of another embargo. In a scenario that involved another Middle East war with the Israelis once again emerging as victors, Arab demands were portrayed as leading to an oil embargo, which provoked military intervention by the West.

In the light of this psychological preparation, it was a surprise to learn from a Gallup poll that the American public was unenthusiastic about the prospect of military intervention in the Gulf. As the public talk of intervention died out, it was argued that the debate had served its purpose, which was more political than military—that is, both reassuring the American public and frightening the oil producers. Neither one seems to have been as gullible as the media and the Government would have liked to believe.

Iran: Internal Aggression and Intervention

If the oil embargo and discussion of possible American military intervention had educated the public as to the Government's readiness to act in the event of a "national emergency," it had also exposed the fallacy that intervention would occur only in the event of external aggression, a myth that died hard in spite of evidence to the contrary. As recently as February of this year, on the occasion of his Middle East tour, Defense Secretary Brown insisted in an interview with *The Washington Post* that "strictly internal" developments would not warrant American intervention. Only external aggression, and Soviet aggression in particular, would justify military involvement in the Middle East by the United States. No situation contradicted this proposition more dramatically than that which occurred in Iran, where the projected IBEX program involving several hundred American electronic experts working with Iran to develop a $500 million monitoring system for surveillance of the Soviet Union had been but a part of the extensive American participation in Iranian military and intelligence operations. These operations were conceded to be directed against internal opposition as well as against popular movements of liberation in the entire Persian Gulf region.

The military cooperation between Iran and the United States began in the immediate post-World War II period. It is estimated that from the end of the war until 1975, more than 11,000 Iranian military personnel were trained at American installations. And in July 1978, Nicholas Gage of *The New York Times* reported that some 1,100 American military personnel were engaged in training Iranians in the use of sophisticated weapons, while a significant number of retired American officers worked with private companies in Iran dealing with military equipment. Altogether an estimated 8,000 Americans, or "a fifth of the Americans in Iran," were involved in providing military training. Given the nature and extent of Iranian arms purchases from the United States, this figure should not be surprising. Between 1972 and 1976, the total sales of American arms to Iran was $10.4 billion, while that figure was scheduled to reach $18.5 billion for the period 1970-83. The consequences, in terms of existing Iranian military capability, were fairly stark: American military training and presence would be necessary for any sustained Iranian action. Suffice it to say that the myth of intervention as justified only in the event of external aggression was belied by the realities of the American-Iranian relationship. There was evidence that Americans had already been engaged in active military operations with Iranian forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, in surveillance over Dhofar, where small ground involvement had also occurred, and in the region of the Gulf and Indian Ocean, where, according to *The Washington Post* of May 13, 1977, some surveillance was being conducted by U.S. personnel.

It was, however, in the training and provisioning of the notorious Iranian security apparatus, SAVAK, which operated not only in Iran but abroad and in the United States, that America demonstrated its willingness to become engaged in a form of intervention far more pervasive and critical to the operation of the Shah's state than military collaboration and intervention, as previously understood, would have warranted. It is by now an open secret SAVAK had been set up by the C.I

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1957, and the collaboration intensified over time. It was additionally aided by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service. SAVAK agents who received special training at the Marine Corps base at Quantico, Va., were given special orientation sessions at C.I.A. headquarters and received additional training under police programs administered by the Agency for International Development. And if this was insufficient to assure the safety of the Shah's regime, the C.I.A. operated in Iran outside of the SAVAK framework, monitoring "the loyalty of the armed forces, on whose support the Shah's power rests," according to Nicholas Gage of *The New York Times*.

In the light of this extraordinary repressive machinery, the popular revolution that overthrew the monarchy seems nothing less than awesome. This revolution understandably shook American strategy in the Middle East to its foundations, disrupting its entire system of alliances and its "mediation" efforts between Israel and Egypt, and leading to plans for military intervention to protect its national interests.

Half Wars and Strike Forces

Although there was no evidence of Soviet involvement in the Iranian revolution that overthrew the Shah, it was not difficult to contemplate what the political fallout would be in the American assessment of its overall "losses" in the Middle East. "Geopolitical gameplaying can be exaggerated," wrote Henry Brandon in the January 14 issue of *The Washington Star*, "but there is no doubt that what is happening between Addis Ababa and Kabul, between Ankara, Teheran and Islamabad, however unconnected, represents a net gain in the overall geopolitical balance for the Soviet Union." The American response to Teheran came in the winter and early spring of 1979 in the form of discussions of strike forces, "half wars" and new responsibilities for the United States in the Persian Gulf. But in fact the so-called "new American strategy" designed to protect its oil supplies and to assure the survival of its "moderate" Arab allies was not particularly new. In August 1977 President Carter directed the Pentagon to form a "rapid reaction mobile force for quick strikes in Third World crisis spots, primarily the Persian Gulf," according to Jan ustin and Banning Garrett in the July '8 *Inquiry*. In the course of the next months, in response to the growing rn over conditions in the Horn of a, planning for such an expanded force was given public airing. The February 27, 1978, issue of *U.S. News & World Report* revealed that

> . . . the U.S. would take over one of the big Israeli airfields in the Sinai as part of an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. This would serve a triple purpose: guarantee the security of the Jewish state, deter the Russians from contemplating intervention in any future Mideast conflict and enable the U.S. strike force to move into a Persian Gulf crisis to aid a friendly power.
>
> Some ranking administration officials believe that this plan would be welcome, not only to Israel, but also to the moderate Arab regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates and Jordan.

The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty

Written well over one year before the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty on March 26, the article suggests compelling reasons for the Carter Administration's dogged determination to achieve a signing of that "momentous" document. At the least it calls for a critical examination of American policy in the Middle East and the circumstances that led to the signing of this treaty. A comprehensive review of the function of intervention in American Middle East policy should involve a close scrutiny of the "special relationship" between Israel and the United States and the way that the mutual interests of both of these countries were served, not only directly with respect to oil, but indirectly—for the United States at least—in the Lebanese conflict and the Palestinian question. These have not appeared as high priority issues in American policy, although in practice the United States has been deeply concerned with the Lebanese conflict and the related Palestinian struggle because their destabilizing effect on the Middle East as a whole affects America's vital interests in the region. That the United States will now take a more direct role in the Palestinian question reflects this conjunction of interests and a recognition that the viability of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty is linked to the stabilization, if not the solution, of the Palestinian problem, and the shadow it has long cast on the resolution of the internal Lebanese crisis.

The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty itself,


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from the viewpoint of American Middle East policy, presumes a greatly expanded role for the United States in the region. By the terms of the treaty, that role will be financial at least in part. Some $5 billion for aid and loans to Israel and Egypt (most of which is expected to go to Israel) is involved. In addition the United States has agreed not only to act as Egypt's principal arms supplier but to guarantee Israel's oil needs at world market prices in the event of an embargo. The Administration has also committed itself to an active role in the Palestine question, which some observers see as its most frustrating Middle East assignment to date. But this view in fact ignores the extent to which the United States has tacitly approved, or at least never adequately disavowed, the Israeli position on the Palestine question. And while the United States maintains a stoic calm and publicly regrets certain aspects of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, whether in the West Bank or in Lebanon, it is unlikely that it has not been fully informed of the intentions of that policy. Prime Minister Menachem Begin has vowed to liquidate the Palestinian resistance, which would further weaken the Lebanese state, threaten Syria and result in the possibility of renewed war in the region. This prospect makes imperative a clarification of American policy with respect to the Palestinians, the future of Lebanon and the role of Syria; otherwise, it must be assumed that American and Israeli interests are identical on these questions.

Secret Understandings?

Independent of the treaty, but only in form, is the United States-Israeli "memorandum of agreement" which committed the United States to come to the aid of Israel in the event of the violation of the treaty; a commitment that obviously holds out the prospect of American military involvement. While this has been considered by some observers as the most problematic, if not unexpected, aspect of the Egyptian-Israeli accords, it may not be. According to an article by Simon Malley which appeared in the April 16-29 French-language periodical *Afrique Asie*, which has access to Algerian and Syrian sources, a number of "secret understandings" were arrived at by Israel, Egypt and the United States. These involve a rather detailed agenda designed to destabilize the Arab front hostile to the treaty, along with plans for the "paralysis of the P.L.O." and for an expanded role by Egypt in Africa and the Arab world. The third category of "understandings" involves "commitments undertaken by the U.S." which repeat the basic understanding of the American-Israeli memorandum of agreement while making a number of additions. According to the Malley summary, the United States will be enabled to come to the defense of Israel and the treaty because of the naval, ground and air bases it will have in Israel and Egypt. Furthermore the United States takes the position, in this document, that it will regard all hostile actions against oil-rich areas of the region as a threat to its security as well as to that of the entire industrialized world. Such a threat would warrant military intervention and it would be taken in the guise of the American "defense" of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty which, if Malley is correct, will serve as a front for the preservation of American strategic and economic interests in the Middle East.

Whether these alleged "secret understandings" exist or not, it is sobering to recall that they include nothing that contradicts the American definition of its interests in the region already on record. The commitment, often repeated, to protect Arab "moderates" and the oil-rich Persian Gulf states—or quite simply the oilfields—is merely a sanitized and summary version of the same formula. What it involves in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty is the commitment to maintain the status quo where that coincides with the joint interests of the United States and Egyptian and Israeli allies, and where necessary to oppose and destroy those movements that seek a radical transformation of their societies, if such change is deemed inimical to the interests of these powers. In the Middle East there is no area beyond the purview of such interests.

Military Intervention Reconsidered

What makes the "secret understandings" Malley describes additionally interesting is the fact that the section concerning potential American military intervention in the Persian Gulf emerged as Administration policy in the aftermath of the fall of the Shah. While the existence of such "secret" accords is still open to speculation, it is quite clear that the United States sought to make its position with respect to its military strength, capability and willingness to defend its allies and interests in the Gulf region both clear and strongly stated. There is also little doubt that the fall of the Shah and the lack of support for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, supposedly America's most stalwart allies, awakened the Administration to the potentially unstable nature of its Middle East policy.

Thus, a succession of diplomatic missions were dispatched to the Middle East and a spate of declarations from ranking Administration officials were heard. This activity in the months of February and March was obviously designed to reassure allies such as Saudi Arabia of the reliability of the United States, in spite of its inability to prevent the fall of the Shah; and simultaneously, to reassure the American public of the ability of the United States to keep pipelines open in the face of a growing oil shortage and a much publicized energy crisis. On February 25, in two separate television interviews, Secretary of Defense Brown and Secretary of Energy Schlesinger declared that the United States would defend its vital interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf with force if necessary. The same theme was repeated by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, one month later. Both affirmed that the American stake in oil supplies was so vital that "it could justify a reversal of America's post-Vietnam reluctance to become involved in foreign military adventures," according to *The Washington Post*.

Saving Yemen

Events in North Yemen provided the opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of American purpose. At the request of Saudi Arabia, President Carter sent $100 million worth of anti-aircraft guns, artillery and anti-tank missiles, with additional arms expected, to "save" the Yemeni regime from "invasion" by the forces of South Yemen. The argument was that the South was armed and trained by its Soviet ally and thus threatened the integrity of the northern state of Yemen and the entire Gulf region. This justified, in the Administration's view, bypassing Congress and ordering that an additional $400 million arms package be sent to North Yemen. The "emergency" invoked to justify this extraordinary transfer was regarded with considerable skepticism by some members of Congress.

Yemen was an expensive symbol. It—and the missions and declarations that had preceded it—were intended to establish that the United States would intervene militarily to protect its interests.

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But even on the domestic level, an increasingly concerned and suspicious public would not be so easily persuaded. The current oil shortage, which had been connected in the public mind with the new Iranian regime, was shown to be, in one instance at least, false. According to a Congressional study released on May 18, "American refiners helped bring about current gasoline shortages when they suddenly cut back on gasoline production despite having sufficient supplies of crude oil. . . ." The same study reported that despite fears that the revolution in Iran would create shortages, crude oil stocks in the United States rose from 296.6 million barrels in January to nearly 322 million barrels in April." And while it was reported that "the twenty-five largest U.S.-based oil companies reported first-quarter earnings after taxes of $4.3 billion, 57.9 percent above the $2.7 billion they earned in the first quarter of 1978," according to *The Boston Globe*, a vice president of Shell Oil Company pointed an accusing finger at those "sovereign governments that can do as they please. Until that ends, there will be shortages until hell freezes over."

Onus of Complicity

These ominous words can be interpreted as both a warning and a threat. By placing the blame for the current crisis on "them," the onus of complicity which has long hung over the oil companies is presumably dissipated and talk of intervention emerges as reasonable, and perhaps even inevitable—a position that has been adopted by some Administration officials for broader reasons of "national interest." But the implicit accusation against the "sovereign governments" is deceptive because it alleges a false relationship between "independent producers" and "dependent consumers," when, historically, control has in fact been in the hands of the consuming powers. In practice, the relationship between the United States and oil-producing states is considerably more complex than is suggested by the Shell Oil Company vice president's statement, as the intricate ties of military, political and economic interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia attest. Although it is clear that even "our vital interests" cannot prevent a people, such as the Iranians, in the most recent case, from overthrowing a repressive regime which had served us well.

Just as the American public seems unwilling to accept the convenient explanations of the current crisis offered by oil companies and Government, one can hope that it will develop an equally skeptical awareness of the roots and potential consequences of our interventionist policies. □

INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA

A Hundred Years Of Dependency

PENNY LERNOUX

"All who migrate to a 'lesser' country . . . consider it a duty, a necessity, almost a question of hygiene to avoid contamination from the lower level," observed Dom Pedro Casaldáliga, the Catholic Bishop of the Brazilian Amazon and himself a Spaniard. "They believe they have a right to impose, to dictate."

Penny Lernoux, The Nation's Latin American correspondent, is a prize-winning American journalist who has lived in Latin America since 1962. She is the author of the forthcoming Cry of the People *(Doubleday).*

Casaldáliga was speaking of the colonial mentality of the Catholic Church in Latin America, but his comment applies equally to the upper-class whites who control the continent's governments, economy and social structures. "Old" families who trace their ancestry to the sixteenth-century conquerors or second-generation immigrants from Europe, most of them whites, live aloof from their societies, with no pride in being Latin American, because the majority of Latin Americans are "lesser" people—illiterate Indians, half-castes and blacks. Nationalism is strident but superficial: privately, the upper classes wish they were English or French or American. Thus, they are predisposed to believe that anything American is



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superior to the native product, whether a political philosophy, military doctrine or soft drink. This is an alienation observed nowhere else in the Third World, and a key reason for the United States' enduring influence in the region. While geographic proximity makes Latin America the United States' "natural zone of influence," Cuba has proved that this is not the decisive factor. More important is an internal colonialism that sustains external dependency and actively seeks U.S. intervention when its interests are threatened, as in Allende's Chile.

Internal colonialism goes back to the Iberian conquest of the New World, when cross and sword merged in a crusade for the bodies and souls of the "heathen" who "for years without number had been under the domination of Satan, immersed in vice and blinded with idolatry." Unlike the United States, most of Latin America was already occupied by culturally advanced Indian civilizations at the time of the conquest. Although the Europeans managed to slaughter several million Indians, enough survived to provide a base of manual labor and women for a colonial society. Many of Latin America's cities are built on the ruins of Indian settlements. Where the aboriginal populace died out, as in coastal Brazil, the Europeans imported African slave labor.

Pyramid of Privilege

From the very beginning, Latin American society was constructed like a pyramid, with a few European settlers enjoying all the privileges of empire and the masses having no rights at all. The pyramid survived because the people were repeatedly told that they were stupid, lazy and inferior. Foreign missionaries helped drum these ideas into the natives' heads by claiming that it was God's will that they should be poor and ignorant. As the Archbishop of Lima told his Indians, "Poverty is the most certain road to felicity." Any Indian or African who had the temerity to doubt such wisdom by rebelling against the system was promptly killed.

The law, to be sure, was written in a way to protect the poor and the Indians, but it never worked that way, for Spanish and Portuguese legislation could be enforced only on the rare occasions when the Crown threatened to send troops to discipline the settlers. "The law is to be observed but not obeyed," goes an old Spanish saying still in vogue today. Put another way, the only law respected was—and is—the law of the fist.

Latin America's achievement of independence from Spain in the first part of the nineteenth century did not alter the social pyramid, nor did industrialization in the twentieth century. The only difference is that those at the top are now white Latin Americans instead of white Europeans, and can count industries as well as ranches in their inheritance. The overwhelming majority of the people remain uneducated and fatalistic. All initiative was stamped out of their collective consciousness over the centuries, because it was not intended that they should think or react. *"¿Para que?"* (Why bother?) has been the universal response in Latin America, whether in a Caribbean Negro community or an Indian village in the Bolivian highlands.

As anthropologists have amply described, there is an enormous difference between a culture that is poor and a culture of poverty. In the former, the people may have only a rudimentary economy and learning but they are proud of their traditions. In the latter, the people are ashamed of their color and origins because they have been taught to feel inferior. That is the culture of poverty studied by Oscar Lewis in Mexico and Puerto Rico, and the culture of two-thirds of the Latin American population.

It is a culture without history save in popular legend because the history books were written by white hands, reinforcing the social and political myths of the wealthy minority. National heroes usually are white descendants of the Spanish and Portuguese settlers. Important historical events are almost always described in terms of the white minorities. Latin Americans religiously honor such independence leaders as Simón Bolívar, while totally ignoring the Indian and African chieftains who led important uprisings against the white settlers.

Roots of Dependency

Iberian colonization also laid the foundations for Latin America's enduring dependency on the West. In the three centuries after Columbus, the region served primarily to enrich the Iberian states, through the export of precious metals, taxes, the import of European goods and the African slave trade. After the wars of independence, outright imperialism was replaced by a more sophisticated arrangement when the English introduced mercantile capitalism, trading manufactured goods for raw materials. America followed a similar pattern at the beginning of this century, its interest being primarily minerals, and American investors gradually replaced the British as the most important foreign influence in the region. The dependency relationship also changed, for now Latin America was no longer the Indian come to barter his skins at the trading post. It was an important source of income for corporations in the United States, of cheap labor for U.S. export subsidiaries and of small but extremely lucrative markets, particularly for arms and capital equipment.

During these centuries economic colonialism ran in tandem with political vassalage, first to the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, then to the nineteenth-century European powers and finally to Washington. Even Latin American leaders who wanted to take an independent course—and they were few—found themselves boxed in by an international economic system and the terms of trade. Although more sophisticated than the nineteenth-century European rulers who sent gunboats to collect money from the Latin American governments, the International Monetary Fund serves substantially the same purpose today. Any Latin American government that ignores its dictates does so at the risk of bankruptcy, as Peru's nationalistic generals learned to their cost in 1977. Not that many countries want to object—most Latin Americans in government belong to the wealthy minority, often the military, and such people are perfectly content with their junior partnership in U.S. corporate industry. (Brazil's military regime has even invented a political theory to rationalize its satellite relationship with the United States called the "Doctrine of National Security.")

Ever since 1823, when President James Monroe enunciated his doctrine for Latin America, Washington has befriended dictators. Before World War II, these usually were yes men who identified with American interests, an example being Anastasio Somoza, who held Nicaragua in reserve for the United States in case Washington should ever want to build a second trans-isthmian canal in Central America. (One of Somoza's predecessors was booted out of office for opening negotiations with the Japanese.) After World War II, United States interests were broadened to include cold-war priorities. Even when no specific economic or political advantage was to be gained, Washington supported Latin American dictators who claimed to be anti-Com-

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unist, such as Gen. Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay. But military intervention, the Monroe Doctrine's cornerstone, was abandoned after the 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster, the lone exception being the Marines' occupation of the Dominican Republic.* Direct intervention was replaced by a sophisticated combination of military indoctrination and economic controls to insure that there would be no repeat of the Cuban revolution. Brazil was chosen "regional policeman."

Shaking the Money Tree

The dual supports of this intervention were the Alliance for Progress and counterinsurgency training. Sold as a reform program with the promise of billions of dollars in American aid, the Alliance was early converted into a "grotesque money tree," in the words of Senator Frank Church, to enable U.S. corporations to buy up Latin American industries and to gouge the region's treasuries. (By the end of the 1960s, 99 percent of the Alliance's tied aid was being spent in the United States for products often costing 30 to 40 percent above the going world price.) Thanks to the Latin Americans' increasing dependence on aid from the United States, and a spectacular growth in the region's foreign debt, Washington was able to impose a model of "development," the principal features of which are control of Latin America's most dynamic export industries by American multinational corporations and a sharp reduction in the workers' real wages. The theory behind such "development" is that the people's standard of living must be temporarily sacrificed to the greater need to diversify exports.

Again, the model has been Brazil and its brief but much publicized "economic miracle." Within two years of the 1964 coup in Brazil,† foreign companies had gained control of 50 percent of the country's industry—often through the expedient of what the Brazilian Finance Ministry called "constructive bankruptcy," a combination of fiscal and monetary measures that forced local firms to sell to foreign interests or go bankrupt. Today, fourteen of the country's twenty-seven largest companies are in foreign hands; of the remainder, eight are state-owned and only five are private Brazilian firms. The overall picture for Latin America is much the same: 40 percent of the continent's manufactured exports are controlled by American companies, and half its exports and one-third of its imports are traded between American subsidiaries and parent companies.

Conceived as a means of destroying the continent's nascent guerrilla movements, which it did, the Pentagon's counterinsurgency training was also a necessary corollary of the model of development: only repressive military regimes could contain a situation in which the workers' wages progressively declined. Thousands of Latin American military officers were "instilled with a sense of U.S. priorities and policies," as an American Presidential committee proudly reported, and thus came to see themselves as the guardians of national security in a never-ending war between the West and Communism. National security was equated with preserving "profit and stability"; any attempt to change the status quo was judged subversive, "Communist." The military became an occupying army; its enemy, the people.

While some of these regimes have borrowed from European fascism—Brazil's labor code is an example—they lack the popular support accorded Hitler and Mussolini, being essentially satraps of Washington. (Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, the Brazilian military's chief ideologist, claims a satellite relationship with the United States is necessary because it is the dominant technological power in the region and the "keeper of the beacon for Western civilization.")

Today, eleven Latin American countries are ruled by such regimes. A few are preparing for transition to civil government, including Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, but the military will continue to exercise a veto over government policy, thereby nullifying any possibility of genuine reform. Even in those rare cases, such as Peru, where the military attempted some reforms in the early 1970s, American pressure, including economic "destabilization," forced the generals back into line.

Profits From the Poor

José Miguéz Bonino, Latin America's foremost Protestant theologian, charges that capitalism has been "able to 'buy off' its proletariat in the developed

*There have been sixty-nine cases of U.S. military intervention in Latin America since 1850.

†When a C.I.A. outlay of $20 million to opposition candidates in the 1962 state and Congressional elections failed to unseat Brazil's populist, left-of-center President, Joao Goulart, Washington actively encouraged a military putsch, even sending a naval task force to the South Atlantic to support the coup leaders.

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

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world by exploiting the 'external proletariat' of the Third World." This is obviously true of Latin America, which finances American industry through cheap labor and raw materials. For every dollar that U.S. companies invest in the region, three come back to the United States in profits, according to the Commerce Department. Latin America also is becoming a source of cheap food for American tables, with a dramatic upsurge in U.S. agribusiness and acquisitions, displacing tens of thousands of Latin American peasants, who have been forced to migrate to the already swollen city slums.

American cultural penetration has deepened with the growth in corporate activity. Approximately 80 percent of the films shown in Latin America, for example, are made in the United States. While the upper-class whites are no newcomers to acquisitive consumer habits, even the poorest, most isolated village has competing Coca-Cola and Pepsi signs. Although nonnutritious and more expensive, foreign-brand soft drinks are considered superior to the native fruit juice because they are associated with the "good life." A United Nations survey of the slums of Caracas revealed similar consumer habits, as imported, 24-inch color television set, for example, in a two-room, tin-and-cardboard shack with no running water or bathroom facilities and only dirt for a floor. When queried as to why they preferred such an expensive set when a smaller, black-and-white one would serve as well, the shack's inhabitants explained that the more expensive set was better because that was what the wealthy, white Venezuelans bought. Thus the capitalist claim that to have more is to be more persuades even the poorest sectors of society.

The problem, of course, is that there is increasingly less to go around, not with tawdry American-sponsored birth control programs. Statistics published by the United Nations and the Organization of American States show that in the past two decades the rich have gotten richer and the middle class poorer. The poor, that unregarded majority, have gotten nothing. Because of this "trickle-up" process, 50 percent of the region's 320 million people receive a mere 14 percent of its income. Some 207 million people in the six most populous countries earn less than $75 a year.

These statistics give the lie to "development." As the Alliance for Progress proved, a simultaneous increase in corporate profits *and* basic necessities for the people is impossible because the one precludes the other. The statistics also explain why there can be no long-range stability within a framework of imperialism. The civil war in Nicaragua and the recent spate of illegal labor strikes in Brazil are but two examples of the explosive frustrations boiling just beneath the surface.

What's Good for Business

Maurice Duverger, a professor of political science at the Sorbonne University, reflects the opinion of many European intellectuals when he says that "it is not possible to play with the principles you proclaim. While the United States enjoys a liberal democracy internally, its methods abroad are just the opposite: dictatorship, permanent repression, terror." Few Americans object to these methods because the capitalist accumulative urge is stronger than the democratic ethic. (Where else but in the United States would one hear the claim that God is a capitalist?) Hence the prevailing logic: what is good for business is good for the United States and therefore Latin America, even though such logic justifies military dictatorship.

The Latin Americans have long been accustomed to such double-think. Carter's human rights policy, for example, is viewed as the latest face lift for an ugly Uncle Sam, mainly at the behest of American corporations, which worry about the international image of their military partners, particularly their record of torture and assassination. No one can take Washington's claims seriously when the Government has yet to ratify thirty-four out of thirty-nine international human rights covenants. Only the Americans believe their own propaganda.

The source of the problem, at least as regards Latin America, is just that—propaganda based on an arrogant indifference to reality. As the State Department itself admits, American policy for Latin America has alternated between negligence and the imposition of U.S. priorities. No American in a position of power has ever attempted to find out what the Latin American masses want, and as long as corporate business directs Latin American policy, no one ever will. For the whole point of that policy is "to get away from it all," as the chairman of Abbott Laboratories admitted—away from Government restrictions and taxes, Congressional scrutiny, a free press and the labor unions of the internal democracy of the United States—in order to reap unlimited profits in the dictatorships south of the border. Latin America also is a profitable dumping ground for second-hand machinery and products outlawed or severely restricted in use in the United States, such as hazardous drugs and pesticides. (Among the latest exports: Tris-treated children's clothing, stocks of which were shipped to Latin America after the product was banned by the Federal Trade Commission because of possible cancer-causing effects.)

Like the "lesser" people of Latin America who have no history, the American proletariat has forgotten its origins, even though the Statue of Liberty reminds us of them. Thus the middle class believes the myths of the schoolbooks (i.e., millions remain convinced that the United States bought the Panama Canal in 1903). And it blames the poor migrants and those on welfare when there is an economic crunch—not the rich corporations, which are the source of the trouble. Americans do not inquire into the multinationals' business practices and large land acquisitions in Mexico, although they have contributed to the migration of some 2 million Mexican farm workers to the United States. Nor, when criticizing the welfare rolls, do they consider the welfare to multinationals—not only $2 billion-plus in annual tax write-offs but in a multitude of Government subsidy programs, including Washington's latest contributions to the I.M.F., which is designed to enable the fund to lend money to the developing countries to pay back loans that had been found not creditworthy by U.S. banks.

Progressive sectors in Latin America argue that the only way to change the region's economic and political structures is through education. Not book-learning (the books are distorted in any case), but consciousness-raising that will alter the poor people's fatalistic view of their lives. American intervention in Latin America will not cease so long as Americans do not change their perception of their society and its Government through similar consciousness-raising. One of the first issues that should be clarified is that people in other countries do not necessarily want to be Americans—they have their own culture, religion and way of doing things even in such colonial societies as Latin America. They also have a right to the food they produce and the products they make and their own choice of government. Democracy does not mean unlimited consumption or corporate growth; it means the right to participate. □

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COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA

Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia

GARETH PORTER

When Vietnamese troops rushed into an abandoned Phnom Penh last January and began the effort o pacify the Cambodian countryside, he Vietnamese revolutionaries found hemselves cast in the role that had beonged to Western imperialists in Indochina in the past. Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia poses the question of notivation and causation: was it the culmination of a Vietnamese ambition o dominate Indochina or the result of a political system that requires war? Or was it simply a response to an objective threat to Vietnamese security?

None of these explanations adequately explains the Cambodian invasion. A web of geopolitical realities, ideology and emotion surrounds the Vietnamese decision to intervene. Marxism-Leninism provided no more insurance against misperceiving the behavior of the other party in the conflict than traditional nationalism.

The Vietnamese fear of encirclement by China was a central element in Hanoi's intervention, as were the military provocations and unpopularity of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. But underlying the Vietnamese response to the crisis was the idealized conception of Indochina as three countries closely bound to one another and under Vietnamese tutelage. The idea that the political unity of the three countries was both a moral right and a geopolitical necessity had hardened over several decades into an ideological principle of central importance to Vietnamese leaders. Originating in a period of unequal relations between Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists, the idea was bound to provoke conflict when the relationship became one of independence and formal equality.

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Indochinese Unity

The idea of Indochinese unity was born with the Comintern decision to establish the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, making the Vietnamese Communists responsible for Laos and Cambodia as well. The justification was that all three countries faced the same enemy and that none could win independence separately from the other two. But Vietnamese responsibility for Indochina had obvious implications for the post-independence phase of the revolution as well, and the Vietnamese proposal for an "Indochinese Federation" of the three states once the French were defeated was the mechanism for insuring that all three developed according to the correct political line.

The principle of Indochinese unity coexisted with the principle of self-determination, which the Indochinese Communist Party leaders also professed. Throughout the early years the Vietnamese leaders tried to reconcile them, arguing in November 1939, for example, that alliance of the three peoples did not necessarily mean a single state but that the right of self-determination did not necessarily mean separation.

The anti-French resistance war, in which the three countries formed a single strategic theater, further reinforced the Vietnamese Communist belief in the necessity of Indochinese unity. When the Vietnamese decided in 1951 to form three separate parties so that the resistance forces in Laos and Cambodia would have more credibility as authentic anti-French nationalists, they did not intend to downgrade the principle of Indochinese unity. As Truong Chinh said in his 1951 speech on the formation of three parties, there would have to be "long-term cooperation after the resistance . . . in order to help one another on the road to people's democracy."

After the Geneva Conference, as the Vietnamese gave up their last organizational authority over Laotian and Cambodian Communists, they also insured that the three parties would maintain a common political line through consultations with the leaders of the Laotian and Cambodian parties, who, as faithful former members of the Indochinese Communist Party, adhered to the ideology of Indochinese unity. This process of coordination, in which the two smaller parties acknowledged the leading role of the Vietnamese in determining strategy for all of Indochina, was disrupted only by the rise of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to power in the Cambodian Party in 1963.

Vietnamese leaders regarded Pol Pot and Ieng Sary as "adventurist" and "immature" for advocating preparation for, and later carrying out, armed struggle against Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The Cambodian leaders, for their part, regarded the Vietnamese as "revisionist." Long before the second Indochina War ended, the ideological and strategic conflict with the Cambodian leadership posed a threat to the Vietnamese objective of Indochinese unity.

The more troubled relations between Vietnamese and Cambodian parties became, the more the Vietnamese turned to the relationship between Vietnamese and Laotian parties as a model of Indochinese unity. When the weak and vulnerable Laotian Communist Government came to power in December 1975, it asked the Vietnamese to station troops in Laos to help insure internal security against anti-Communist guerrillas. The Vietnamese regarded their military presence as a normal form of cooperation between stronger and weaker states required by Indochinese revolutionary solidarity. This cooperation was formalized by a treaty with Laos in July 1977, which the Vietnamese would cite as the expression of the "special relationship" between the two countries.

The Special Relationship

The term "special relationship" was first used publicly at the Fourth Party Congress of 1976 in reference to Vietnamese relations with both Laos and Cambodia. It was never explicitly defined, but as Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien explained in an interview with this author last November, it referred to the fact that the three countries "have a long history under the same colonialism," had the same enemy during the second Indochina War and now "must be close to each other, although each country is independent."

The Vietnam-Laos treaty of 1977 and the term "special relationship" were both implicit warnings to the Cambodian leadership not to stray too far from friendly relations with Vietnam. In fact, however, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary leadership was pursuing policies which put it on a collision course with the

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Vietnamese. Instead of relying on a Sihanouk-style diplomacy toward Vietnam, which combined cooperation and tough negotiating, the Pol Pot regime adopted a strategy of provocation for dealing with its Vietnamese problem.

The reason it did so appears in retrospect to have risen out of a determination to reverse the long historical decline of what had once been a proud and powerful Khmer empire. The objectives of the Cambodian revolution, as conceived by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group, included the elimination of the elements of softness, complacency and stagnation from Cambodian society and its transformation into a tough, disciplined and dynamic society capable of resisting the pressures from Vietnam which they believed inevitable.

The Cambodian leaders preferred to maintain a high level of tension with Vietnam in order to mobilize Cambodian defensive nationalism, to weaken those political elements within the Cambodian Party and Army who might prefer more cooperation with Vietnam, and to put the Vietnamese on notice that pressures on the new Cambodia would be unsuccessful. A July 1977 Resolution of the Party Committee for the Eastern Zone declared that the conflict with Vietnam was a "conflict which cannot be resolved" and said political means for dealing with the border problem had "the least chance of success."

The attitude of the Cambodian leaders was that negotiations with Vietnam would only show weakness. In the 1976 preliminary border talks, the Cambodian delegation demanded that the Vietnamese accept ten changes in the borders as they had been drawn by the French, and would accept no negotiation on the previously unsettled maritime boundary. When the Vietnamese refused to accept this take it or leave it Cambodian position, the Cambodians broke off the talks and refused to negotiate with Vietnam again.

Rejecting diplomacy as a method of dealing with the Vietnamese, Cambodia attempted to define the border unilaterally—a formula for endless military conflict and an invitation to intervention by a stronger neighbor. In April 1977, Cambodian forces launched major attacks on Vietnamese border posts in the areas Cambodia had claimed in the 1976 talks.

These military attacks took on even more ominous significance to the Vietnamese in the context of moves by Cambodia that suggested an emerging alignment with China. In August 1975, a Cambodian state delegation visiting China had agreed to a joint communiqué embracing the Chinese line on "contention for world hegemony between the superpowers." Cambodia thus appeared to commit itself to the Chinese side on an issue on which China would unsuccessfully pressure Vietnam the following month. In 1976, at the Colombo Conference of nonaligned nations, Cambodia refused to join Vietnam and Laos in condemning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a position which again aligned Cambodia with China against Vietnam.

The Chinese Threat

The closeness of Sino-Cambodian relations paralleled the deterioration of Vietnam's relations with China. In December 1976, according to a Vietnamese source, the Fourth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party passed a secret resolution identifying China as a long-term threat to Vietnam's independence. Phnom Penh's moves toward China and its hostility toward Vietnam thus appeared to the Vietnamese to be closely linked. A mid-1977 Vietnamese note to the Cambodian Central Committee hinted at this conclusion, the Vietnamese asking rhetorically if the attacks on Vietnam had been "perpetrated by a group, a faction of ill-intentioned persons, in an attempt to sabotage the traditions of solidarity and fraternal friendship binding our two parties and peoples."

The Vietnamese perception of Cambodian leaders as carrying on a border war with Vietnam at the behest of China was almost certainly mistaken. Regardless of Chinese interests in weakening Vietnam through Cambodia, the Pol Pot regime had its own reasons, albeit irrational ones, for its border attacks.

This Vietnamese conclusion was probably a sufficient basis for the Vietnamese to begin working actively for the overthrow of Pol Pot by supporting his opponents in Cambodia. But the deep division within the Cambodian Party and Army made such intervention appear both more feasible and more legitimate than would otherwise have been the case. Opposition to the domestic and foreign policies of the Pol Pot regime was not the result of Vietnamese manipulation but the legacy of past Vietnamese collaboration with Cambodian Communists. Recognition of the role of the Vietnamese Communists in the founding of the Cambodian Party, and the first resistance war was a political theme which the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group had not entirely suppressed, despite the purges carried out in 1973-74 against cadres who had been trained in North Vietnam after the anti-French resistance war. According to a Cambodian cadre who later fled to Vietnam, as late as September 1976—when the Cambodian Party's theoretical journal was claiming that the party was born in 1960 rather than 1951 and omitting any mention of earlier Vietnamese-Cambodian cooperation—the Cambodian Communist youth organ published a brief history of the party emphasizing the aid given to it by the Vietnamese.

Pol Pot's Tyranny

Against this background of conflicting attitudes within the party toward socialist Vietnam, a growing number of Cambodian cadres were alienated by the Pol Pot regime's postwar policies. Apart from the provocative policy toward Vietnam, the extraordinary pace of massive agricultural construction projects at great cost to the health of the population; the atmosphere of terror in the countryside, particularly among the 3 million former urban dwellers who were regarded as suspect by the "old people," and the rejection of all aid from countries other than China all contributed to the mounting dissatisfaction with the leadership among middle- and higher-ranking cadres in the army.

Tensions within the party and army were exacerbated still further by the massive new purge of those suspected of disloyalty, beginning in early 1977. Such a purge, in response to an anti-Government plot discovered in September 1976, was by its very nature impossible to control and undoubtedly hit cadres who were innocent or merely critical as well as those who had actually become disloyal to the regime.

Two consequences of the purge were crucial in the Vietnamese decision to intervene. First, an unsuccessful military uprising against the Pol Pot regime occurred in February 1977, right in the capital, and in March 1977 there was another near Siem Reap. A third occurred in August near Phnom Penh. These failed uprisings, in which the Vietnamese appear to have had no involvement, were probably regarded by the Vietnamese leaders as indicating an atmosphere that was ripe for rebellion against Phnom Penh.

Second, the number of political and military cadres who fled to Vietnam to avoid repression grew rapidly in 1977, augmenting the number which had fled the purges of 1973-74. The evidence of widespread hatred for the Pol Pot regime in the army and party and the large number of experienced cadres

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available in Vietnam to organize a movement against Pol Pot presented a powerful inducement to intervention.

Although it is not clear exactly when the decision was made, the Vietnamese were probably collaborating with Cambodian foes of Pol Pot in laying the groundwork for a political-military struggle to overthrow the regime before the June 1977 Vietnamese note quoted above. The "base area" for the new movement against the Pol Pot regime was to be Zone 203, comprising Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kompong Cham provinces. Secret cells were organized in the party and army, apparently with the help of certain high-ranking Cambodian cadres in the region who either had not been considered disloyal by Phnom Penh or who were simply too powerful to be purged.

Vietnamese strategy in late 1977 and early 1978 was to try to resolve the border war through a combination of diplomacy and military pressure, represented by the multi-division operation that lasted from November through January. At the same time, it backed a long-term Cambodian movement to overthrow Pol Pot.

Decision to Intervene

What happened, then, to push Hanoi to decide on direct military intervention in Cambodia? The timing of the decision, in June and July 1978, indicates that it was prompted by three major developments that occurred during the first half of 1978: the Vietnamese failure to achieve a border settlement, the political break between Vietnam and China and the collapse of the first major Vietnamese-backed uprising in Zone 203.

The Cambodian rejection of the February 1978 Vietnamese peace offer and subsequent attacks deep into Vietnamese territory in March and April 1978 eliminated the preferred strategic option and presented the Vietnamese with the threat of an unending border war with Cambodia. Such a war would continue to disrupt Vietnamese efforts at economic recovery by creating a wide belt of insecurity in the border provinces where a large proportion of new economic zones were located.

Moreover, the limited Chinese moves in January 1978 toward public support of Cambodia in the border war convinced Hanoi that the war was being waged by the Pol Pot regime with China's active collusion in order to harass and weaken Vietnam. Cambodia became, in the Vietnamese view, a "second front" in a war being waged by China against Vietnam.

The crisis over Cambodia was followed quickly by the beginning of China's campaign to draw attention to the alleged Vietnamese mistreatment of Hoa people. The Chinese campaign, which climaxed with the first public denunciation of Vietnam by Peking at the end of May, was taken by the Vietnamese as a signal that China was preparing its population and the rest of the world for an open break with Vietnam.

As the Chinese were denouncing Vietnam publicly, the opposition forces in Zone 203 staged their first major uprising after being surrounded by troops loyal to Phnom Penh. It was successfully broken up by Pol Pot's forces, and the survivors fled to Vietnam. That failure was a final blow to Vietnamese hopes for the development of an internal movement to overthrow Pol Pot.

The Vietnamese Party political bureau met repeatedly in June and early July to consider the twin crises in Vietnamese relations with Cambodia and China. The decisions reached at those meetings were never revealed publicly by Hanoi, but they almost certainly included the decisions to use military force to bring down the Pol Pot regime and to prepare for war with China.

Rift With China

The Vietnamese perception of Chinese intentions must be examined more closely to understand why Hanoi was not constrained from intervention in Cambodia by the possibility of Chinese retaliation. In 1975, before relations with China worsened, a Vietnamese official told an American delegation that the fear of "a more powerful nation" made it "compulsory" for Vietnam to respect Cambodian independence. But what had been a constraint in the context of a Sino-Vietnamese relationship that was still a mixture of cooperation and conflict became a provocation after relations between the two countries became extremely tense.

The Vietnamese leaders had long regarded China as having abandoned Marxism-Leninism in favor of traditional Han Dynasty chauvinism. Chinese efforts to nudge the Vietnamese toward Peking's anti-hegemony position were, in this view, pressures to force Vietnam to drop its independent line in international affairs.

China's decision to break openly with Vietnam could only mean one thing to the Vietnamese: that China would sooner or later directly threaten Vietnam. While the Vietnamese leaders must have realized that their military intervention in Cambodia would increase the chances of a Chinese invasion of Vietnam, they evidently felt that if the Chinese did attack, Cambodia would be the pretext rather than the real reason. It may also have occurred to them that it would be better to face a Chinese invasion at a time when China was still relatively weak militarily and economically than to face her later on, after the four modernizations had begun to take effect with the help of Western technology and capital.

The Vietnamese also decided in the June and July meetings to sign a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, which would contain a security consultation clause that might serve as a deterrent to Chinese attack. But in the final analysis, they knew Vietnam would have to face the possibility of a Chinese invasion, and they began to plan for a major military manpower buildup which was designed to cope with the Chinese military threat. At tremendous cost to the country's five-year plan for economic development, which had to be scrapped, the Vietnamese girded for possible war with China.

Another feature of the Cambodian situation weakened what would otherwise have been a constraint on Vietnamese behavior; the general view in Western countries that the Pol Pot regime was guilty of near-genocide. But for this political reality the Vietnamese would have feared the loss of the good will of governments and peoples whose trade, aid and political support Vietnam previously won as the victim of great power aggression. When even President Carter himself singled out the Pol Pot Government as the world's worst violator of human rights, the Vietnamese, while cynical about U.S. concern for human rights, must have calculated that a move to oust Pol Pot would not irreparably damage Vietnamese relations with the capitalist West.

But instead of seizing the opportunity to pose as the champion of the human rights of Cambodians, the Vietnamese chose to deny that their military personnel had anything more than a very marginal role in the liberation of Phnom Penh. Perhaps reflecting their habit of clandestinity in military affairs, the Vietnamese invoked the myth of a general uprising by the Cambodian people against the Pol Pot regime. That strategy prevented Vietnam from arguing its case before the world. It was locked into a posture of denial which could not be credible in the face of massive press coverage of the invasion and occupation.

The costs of the Vietnamese interven-

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tion are much greater than the Vietnamese leaders may wish to acknowledge. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which it triggered, resulted in the complete destruction of 370 villages and four provincial capitals. The Chinese claim of 50,000 Vietnamese casualties is not far from the truth, according to Soviet sources. Even more serious, the threat of Chinese invasion insured the militarization of Vietnamese society for as long as the conflict continues. Vietnam has taken virtually complete responsibility for the future of a country that has been in a state of war and upheaval for nearly a decade. It will be years before Cambodia returns to normal existence. In the meantime, there will continue to be suffering and death as a result of disease and hunger, and Cambodia will be an enormous drain on Vietnamese resources, even with Soviet assistance. Vietnamese troops will be tied down there and in Laos for years, while massive numbers of Vietnamese troops must remain on the alert in the North against another possible Chinese attack. Pinned down on three fronts, Vietnam is unlikely to resolve its critical economic problems, which require the concentration of manpower and economic resources on raising agricultural production.

Diplomatically, Vietnam has lost the opportunity for at least a critical time to normalize relations with the United States, which means the loss of needed trade and investments. Its relations with non-Communist neighbors have deteriorated as a direct result of the intervention to approximately where they were at the end of the Vietnam War. Dependence on Soviet military and economic support has required military concessions to the Soviets—the use of Da Nang air base by reconnaissance planes and Cam Ranh Bay by visiting Soviet submarines—which further imperil Vietnamese relations with non-Communist states, including Japan.

The question that the Cambodian intervention poses for socialist Vietnam is whether it can maintain the Indochinese unity it has always insisted was a vital interest in the setting of the present geopolitical conflict with China, without fatally weakening the revolution for which it sacrificed so much for so long. So far, the Vietnamese leadership appears to remain confident that it can resolve the contradictions between the heavy costs of Vietnam's Cambodian commitment and its own domestic needs, but the signs of great strain on its economic and political resources are already clear. □

Crossword Puzzle No. 1777

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Those who spend their years being afraid of tidbits? (7,6)
10 Such a noise in the city? Quite the reverse. (5)
11 Abandon one who abandons a fighter in North Africa. (6,3)
12 They make funny imitations—standard with such as Horace. (9)
13 Real upset, with the point being to obtain knowledge. (5)
14 One interpretation of the unicorn Scott created. (12)
19 It took a light rubber to make it work. (8,4)
22 A little street set back—you pass them on the way to learning. (5)
24 What does this break? The deuce you say! (9)
25 Entreat, in a way, to take in and consider. (9)
26 The route is changed to make a kind of space. (5)
27 Making things perfect by finishing people inside. (13)

DOWN

2 If so, you might appreciate 1 more. (6)
3 Baby bonnet almost? (Too late to wear one!) (9)
4 He used to get everything! (6,3)
5 Hears, as it were, records. (5)
6 It might describe an infection caught by certain Irishmen between five and fifty. (5)
7 Sounds like a cheer on the beginning of a visit—but it's very unusual. (4,4)
8 The condition of high command—at least in one phase. (5)
9 Those who throw the first rocks might be, on getting smart about it. (7)
15 Concerning the French Secretary's suitability? (9)
16 and 17 Sorties? (Misses having them occasionally.) (6-3,7)
18 Tot, perhaps—with a high voice. (8)
20 It might contain something like the automobile weight. (6)
21 Gives birth to animals. (5)
23 Bring up the components of old-fashioned punishment. (5)
24 Wide-eyed with what Pat might expect after death? (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1776

ACROSS: 9 Impersonal; 10 Wear; 11 and 25 The state of the Union; 12 and 1 Tom, Tom, the Piper's Son; 13 Essen; 15 Shinnied; 16 Object to; 19 Grain; 21 Aghast; 22 Inasmuch; 24 Fret; 26 Disaster area. DOWN: 2 Humphrey Bogart; 3 Presses; 4 Pasta; 5 Runner; 6 Splitting; 7 Newsmen; 8 Napoleonic Code; 14 Notations; 17 Enacted; 18 Opiates; 20 Ammonia; 23 Adele.

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

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